R.I. Bar Ass'n v. Auto. Serv. Ass'n
Decision Date | 09 May 1935 |
Docket Number | No. 623.,623. |
Citation | 179 A. 139 |
Parties | RHODE ISLAND BAR ASS'N et al. v. AUTOMOBILE SERVICE ASS'N et al. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Petition by Judah C. Semonoff and others, on their own behalf and on behalf of the Rhode Island Bar Association, against Francis J. Loughlin and others, doing business under the name and style of the Automobile Service Association, otherwise known as "A. S. A.," and another, to adjudge respondents in contempt of court for illegal practice of law.
Decree to be entered in accordance with opinion.
Clarence N. Woolley, of Pawtucket, and Judah C. Semonoff, Patrick H. Quinn, Paul %%%R. McIntyre, and Henry B. Gardner, Jr., all of Providence, for petitioners.
Edward W. Morris, of Providence, for respondents.
This is a petition brought by Judah C. Semonoff, James A. Higgins, and Eugene L. Jalbert, members of the bar of this state and duly qualified members of the committee on the Illegal Practice of the Law of the Rhode Island Bar Association, on their own behalf and on behalf of said bar association, a voluntary association, against Francis J. Loughlin, John F. Phillips, and James Conaty, doing business under the name and style of Automobile Service Association, otherwise known as "A. S. A.," and Edward W. Morris, Esq., a member of the bar of this state, to adjudge said respondents in contempt of the authority of this court for illegal practice of the law.
It appears from the allegations in the petition and the testimony given before us that the respondents have performed and hold themselves out to perform the following services:
The lay respondents admit they have performed such services, but deny that the manner in which they have been performed through their attorney, respondent Morris, constitutes the practice of law by them, and pray that this court define by its decree what is the practice of law.
The practice of law is difficult to define. Perhaps it does not admit of exact definition. Whether or not it can be reduced to definition is not important to the decision of the matter before us at this time. "Definition, simple, positive, hard and fast as it is, never tells the whole truth about a conception," said the American philosopher, Josiah Royce, and we adopt that view in refraining from any attempt at definition here. That the practice of the law is a special field reserved to lawyers duly licensed by the court, no one denies. The lay respondents admit this, but claim that the acts performed by them lie without the boundaries of that field. They support this contention by citing section 44 of chapter 401 "Of Offenses Against Public Policy," G. L. 1923, which reads as follows:
They say they have not violated this statute, but if they have, then there is a remedy for their offense in the criminal court and, therefore, there is no need for this contempt proceeding. They assume that the act of the General Assembly defines for all purposes the practice of the law and takes the matter out of the control and supervision of this court. That is not so. The section cited does not comprehend all the many and varied acts which may be done within the practice of the law, nor do sections 45, 46, and 47 of the same chapter which set out other acts constituting, in the opinion of the Legislature, illegal and unauthorized practice of the law, and make them punishable by fine or imprisonment. They merely enumerate some of them and prescribe a penalty for the performance of any of them by unauthorized persons. If, however, they did include all possible acts, it would not impair or restrict the power of this court over the practice of the law. Indeed all of these sections, since the bringing of these proceedings, have been extensively and somewhat comprehensively amended and amplified by the General Assembly at its January session by chapter 2190 of the Public Laws 1935. Yet the power of the court to regulate and control the practice of the law remains where it has always been, notwithstanding the exercise by the General Assembly of its undoubted power to declare acts of unauthorized practice of the law illegal and punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both. We hold that the enactment of chapter 401, section 44, and also sections 45, 46, and 47, was in aid of the authority of this court in the regulation and control of the practice of the law, and not subversive of it.
It may be pointed out here that the same act of a person may constitute a violation of the criminal law and also may constitute such a violation of his equitable duties towards others as to justify the use of the equity powers of the court, notwithstanding the punishability of his conduct as a crime. It has been urged that this would be using the equity powers of the court to punish crime, but this objection has been held untenable. The rule is now well established that the two jurisdictions are separate and distinct, but may apply to the same conduct. In like manner, unauthorized practice of the law may constitute a violation of the criminal law and be punishable as such, and yet may constitute at the same time a contempt of the authority of the court which may be forbidden by injunction. Fitchette v. Taylor, 191 Minn. 582, 254 N. W. 910, 911, 94 A. L. R. 356, and note at page 363. We think the same reasoning is applicable in this contempt proceeding in which petitioners were granted a restraining order during the pendency of the petition.
It is not necessary, in order to sustain the power of the court, to hold that the Legislature cannot also act to prevent the evils to the public that inevitably arise from unauthorized practice of the law. In the exercise of the police power it undoubtedly can legislate in this matter. The statute, therefore, cannot avail these respondents if their admitted acts are within the field of practice of the law. Stripped of all extraneous issues, that is the real question before us in this proceeding. If the acts complained of by the petitioners, and admitted by the respondents, are found to amount to the practice of law, then summary action will be in order as prayed for by the petitioners.
While a proceeding to adjudge in contempt for unauthorized practice of the law does not appear to have been brought heretofore in this state, we are nevertheless satisfied that it is a proper proceeding. It has...
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