Freeform Pools, Inc. v. Strawbridge Home for Boys, Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 April 1962
• Docket Number: No. 199,199
• Parties: , 95 A.L.R.2d 1365 FREEFORM POOLS, INCORPORATED v. STRAWBRIDGE HOME FOR BOYS, INC., et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 297

228 Md. 297

179 A.2d 683, 95 A.L.R.2d 1365

FREEFORM POOLS, INCORPORATED v. STRAWBRIDGE HOME FOR BOYS, INC., et al.

No. 199.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 12, 1962.

M. Peter Moser, Baltimore (Lloyd M. Gerber, Lawrence I. Weisman and Nyburg, Goldman & Walter, Baltimore, and Arnold Fleischmann, Towson, on the brief), for appellant.

Donald M. Smith, Westinster (A. Earl Shipley, Westminster, and T. Lyde Mason, Jr., Towson, on the brief for Strawbridge Home for Boys, Inc.), for appellees.

Before HENDERSON, PRESCOTT, HORNEY, MARBURY and SYBERT, JJ.

MARBURY, Judge.

The appellant, plaintiff below, appeals from an order of the Circuit Court for Carroll County sustaining without leave to amend the demurrer of defendant, Strawbridge Home for Boys, Inc. (Strawbridge), to plaintiff's bill of complaint to enforce a mechanics' lien or to impose an equitable lien on defendant's property for work performed and materials used to construct a swimming pool, fence, concrete deck, and other appurtenant structures. The facts, well pleaded in the bill of complaint, and exhibits filed therewith, which are admitted as true for the purposes of this demurrer, are as follows:

The appellant, (Freeform), is a contractor engaged in the building of swimming pools, as well as other buildings and structures required in connection therewith, such as bathhouses, concrete walkways, fences, filter systems, and filter houses. Strawbridge was the record owner of legal title to a tract of land consisting of about 318 acres, on which Freeform seeks to enforce a lien.

Prior to March 28, 1960, Strawbridge entered into a contract of sale by which Carrollton Farms, Inc. (Farms) purchased that tract of land, and subsequently Farms entered into a contract with Carrollton Golf and Country Club, Inc. (Country Club) by which County Club purchased part of that land. With the knowledge and acquiescence of Strawbridge, Farms and Country Club thereafter advertised and held themselves out to be the legal owners of the tract and its developers as a country club, although Farms and Country Club were only the equitable owners of the tract.

In March of that year, with the knowledge, acquiescence, and participation of Strawbridge, Country Club, representing that it was the legal owner of the tract, commenced negotiations with Freeform for the construction of a swimming pool and other structures on the tract, as the result of which a contract was executed on March 28, 1960. By it Freeform agreed with Country Club, as owner of the tract, to build a pool, fence, and concrete deck for a total sum of $43,000.

In May 1960, Freeform, in reliance upon the ownership representations made by Country Club and Farms, began to build the swimming pool. From then until active construction ceased about May 31, 1960, Freeform expended its money, labor, and materials for that purpose, including overhead and profit pursuant to the contract, to its damage in the amount of $15,862.25 in excess of the $8,000 paid Freeform by Country Club on account of the contract. On August 15, 1960 Country Club and Farms defaulted on the contract to purchase the tract.

On November 16, 1960, Freeform recorded a mechanics' lien, for work done and materials and equipment furnished on said tract of land at the instance and request of Country Club and Farms with Strawbridge's knowledge and acquiescence, but the lien has not been paid, and Freeform claims it is entitled to a decree for the enforcement thereof.

In its opinion the lower court stated as its only reason for sustaining the demurrer that a mechanics' lien exists 'only by virtue of the statute' and there can be no lien for anything that does not fall within the statutory provision, and further, that in its, opinion a mechanics' lien 'cannot be obtained for the construction of a swimming pool.'

As we read the record there are only two questions presented which are necessary to the decision in this case. They are: I, is a swimming pool a lienable item within the mechanics' lien law, and II, under the allegations of the bill of complaint, supported by the exhibits filed therewith, could the appellant be entitled to an equitable lien?

I

Code (1957), Article 63, § 1, the mechanics' lien law, provides in pertinent part as follows:

'Every building erected and every building * * * improved to the extent of one-fourth its value * * * shall be subject to a lien for the payment of all debts contracted for work done for or about the same, and for materials furnished for or about the same, including the drilling and installation of wells for the purpose of supplying water, the sodding, seeding or planting in or about the premises, of any shrubs, trees, plants, flowers or nursery products of any kind or description and the grading, filling, and landscaping thereon.' (Emphasis supplied.)

It is the contention of the appellant that the swimming pool under construction was a 'building' or at least an 'improvement' to a building so as to come within the meaning of the words 'building' and 'building improved' as used in the statute.

While it is true that under the mechanics' lien law, supra, § 32, the law is remedial and under the decisions of this Court is to be construed in the most liberal and comprehensive manner in favor of mechanics and materialmen, Reisterstown Lumber Co. v. Reeder, 224 Md. 499, 507, 168 A.2d 385, and cases there cited, Courts have no power to extend it to cases, beyond the obvious designs and plain requirements of the statute. Basshor v. Baltimore & O. R. R. Co., 65 Md. 99, 103, 3 A. 285. A mechanics' lien is a claim created by statute and is obtainable only if the requirements of the statute are complied with. Adkins & Douglas Co. v. Webb, 160 Md. 571, 154 A. 259, and cases collected in 15 M.L.E., Mechanics' Liens, §§ 1, 2, and 3. There is no definition in the mechanics' lien law of the word 'building.' Taken in its broadest sense it can mean only an erection intended for use...