People v. Bonier

• Decision Date: 15 November 1904
• Citation: 179 N.Y. 315,72 N.E. 226
• Parties: PEOPLE v. BONIER.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

179 N.Y. 315

72 N.E. 226

PEOPLE

v.BONIER.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 15, 1904.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Trial Term, Erle County.

Charles Bonier was convieted of murder in the first degree, and appeals. Reversed.

Phillp v. Fennelly, for appellant.

Edward E. Coatsworth, Dist. Atty. (Frank A. Abbott, of counsel), for the People.

VANN, J.

On the 16th of January, 1904, the defendant was convieted upon an indictment found December 22, 1903, charging him with the crime of murder in the first degree, committed in the city of Burfalo on the 20th of November, 1903, by taking the life of one Franz Freher, with willful and deliberate purpose.

The evidence against the defendant was wholly eireumstantial, but it tended strongly to establish his guilt, and clearly warranted the submission of the case to the jury. A careful review of the testimony has led us to the conclusion that the verdict was not against the weight of evidence, and that it should not be disturbed, unless some error, duly raised by exception, was committed, during the trial, of such a nature as to give rise to the presumption that the defendant suffered prejudice therefrom.

Evldence was given by witnesses called in behalf of the defendant tending to show that his general reputation from the speech of people, in the community where he had lived for many years, was good, and that they had never heard anything against him. No evidence was given in behalf of the people in relation to his reputation or character. In charging the jury upon this subject, the court said: ‘You will take into account the evidence of these two witnesses who testified in behalf of the defendant with reference to his character. They said they had known him, one of them eight months or nine months, and made an investigation of his character and standing, or his reputation perhaps would be better, and, so far as he learned, it was good. and he so reported. The other gentleman had known him some time, and, so far as he knew, his reputation was good. You have a right to take that into account. He was at liberty to swear six witnesses. He was under no obligation to do so, but he might have done so. It is proper for you to take into account the fact that these witnesseshave testitied that he was a person of good reputation in the community where he lived, for the purpose of diserediting the weight and probability of the cireumstances sought to be established. and, in addition, to create a probability of innocence. No matter what his standing might have been in the community where he lived in the past, he might yet be guilty. So you will observe it is proper to be taken into account by you as bearing upon the probabllity as to whether or not he is guilty of the crime charged in the indictment.’ The court had previously charged upon the subject of reasonable doubt that: ‘It is for the people to prove that the defendant committed the crime, and prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. The case made to conviet beyond a reasonable doubt need not be so conclusive as to repel all other possible conclusions. There might be some possible doubt about any given statement of facts, but it is such a doubt as a reasonable man would have with respect to the truth of a fact. That is what is meant by a reasonable doubt. Not that the evidence must be conclnsive and absolute beyond peradventure, but that it is reasonably established and that, therefore, there is no reasonable doubt about it.’

The following extract from the record sets forth three consecutive requests to charge presented by the counsel for defendant, the action of the court thereon, and an exception taken to the final ruling: ‘Mr. Murphy: I ask your honor to charge that, in the absence of any testimony upon the subject of character, the presumption is that the defendant's character is good. The Court: That is true. Mr. Murphy: I ask your honor to charge that there is testimony in this case, and that if the jury believe it-believe the testimony of these witnesses upon the subject of the defendant's character-that that is proof conclusive of good character. The Court: Yes, on that subject I should think so. I will charge it. Mr. Murphy: Now, I ask your honor to charge the jury that the presumption which arises as to the defendant's good character, both from the failure to attack it and from the testimony given, may of itself be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. The Court: That I deny. The jury should consider the evidence of good character for the purposes mentioned. Mr. Murphy: I except.’

The execption thus taken raises the only serious question that we have before us for consideration. The law as to the weight which a jury may give to evidence showing that the accused was a person of good repute is so well settled in this state that counsel do not seriously differ as to what the law is, but they differ widely as to whether it was complied with by the court in this case. We will refer to a few of the authorities and to the reasoning of learned judges in laying down the rule, so that the foundation and force thereof may be understood, before we attempt to apply it to the case in hand.

In an early case upon the trial of an indictment for murder, the court ‘in connection with many just observations as to the importance and effect of proof of good character, * * * stated to the jury that, where the question was one of great and atrocious criminallty. evidence of good character, and of a man's habitual conduct under common circumstances, must be considered far inferior to what it is in the instances of accusations of a lower grade; but still. even with regard to the higher crimes, testimony of good character, though of less avall, was competent.’ The judgment was reversed because the charge tended to control the woight of the evidence and was calculated to mislead the jury as to the effect which it might recelve. The court said: ‘The principle upon which good character may be proved is that it affords a presumption against the commission of orime. This presumption arises from the improbability, as a general rule, as proved by common observation and experience, that a person wo has uniformly pursued as honest and upright course of conduct will depart from it and do an act so inconsistent with it. Such a person may be overcome by temptation and fall into crime, and cases of that kind often occur, but they are exceptions; the general rule is otherwise. The influence of this presumption from character will necessarily vary according to the varying circumstances of different cases. It must be slight when the accusation of crime is supported by the direct and positive testimony of credible witnesses; and it will seldom avail to control the mind in cases where the testimony, though circumstantial, is reliable, strong, and clear. But in cases where the other evidence is nearly balanced, but slightly preponderating against the defendant, the presumption from proof of good character is entitled to great weight, and will often be sufficient to turn the scale and produce an acquittal. I am unable to perceive why this presumption may not, and should not, as a general rule, be as controlling in cases of high crimes as in those of smaller ones. In a case of murder, arson, robbery, or any other great offense, when it is apparent that it must have been planned and committed with great deliberation, and the evidence against the accused is uncertain, why should not proof of good character influence the judgment as powerfully as in an case? I can readily see that in cases of great crimes, evidently perpetrated with but little if any forethought, under the influence of some sudden and powerful motive, such proof will be comparatively weak, but it will be so in reference to any other crime with similar circumstances. The attending circumstances must. I think, determine the degree of force which evidence of good character should have; it is not in ordinary cases affected by the grade of the offense.’ Cancemi v. People, 16 N. Y. 501, 506.

In a later case, where the...