Daley v. LaCroix

• Decision Date: 22 September 1970
• Docket Number: No. 18,18
• Parties: Estelle DALEY, Timothy Daley, by his next friend, Leonard H. Daley, and Leonard H. Daley, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Charles LaCROIX, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 390

179 N.W.2d 390

384 Mich. 4

Estelle DALEY, Timothy Daley, by his next friend, Leonard H.

Daley, and Leonard H. Daley, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Charles LaCROIX, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 18.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Sept. 22, 1970.

Soma, Oster & Hoste, by Craigen J. Oster and Jacob M. Femminineo, Mount Clemens, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Arthur W. Mitchell, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

Before the Entire Bench.

T. M. KAVANAGH, Judge.

This appeal presents as a threshold question an issue which conceptually, though not decisionally, equally divided our Court in Manie v. Matson Oldsmobile-Cadillac Company (1967), 378 Mich. 650, 148 N.W.2d 779, Viz., whether the 'impact' rule in emotional distress has any continued vitality in the Michigan civil jurisprudence.

On July 16, 1963, about 10:00 p.m., defendant was traveling west on 15 Mile Road near plaintiffs' farm in Macomb county. Defendant's vehicle left the highway, traveled 63 feet in the air and 209 feet beyond the edge of the road and, in the process, sheared off a utility pole. A number of high voltage lines snapped, striking the electrical lines leading into plaintiffs' house and caused a great electrical explosion resulting in considerable property damage.

Plaintiffs claimed, in addition to property damage, that Estelle Daley suffered traumatic neurosis, emotional disturbance and nervous upset, and that Timothy Daley suffered emotional disturbance and nervousness as a result of the explosion and the attendant circumstances.

The case was tried to a jury in Macomb county circuit court. At the conclusion of plaintiffs' proofs, on motion of defendant, the trial judge directed a verdict against Timothy Daley in that no proper evidence of a personal injury to him had been presented, and against Estelle Daley in that she had failed to prove a causal relationship between the accident and her claimed personal injury. In the Leonard H. Daley action he directed the jury to disregard any proof of hospital expenses paid by plaintiff on behalf of Timothy and Estelle. The jury returned a judgment in favor of Leonard H. Daley for property damage in the amount of $2,015.20.

The Court of Appeals (13 Mich.App. 26, 163 N.W.2d 666) affirmed the trial court's grant of a directed verdict upon the ground that Michigan law denies recovery for negligently caused emotional disturbance absent a showing of physical impact, citing Nelson v. Crawford (1899), 12 Mich. 466, 81 N.W. 335; Ellsworth v. Massacar (1921), 215 Mich. 511, 184 N.W. 408; ¹ Alexander v. Pacholek (1923), 222 Mich. 157, 192 N.W. 652; Manie v. Matson Oldsmobile-Cadillac Company (1966), 2 Mich.App. 315, 139 N.W.2d 776.

Leave to appeal to this Court was granted. 381 Mich. 805.

Recovery for mental disturbance caused by defendant's negligence, but without accompanying physical injury or physical consequences or any independent basis for tort liability, has been generally denied with the notable exception of the Sui generis cases involving telegraphic companies and negligent mishandling of corpses. See 23 A.L.R. 361; 64 A.L.R.2d 100, § 7; see, also 2 Restatement, Torts (Second), § 436A; 1 Cooley, Torts (4th Ed.) pp. 95--102.

On the other hand the law had always permitted recovery in closely analogous situations notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff's mental or emotional reactions were a necessary element in the chain of causation. See 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, §§ 78--80, pp. 737--739. Also, compensation for a purely mental component of damages where defendant negligently inflicts an Immediate physical injury has always been awarded as 'parasitic damages.' See 1 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, 461; 1 Cooley, Torts (4th Ed.), p. 107; 2 Harper & James, Torts, § 18.4, p. 1032; Prosser, Supra, at p. 349. See, also, 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, § 195 et seq., discussed Infra.

Where, however, a mental disturbance results immediately in physical injury, the authorities divide. ² The early judicial response to this problem was to deny recovery based upon several grounds:

'The same objections against allowing recovery have been advanced: it is said that mental disturbance cannot be measured in terms of money, and so cannot serve in itself as a basis for the action; that its physical consequences are too remote, and so not 'proximately caused;' that there is a lack of precedent, and that a vast increase in litigation would follow.' (Prosser, Torts (3d Ed.), § 55, p. 346)

These objections, however, could not withstand close scrutiny and the courts began pointing out the logical invalidity of these reasons and repudiating the decisions resting upon such reasoning. ³ The final bastion against allowing recovery is the requirement of some impact upon the person of the plaintiff. It is this doctrine and its continued vitality in our State ⁴ which we must now consider.

In the landmark decision of Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas (1888), 13 A.C. 222, recovery for a much disputed damage to plaintiff's nervous system caused by defendant's oncoming train was denied upon the ground that:

'Damages arising from mere sudden terror unaccompanied by any actual physical injury, but occasioning a nervous or mental shock, cannot under such circumstances, their Lordships think, be considered a consequence which, in the ordinary course of things, would flow from the negligence of the gate-keeper. If it were held that they can, it appears to their Lordships that it would be extending the liability for negligence much beyond what that liability has hitherto been held to be. Not only in such a case as the present, but in every case where an accident caused by negligence had given a person a serious nervous shock, there might be a claim for damages on account of mental injury. The difficulty which now often exists in case of alleged physical injuries of determining whether they were caused by the negligent act would be greatly increased, and a wide field opened for imaginary claims.'

As a further hedge against fraudulent or fancied claims and the feared flood of litigation, ⁵ a large number of American courts in adopting the Victorian Railways Commissioners rule superimposed ⁶ the additional requirement of a contemporaneous physical impact. The leading American authority of Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co. (1896), 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354, with 'remorseless logic' ⁷ stated the position as follows (pp. 109, 110, 45 N.E. p. 354):

'Assuming that fright cannot form the basis of an action, it is obvious that no recovery can be had for injuries resulting therefrom. That the result may be nervous disease, blindness, insanity, or even a miscarriage, in no way changes the principle. These results merely show the degree of fright, or the extent of the damages. * * * Therefore the logical result of the respondent's concession would seem to be, not only that no recovery can be had for mere fright, but also that none can be had for injuries which are the direct consequences of it. * * * These considerations lead to the conclusion that no recovery can be had for injuries sustained by fright occasioned by the negligence of another, where there is no immediate personal injury.'

Persuaded by 'the clear weight of authority' our Court in Nelson v. Crawford (1899), 122 Mich. 466, 81 N.W. 335, and has consistently to date, cited with approval and followed the rule of Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., Supra.

The life of the law, however, has not been logic but experience. ⁸ Bowing to the onslaught of exceptions ⁹ and the growing irreconcilability between legal fact and and decretal fiction, ¹⁰ a rapidly increasing majority of courts have repudiated the 'requirement of impact' and have regarded the physical consequences themselves or the circumstances of the accident as sufficient guarantee. ¹¹

Pertinently, the New York Court of Appeals in Battalla v. State (1961), 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729, expressly overruled its Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., decision, Supra, observing at p. 239, 219 N.Y.S.2d at p. 36, 176 N.E.2d at p. 730:

'Before passing to a resume of the evolution of the doctrine in this State it is well to note that it has been thoroughly repudiated by the English courts which initiated it, rejected by a majority of American jurisdictions, abandoned by many which originally adopted it, and diluted, through numerous exceptions, in the minority which retained it. Moreover, it is the opinion of the scholars that The right to bring an action should be enforced.'

Based upon close scrutiny of our precedential cases and the authority upon which they rested and cognizant of the changed circumstances relating to the factual and scientific information available, ¹² we conclude that the 'impact' requirement of the common law should not have a continuing effect in Michigan and we therefore overrule the principle to the contrary contained in our previous cases.

We hold that where a definite and objective physical injury is produced as a result of emotional distress proximately caused by defendant's negligent conduct, the plaintiff in a properly pleaded and proved action may recover in damages for such physical consequences to himself notwithstanding the absence of any physical impact upon plaintiff at the time of the mental shock. ¹³

The rule we adopt today is, of course, subject to familiar limitations.

Generally, defendant's standard of conduct is measured by reactions to be expected of normal persons. Absent specific knowledge of plaintiff's unusual sensitivity, there should be no recovery for hypersensitive mental disturbance where a normal individual would not be affected under the circumstances. See Prosser, Supra, at p. 352; see, also, Harper & James, Supra, at p. 1035. As stated in comment c, Restatement, Torts (Second), § 313, at p. 114:

'On the other hand, one who unintentionally but negligently subjects another to such an emotional distress does not take the risk of any exceptional physical...