Daniel Wiley v. Sinkler, 2

• Citation: 21 S.Ct. 17,45 L.Ed. 84,179 U.S. 58
• Decision Date: 11 October 1898
• Docket Number: No. 2,2
• Parties: DANIEL WILEY, Plff. in Err. , v. D. L. SINKLER, T. D. Lanigan, and Benjamin Elfe
• Court: United States Supreme Court

179 U.S. 58

21 S.Ct. 17

45 L.Ed. 84

DANIEL WILEY, Plff. in Err.,

v D. L. SINKLER, T. D. Lanigan, and Benjamin Elfe.

No. 2.

Submitted October 11, 1898.

Ordered for oral argument October 24, 1898.

Argued December 8, 1899.

Decided October 15, 1900.

This was an action brought March 11, 1895, in the circuit court of the United States for the district of South Carolina, by a resident of the city of Charleston in that state, against the board of managers of a general election at a ward and precinct in that city, to recover damages in the sum of $2,500 for wrongfully and wilfully rejecting his vote for a member of the House of Representatives of the United States for the state of South Carolina on November 6, 1894. The allegations of the complaint were as follows:

'I. That the plaintiff is and was on the 6th day of November, 1894, a resident of the city and county of Charleston, in the state of South Carolina; and that he had been a resident of said state for a period of more than twelve months next preceding said 6th day of November, 1894, and a resident of said city and county for more than sixty days next preceding said day; and that under the Constitution and laws of the said state of South Carolina and the Constitution and laws of the United States the said plaintiff is, and was at the time aforesaid, twenty-one years of age, and is and was in every other respect a duly qualified elector of said state, and is and was on the said 6th day of November, 1894, entitled to vote for a member of the House of Representatives of the United States from said state of South Carolina.

'II. That the defendants were on the day and year aforesaid the board of managers of the Federal election, at the first election precinct in the sixth ward of said city of Charleston, in said county and state; that, as the plaintiff has been informed and believes, the said defendants were duly appointed and qualified as such managers; and that they were present at the polling place in the said election precinct on the said 6th day of November, 1894, and during all the time the polls were opened on said day were there, acting as such board of managers of the Federal election.

'III. That the proper election precinct at which the said plaintiff was entitled to vote is the said first precinct in the sixth ward of the city and county of Charleston, in the state aforesaid; and that on the said 6th day of November, 1894, and while the polls were open for voting purposes, the said plaintiff presented himself at the polling place in said election precinct, and then and there offered to vote and cast his ballot for one of the candidates for the office of member of the House of Representatives of the United States for the state of South Carolina in the Fifty-fourth Congress; and the plaintiff further avers that he then and there had ready the proof of his qualifications as such Federal elector as aforesaid.

'IV. That the said defendants unlawfully, wilfully, and injuriously refused to permit the said plaintiff to vote at said precinct and at said Federal election which was there held according to law, on said 6th day of November, 1894, for one of the candidates for member of said House of Representatives of the United States for the state aforesaid; and wrongfully and wilfully, and without any lawful cause or excuse, rejected the plaintiff's said vote; to his damage $2,500.

'Wherefore the plaintiff demands judgment against the defendants for the said sum of $2,500, and for the costs of this action.'

The defendants demurred to the complaint upon the following grounds:

First. That the court had no jurisdiction of the action, because it did not affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint that a Federal question was involved; and because it appeared on the face of the complaint that a verdict for $2,000 would be so excessive that the court would be required to set it aside.

Second. That the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, because, by § 2008 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, an action must be brought for a penalty, and not for damages; and because the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, either under that statute, or at common law.

The court, without considering the other grounds, sustained the demurrer and dismissed the complaint because it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, in that it failed to state that the plaintiff was a duly registered voter of the state of South Carolina. The plaintiff sued out a writ of error from this court.

The material parts of the Constitution and laws of South Carolina, referred to in argument, are stated in the margin.

Mr. Charles A. Douglass for plaintiff in error.

Mr. W. A. Barber for defendants in error.

Mr. Justice Gray, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court:

This case involves the construction and application of the Constitution of the United States, and is therefore rightly brought directly from the circuit court of the United States to this court, under the act of March 3, 1891, chap. 517, § 5, cl. 4 (26 Stat. at L. 828).

The right to vote for members of the Congress of the United States is not derived merely from the Constitution and laws of the state in which they are chosen, but has its foundation in the Constitution of the United States.

This is clearly and amply set forth in Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 28 L. ed. 274, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 152, in which this court, speaking by Mr. Justice Miller, upheld a conviction in a circuit court of the United States under §§ 5508 and 5520 of the Revised Statutes for a conspiracy to intimidate a citizen of the United States in the exercise of his right to vote for a member of Congress, and answered the proposition 'that the right to vote for a member of Congress is not dependent upon the Constitution or laws of the United States, but is governed by the law of each state respectively,' as follows:

'But it is not correct to say that the right to vote for a member of Congress does not depend on the Constitution of the United States. The office, if it be properly called an office, is created by that Constitution, and by that alone. It also declares how it shall be filled, namely, by election. Its language is: 'The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several states, and the electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature.' Art. 1, § 2. The states, in prescribing the qualifications of voters for the most numerous branch of their own legislatures, do not do this with reference to the election for members of Congress. Nor can they prescribe the qualification for voters for those eo nomine. They define who are to vote for the popular branch of their own legislature, and the Constitution of the United States says the same persons shall vote for members of Congress in that state. It adopts the qualification thus furnished as the qualification of its own electors for members of Congress. It is not true, therefore, that electors for members of Congress own their right to vote to the state law in any sense which makes the exercise of the right to depend exclusively on the law of the state.' 110 U. S. 663, 28 L. ed. 278, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 152.

The court then, referring to the statement of Chief Justice Waite in Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 178, 22 L. ed. 627, 631, that 'the Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one,' explained that statement as follows: 'But the court was combating the argument that this right was conferred on all citizens, and therefore upon women as well as men. In opposition to that idea, it was said the Constitution adopts as the qualification of voters for members of Congress, that which prevails in the state where the voting is to be done; therefore, said the opinion, the right is not definitely conferred on any person or class of persons by the Constitution alone, because you have to look to the law of the state for the description of the class. But the court did not intend to say that, when the class or the person is thus ascertained, his right to vote for a member of Congress was not fundamentally based upon the Constitution, which created the office of member of Congress, and declared it should be elective, and pointed to the means of ascertaining who should be electors.' 110 U. S. 664, 28 L. ed. 278, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 152.

The circuit court of the United States has jurisdiction, concurrent with the courts of the state, of any action under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, in which the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of $2,000. Act of August 13, 1888, chap. 866 (25 Stat. at L. 433).

This action is brought against election officers to recover damages for their rejection of the plaintiff's vote for a member of the House of Representatives of the United States. The complaint, by alleging that the plaintiff was at the time, under the Constitution and laws of the state of South Carolina and the Constitution and laws of the United States, a duly qualified elector of the state, shows that the action is brought under the Constitution and laws of the United States.

The damages are laid at the sum of $2,500. What amount of damages the plaintiff shall recover in such an action is peculiarly appropriate for the determination of a jury, and no opinion of the court upon that subject can justify it in holding that the amount in controversy was insufficient to support the jurisdiction of the circuit court. Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U. S. 550, 29 L. ed. 729, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 501; Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 89, 41 L. ed. 632, 638, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265; Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co. 170 U. S. 468, 472, 42 L. ed. 1111, 1112, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 674; North American Transp. & Trading Co. v....