Stevens v. Moore Business Forms, Inc.
| Decision Date | 25 February 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-55936,92-55936 |
| Parties | 145 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2668, 127 Lab.Cas. P 11,043 Leon STEVENS; Jerry Carson; Nick Cotogno; Ralph Allen; Lauro Andrade, Jr.; Betty Armet; Dale Ball, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MOORE BUSINESS FORMS, INC., d/b/a Moore Business Forms & Systems Division; Local 404 M Graphic Communications International Union; Norman V. Salaets; Ray F. Ardanaz; Graham J. McClean, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Dale M. Fiola, Anaheim, CA, for plaintiffs-appellants.
William S. Waldo, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, Howard Z. Rosen, Posner & Rosen, Los Angeles, CA, for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
Before: ALDISERT *, HUG, and SCHROEDER, Circuit Judges.
This appeal by union members from a district court order granting summary judgment in favor of their union and their employer requires us to examine the statutory duty of fair representation and Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. We must determine whether the district court properly concluded that the Appellants failed to present sufficient evidence that the union breached its statutory duty of fair representation. This is the critical issue because the union's liability under the circumstances presented here is a condition precedent to the Appellants' prevailing on their Section 301 action against the employer. United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 62, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 1564, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981), overruled on other grounds by DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). We must also determine whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting certain provisions of a witness declaration over the hearsay objections of the Appellants.
The Appellants brought this action in the district court against Moore Business Forms, Inc. for violation of Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a), and against Local 404 M of the Graphic Communications International Union (hereinafter "Local 404" or "union") for breach of the statutory duty of fair representation.
Leon Stevens and the other Appellants were employed by Moore at its City of Industry plant in California. They were also members of Local 404, the exclusive collective bargaining representative for the bargaining unit which included the Appellants' positions. Their terms and conditions of employment were governed by a collective bargaining agreement between Moore and Local 404.
On May 30, 1990, Moore announced to its City of Industry employees that the plant would close in mid-August of that year. As a result of the plant closure, Moore paid its union employees severance pay equal to the amount required by Section 25 of the collective bargaining agreement. The severance pay received by Moore's bargaining unit employees was substantially less than that received by non-bargaining unit employees. The Appellants note that the pay differential between union and non-union employees was nine to one. They concede, however, that the benefits given union employees were in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement.
Subsequently, on November 14, 1990, several union members, including the current Appellants, filed a grievance with Local 404. They claimed that they had been discriminated against on the basis of their union membership in violation of Section 3(d) of the collective bargaining agreement, which provided that "[t]he company shall not discriminate in any way against employees because of membership ... [in the union]." E.R., Ex. 81, at 1. Several days thereafter, the union informed the bargaining unit employees that it would not process their grievance because it did not present a violation of Section 3(d). Based on this determination, the Appellants contend that the union breached its duty of fair representation.
Both Local 404 and Moore contend that the union's treatment of the Appellants' grievance cannot be considered in a vacuum and must be viewed in light of past history. Five years prior to the filing of the present grievance, the union faced what it characterizes as nearly an identical issue--disparate benefits between union and non-union employees. At that time, Moore permitted non-union employees to participate in a 401(k) plan, but held union employees strictly to benefits provided under the collective bargaining agreement. Local 522, the predecessor to Local 404, filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging that Moore had discriminated against its union employees by refusing to allow them to participate in the plan. The Acting Regional Director of the NLRB refused to issue a complaint, concluding that different benefits for union and non-union members was insufficient proof of a discriminatory motive on the part of the employer.
Based on this history, Local 404 concluded that the grievance brought by the Appellants regarding the disparity in severance pay was without merit.
The complaint in the district court against both the union and the employer followed. The district court eventually granted summary judgment in favor of the union:
Plaintiffs have not made a showing that the Union's actions were in bad faith, in fact plaintiffs admit that they received the severance pay pursuant to the terms of Section 25 of the instant collective bargaining agreement.... Defendant Union has produced strong evidence, in the form of declarations, that their decision was reasonably based.
Id. at 4-5. The court further held:
Defendant Moore is correct in its assertion that a plaintiff cannot proceed against their employer under Section 301 without first establishing a breach of the duty of fair representation by their Union.... [T]his court finds that plaintiffs have not made a threshold showing of bad faith or discrimination on the part of defendant Union.
The Appellants then filed a motion for reconsideration with the district court, contending that the court had not ruled on their motion to strike portions of Local 404's evidence. On July 29, 1992, the district court issued an order in which it concluded that the challenged portions of Local 404 president Frank Young's declaration were admissible pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Young's declaration established that union records contained the prior claim against Moore and the NLRB's rejection of that claim.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Jones v. Union Pac. R.R., 968 F.2d 937, 940 (9th Cir.1992). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, we must determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir.1992), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 543, 126 L.Ed.2d 445 (Nov. 29, 1993). Moreover, "if the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial as to an element essential to its case, and that party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of fact with respect to the existence of that element, then summary judgment is appropriate." California Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1006, 108 S.Ct. 698, 98 L.Ed.2d 650 (1988).
We review the district court's decision to admit evidence under exceptions to the hearsay rule for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 126 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 170, 121 L.Ed.2d 117 (1992).
A union breaches the statutory duty of fair representation if it ignores a meritorious grievance or processes it in a perfunctory manner. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191, 87 S.Ct. 903, 917, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). The Appellants argue that the union should be held accountable for its failure to make even a minimal investigation into their grievance. They rely principally on our decision in Tenorio v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 680 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir.1982) (). See also Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 749 F.2d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir.1983); Gregg v. Chauffers, Teamsters & Helpers Union Local 150, 699 F.2d 1015, 1016 (9th Cir.1983).
The Appellees respond that there are no genuine issues of fact and that the district court properly determined that Local 404 did not breach its duty of fair representation. They rely on Frank Young's declaration, which established that: Young was president of Local 404; Local 404's predecessor was Local 522; the records of the union showed that five years prior to the Appellants' grievance, Local 522 had filed an unfair labor practice charge against Moore on the basis of disparate benefits between union and non-union employees; the NLRB rejected the charge, concluding that different benefits did not constitute unlawful discrimination; and Young was aware of these records when he was presented with the Appellants' grievance.
In addition, the union indicated that it was aware of other situations in which fringe benefits paid to bargaining unit employees were different than those provided to non-bargaining unit employees. For example, in his declaration, Young notes that when Moore changed from Blue Cross health insurance to Aetna, non-bargaining unit employees were required to pay a contribution to the Aetna program while bargaining unit employees were provided insurance without cost.
Young said that in refusing to process the severance pay grievance, he relied on the disparate fringe benefit packages given to bargaining unit employees and non-bargaining unit employees by Moore in...
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