People v. Kulis

Citation274 N.Y.S.2d 873,18 N.Y.2d 318,221 N.E.2d 541
Parties, 221 N.E.2d 541 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Stanley KULIS, Appellant.
Decision Date27 October 1966
CourtNew York Court of Appeals

Bartholomew J. Rebore, New York City, for appellant.

Frank S. Hogan, Dist. Atty. (Frederick P. Hafetz, H. Richard Uviller and Alan F. Leibowitz, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (Samuel A. Hirshowitz and Barry Mahoney, New York City, of counsel), amicus curies.

Leonard Rubenfeld, Dist. Atty. (Benj. J. Jacobson, Jackson Heights, James J. Duggan, Tuckahoe and Francis J. Valentino, of counsel), for New York State District Attorneys Association, amicus curies.

Isidore Dollinger, Dist. Atty., of Bronx County (Roy Broudny and Peter R. De Filippi, New York City, of counsel), amicus curies.

PER CURIAM.

The record adequately supports the judgment convicting defendant of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law, Consol.Laws, c. 40, § 1050, subd. 2). Before defendant was arrested or subjected to any restraint by police, he made admissions and exhibited physical circumstances in his apartment which tended to connect him with the crime.

At this stage of the investigation, the police were asking residents generally in the house in which the victim's body was found their knowledge of facts which might throw some light on the crime.

Decisions which limit admissibility of statements taken after an arrest or effective detention do not apply to the results of this kind of preliminary inquiry.

After defendant was arrested he requested the right to see a lawyer but this request was not promptly followed by the police and before a lawyer reached him, a statement was taken from defendant by an assistant district attorney.

This statement was not offered by the People as part of their direct case against defendant, but was offered on the issue of his credibility after he had been sworn and testified in his own defense.

Although the statement would not have been admissible as part of the People's direct case (Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977; People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 193 N.E.2d 628), it was admissible on the question of defendant's credibility as a witness (Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503; Tate v. United States, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 13, 283 F.2d 377; Bailey v. United States, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 241, 328 F.2d 542; United States v. Curry, 2 Cir., 358 F.2d 904).

The basis of distinction between the admissibility of wrongfully obtained evidence in the direct case of the prosecution and its use on the credibility of the defendant as a witness is demonstrated in the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Walder (supra, 347 U.S. pp. 64, 65, 74 S.Ct. 354, 356). The prosecution cannot 'use the fruits of such unlawful conduct to secure a conviction' but '(i)t is quite another to say that the defendant can turn the illegal method by which evidence in the Government's possession was obtained to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths. Such an extension of the Weeks doctrine (Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652) would be a perversion of the Fourth Amendment.'

The judgment should be affirmed.

KEATING, Judge (dissenting).

I cannot agree with a rule which, to state it essentially, permits the prosecution to use statements on cross-examination to Impeach the defendant's credibility, where the same statements could not be used on the People's direct case.

Statements so taken from a defendant after he has requested access to counsel are inadmissible under the rules laid down in Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 and People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 193 N.E.2d 628.

Needless to say, the statements were not introduced by the prosecution for the purpose of exculpating the defendant. On the contrary, they were used to impeach him and to establish the unreliability of his testimony. They were, therefore, inculpatory in a very real sense. The proof, indeed, was not a confession, but it was taken in violation of defendant's right to counsel and privilege against self incrimination. Incriminating it was and it should have been excluded.

The Supreme Court has recently addressed itself to this precise question in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1629, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. The Supreme...

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55 cases
  • People v. Marsh
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • December 2, 1968
    ...in Commonwealth v. Burkett (1967), 211 Pa.Super. 299, 304, 235 A.2d 161, 163, and two dissenters in People v. Kulis (1966), 18 N.Y.2d 318, 324, 274 N.Y.S.2d 873, 876, 221 N.E.2d 541, 542. The Burkett and Kulis majorities followed the Walder In State v. Brewton, Supra, the facts were identic......
  • United States v. Birrell
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • November 15, 1967
    ...of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (dictum); People v. Kulis, 18 N.Y.2d 318, 323-324, 274 N.Y.S.2d 873, 875-876, 221 N.E.2d 541 (1966) (dissenting opinion of Keating, J.); United States v. Armetta, 378 F.2d 658, 661-662 (2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly, J.); State v......
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    • New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • October 27, 1966
    ...N.Y.2d 832, 275 N.Y.S.2d 838, 222 N.E.2d 600; People v. Teams, 18 N.Y.2d 835, 275 N.Y.S.2d 841, 222 N.E.2d 603; People v. Kulis, 18 N.Y.2d 318, 274 N.Y.S.2d 873, 221 N.E.2d 541. Michael Vignera, whose appeal was considered along with Miranda, is to have a new trial. The present appellant, M......
  • Harris v. New York
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • February 24, 1971
    ...as direct proof of guilt and no constitutional distinction can legitimately be drawn.' People v. Kulis, 18 N.Y.2d 318, 324, 274 N.Y.S.2d 873, 876, 221 N.E.2d 541, 543 (1966) (dissenting opinion). The objective of deterring improper police conduct is only part of the larger objective of safe......
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