18 N.Y.2d 638, People v. Berger

Citation:18 N.Y.2d 638, 272 N.Y.S.2d 782
Party Name:People v. Berger
Case Date:July 07, 1966
Court:New York Court of Appeals
 
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Page 638

18 N.Y.2d 638

272 N.Y.S.2d 782

PEOPLE, etc., Respondent,

v.

Ralph BERGER, Appellant.

New York Court of Appeals

July 7, 1966.

Page 639

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, 25 A.D.2d 718, 269 N.Y.S.2d 368.

Page 640

[272 N.Y.S.2d 783] Joseph E. Brill, New York City (Bernard J. Levy, Joseph E. Brill, New York City, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

Frank S. Hogan, New York City (H. Richard Uviller, Jeremiah B. McKenna, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

Indictment charged that defendant and others conspired to bribe a public officer attached to the New York State Liquor Authority with intent to influence him in respect to issuance of licenses to sell liquor at certain clubs located in New York County. The defendant made a motion to suppress evidence. The People stipulated that, without the evidence and leads obtained from eavesdropping devices which had been placed in two offices under authority of ex parte court orders issued pursuant to Section 813-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the District Attorney would have had no information on which to present a case against the defendant. The motion to suppress evidence was denied.

Defendant was convicted on two counts of conspiracy in violation of Section 580 of the Penal Law, Consol.Laws, c. 40.

The Supreme Court, Special and Trial Term, New York County, Mitchell D. Schweitzer, J., entered a judgment, and the defendant appealed.

The Appellate Division, entered a judgment affirming the judgment of the Special and Trial Term.

The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals by permission of an Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals, contending that the ex parte court orders which permitted eavesdropping were invalid because they were based on inadequate showing of reasonable grounds for granting them, and that the eavesdrops, which were of the room type rather than the telephone wire tape type, were unconstitutional as an intrusion into private premises.

Judgment affirmed.

All concur except DESMOND, C.J., and FULD, J., who dissent and vote to reverse on the ground that the electronic eavesdrops inside two offices, one of which was a law...

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