18 N.E. 452 (Ind. 1888), 13,763, Town of Knightstown v. Musgrove
|Citation:||18 N.E. 452, 116 Ind. 121|
|Opinion Judge:||Mitchell, J.|
|Party Name:||The Town of Knightstown v. Musgrove|
|Attorney:||L. P. Newby, J. H. Mellett and E. H. Bundy, for appellant. J. L. Shelton, W. Woods, B. F. Davis, W. H. Martz, C. S. Hernly and S. H. Brown, for appellee.|
|Case Date:||November 09, 1888|
|Court:||Supreme Court of Indiana|
From the Henry Circuit Court.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
Lucinda Musgrove sued the town of Knightstown to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by her on the 1st day of July, 1886, without any fault on her part, while riding along a public street in the above mentioned town, in which there was a dangerous unguarded obstruction.
There was a trial by jury and a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff for seven hundred dollars.
[116 Ind. 122] The evidence tended to show that two or more loads of gravel had been hauled upon the street, by the direction of the authorities, late in the evening of the day on which the accident happened, and that they had been left in such manner as to make a gravel heap eighteen or twenty inches in height, and that there were no lights or other arrangements to prevent persons lawfully using the street from running upon the obstruction caused by the gravel. The plaintiff and her niece, a girl some sixteen years old, while riding in the evening after dark, for recreation, upon the invitation of a Mr. Hunter, were driven upon the obstruction thus left, and thrown out of the carriage, which was overturned. Hunter was the owner of the horse and vehicle, and had them in his charge at the time of the accident.
At the trial the defendant offered to prove that Hunter had been at the place where the gravel was unloaded, on the evening of the accident, and that he talked with the men who hauled it about leaving it there in the condition in which it was left. The object of the testimony was to show contributory negligence on the part of Hunter, with a view of insisting that the plaintiff was so identified with him as that his negligence should be imputed to her. The testimony having relation to that subject was all excluded and it is now urged that the judgment ought to be reversed on account of this ruling. It is not claimed that the plaintiff was herself guilty of any default, nor was it proposed to show that she knew or had any reason to suspect that...
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