State v. Loya

• Decision Date: 05 January 2001
• Docket Number: No. 20000034-CA.,20000034-CA.
• Citation: 2001 UT App 3,18 P.3d 1116
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Leslie Gene LOYA, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

18 P.3d 1116

2001 UT App 3

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Leslie Gene LOYA, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 20000034-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

January 5, 2001.

Joan C. Watt and Ronald S. Fujino, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.

Jan Graham and Karen A. Klucznik, Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.

Before GREENWOOD, P.J., JACKSON, Associate P.J., and BILLINGS, J.

OPINION

GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge:

¶ 1 Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress, which led to her conviction for possession of a forged device. Defendant argues her Fourth Amendment rights were violated when police conducted a warrantless search of a motel room. Defendant claims she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room even though she remained after the check out time. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Defendant checked into the Suburban Lodge in Salt Lake City on July 31, 1999 and paid for a room through August 7, 1999. According to the motel manager's testimony, defendant was informed that check out time was at 11:00 a.m. On August 7, the day defendant was scheduled to check out, defendant informed the motel manager, Margie Hathenbruck, that she needed extra time to get out of her room. Although the motel has a policy that tenants must check out by 11:00 or pay for another day, Hathenbruck testified that the motel usually allows a one-hour grace period and that she may have indicated that defendant could stay until 2:00 p.m., when the office closed.

¶ 3 At 1:00 p.m., Hathenbruck went to defendant's room, expecting to find it empty. Defendant's mother answered the door because defendant was packing her belongings. Defendant's mother was angry and told Hathenbruck that she and her daughter would not be able to leave at 2:00 and would "be out when we're ready." Defendant's mother then slammed the door in Hathenbruck's face. Because defendant's mother had been belligerent, Hathenbruck returned with the motel maintenance man, intending to stay in the room until defendant and her mother vacated the room. Defendant's mother continued to be difficult and gave Hathenbruck and the maintenance man a hard time. Consequently, Hathenbruck left the room to call the police to assist her in getting defendant out of the room.

¶ 4 Midvale police officers Volpe and Proulx arrived at the motel at about 1:30 p.m. Hathenbruck explained to the officers that she needed to shut down the office at 2:00 and to get defendant out of the room. When the officers arrived at the room, the door was wide open. Because defendant's mother was acting belligerently and yelling, Officer Proulx entered the room to quiet her down. After talking with Hathenbruck and learning that Hathenbruck wanted defendant out of the room, Officer Volpe also entered the motel room.

¶ 5 The officers did not have a warrant to enter the room, nor did they have defendant's permission to enter. The officers believed that defendant was supposed to check out by 11:00 a.m. and thus had no right to remain in the room. Once the officers were in the room, they noticed drug paraphernalia in plain view on the bed. Furthermore, a search of defendant's belongings revealed the forged checks which served as the basis for this conviction. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found when police entered and searched the motel room. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant then pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a forged check, reserving her right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 6 Defendant challenges both the trial court's factual findings, arguing certain findings are contrary to the evidence presented, and the trial court's legal conclusion, arguing she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the motel room after check out time. A trial court's factual findings are reviewed deferentially under the clearly erroneous standard, and its conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness with some discretion given to the application of the legal standards to the underlying factual findings. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-940 (Utah 1994)

; State v. Wells, 928 P.2d 386, 388 (Utah Ct.App.1996).

ANALYSIS

¶ 7 Defendant argues that two of the trial court's factual findings, numbers three and four, are erroneous to the extent they find that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy until 2:00 p.m.¹ In order to challenge the trial court's findings of fact, defendant "must demonstrate to appellate courts first how the trial court found the facts from the evidence, and second why such findings contradict the weight of the evidence." In re S.T., 928 P.2d 393, 400 (Utah Ct.App.1996). A successful challenge to a trial court's factual findings will "`induce a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'" Id. (citation omitted).

¶ 8 Defendant claims that Hathenbruck's testimony is contrary to findings three and four. Specifically, Hathenbruck testified:

Q: Did you at that time, tell her that she had to pay or be out of the room? Hathenbruck: Yes. I did.

Q: And by what time was she to be out? Hathenbruck: Well, actually, they're supposed to be out at 11:00 or pay by 11:00. She had come down to talk to me and I may have extended that time. We usually give them a one-hour grace period, but I did say that we close at 2:00 that day and we most definitely had to be out before then.

Thus, defendant argues that Hathenbruck's testimony does not clearly establish that defendant was required to leave the room at 11:00 a.m. To the extent that defendant claims the trial court erred in finding defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy beyond check out time, we agree that Hathenbruck's testimony suggests that defendant was given additional time to vacate the room.

¶ 9 Nevertheless, the trial court's factual findings are not clearly erroneous when read together. In fact, the trial court's fourth factual finding states that Hathenbruck gave defendant additional time to vacate the room or pay for an additional day. Thus, it is clear that the trial court accepted defendant's argument to some extent. The critical question, however, is how long did the motel allow defendant to remain in the room, thereby extending her right to privacy. On this question, the trial court did not make any specific finding. Therefore, we must determine when defendant's expectation of privacy ended. See, e.g., State v. Wells, 928 P.2d 386, 387 (Utah Ct.App.1996)

(noting "search and seizure issues are fact sensitive"). Accordingly, although the trial court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous, we refer to additional evidence contained in the record for purposes of our analysis.

¶ 10 In order to contest the search of the motel room, defendant has the burden to establish "a legitimate, continuing expectation of privacy on [her] part while [she] remained in the room after the rental period had ended." Commonwealth v. Brass, 42 Mass.App.Ct. 88, 674 N.E.2d 1326, 1327 (1997); see also State v. Mitchell, 20 S.W.3d 546, 557 (Mo.Ct.App.2000)

(same). Whether an individual has an expectation of privacy is based on a two-prong test: "First, the individual must have a subjective expectation of privacy, and second, that subjective expectation must be reasonable." United States v. Kitchens, 114 F.3d 29, 31 (4th Cir.1997) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516-17, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).

¶ 11 Although Utah appellate courts have not previously addressed this issue, the law concerning a hotel guest's expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment is well settled: "[A] guest in a hotel room is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures." Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490, 84 S.Ct. 889, 893, 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964). A hotel guest's expectation of privacy, however, is not unlimited, but normally ends upon the termination of the rental period. See Kitchens, 114 F.3d at 31

. Nevertheless, "[a] guest may still have a legitimate expectation of privacy even after his [or her] rental period has terminated, if there is a pattern or practice which would make that expectation reasonable." Id. at 32. Thus, in order to fall within this exception, defendant has the burden of showing that Hathenbruck allowed her to stay past check out time based on their conversations.

¶ 12 Relying on two cases, defendant claims she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room until 2:00 p.m. Defendant refers us to United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146 (10th Cir.1986) and United States v. Watson, 783 F.Supp. 258 (E.D.Va.1992) to bolster her claim that her expectation of privacy after check out time was reasonable. In Owens, defendant paid for one night at a motel. See id., 782 F.2d at 147. When defendant did not check out by noon the next day, motel personnel called his room to inquire if he intended to stay another day. See id. at 147-48. In response to this call, defendant's companion went to the front desk and deposited an additional payment of $100.00. See id. at 148. The parties disputed the effect of this subsequent deposit. The motel had a daily rate of $28.45 or a weekly rate of $106.00. See id. Defendant testified that he was told the additional $100 plus the amount paid for the first night was sufficient to rent the room for a week. See id. On the other hand, the motel manager stated that all weekly rentals were assigned rooms in a different part of the motel and had to be approved by the manager, but since neither occurred defendant was only renting on a day-to-day basis. See id. Additionally, defendant had incurred telephone charges that affected the balance he owed to the motel. See id.

¶ 13 The search of the motel room in Owens occurred after defendant's tenancy would have expired if he paid for the room on a day-to-day basis, but prior to expiration if h...