McGinnis v. George Knapp & Co.

• Decision Date: 14 March 1892
• Citation: 109 Mo. 131,18 S.W. 1134
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Parties: McGINNIS v. GEORGE KNAPP & CO.

18 S.W. 1134

109 Mo. 131

McGINNIS v. GEORGE KNAPP & CO.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

March 14, 1892.

LIBEL — SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT.

A complaint for libel, alleging the publication in defendant's newspaper, under the title, "The McGinnis Cohorts," and the further heading, "They Rally Round the Brewers' Flag in the Senate," of the language: "The distribution of the $50,000 slush fund sent here by the liquor interests may enable Senator McGinnis to make good his boast that he did not care whether the house passed the high license bill or not, he could defeat it in the senate;" that the matter so published purported to be part of a letter written to the paper by its special correspondent at the capital, where plaintiff was in attendance as a member of the senate, before which a bill to regulate intoxicants was then pending; that by said language the defendant charged plaintiff with bribery, or that he had knowledge of and was willing to avail himself of the use of money by others to defeat the bill; and that the article was false and malicious, — is sufficient on demurrer.

Appeal from St. Louis circuit court.

Action for libel by James G. McGinnis against George Knapp & Co., a corporation. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

The other facts fully appear in the following statement by SHERWOOD, C. J.:

Action for libel. The petition in the cause, omitting caption, is as follows: "Plaintiff alleges and states that he is a resident and citizen of the city of St. Louis, by occupation an attorney at law, and that he is also a member of the state senate of the state of Missouri, and was such member of said state senate on the 12th and 13th of April, A. D. 1889. That defendant is a corporation, and is engaged in the publication, at said city of St. Louis, of the daily newspaper called `The St. Louis Republic,' and that defendant was such corporation, and published said newspaper, on the 12th and 13th of April, A. D. 1889. That heretofore, on the 13th day of April, A. D. 1889, defendant, in the issue of the said newspaper of said date, published of and concerning plaintiff, under the title `The McGinnis Cohorts,' and the further heading, `They Rally Round the Brewers' Flag in the Senate,' the following language: `The distribution of the $50,000 slush fund sent here by the liquor interests may enable Senator McGinnis to make good his boast that he did not care whether the house passed the high license bill or not, he could defeat it in the senate.' That the said matter so published by defendant was part of a letter purporting to have been written to defendant by its special correspondent at Jefferson City, April 12, 1889. That at said time plaintiff was in attendance at said city of Jefferson, the capital of said state of Missouri, as a member of the state senate, discharging his duties as such. That there was then pending before said state senate a bill entitled `An act to regulate the sale of intoxicants,' the same being substitute for house bills Nos. 145, 759, 86, 102, 188, 168, 360, and 245. That in and by said language hereinbefore set out the defendant charged, and its said special correspondent charged, that plaintiff had been guilty of bribery, or was offering bribes, or was ready to offer bribes, to other members of said state senate to induce them to vote against said bill, or that plaintiff then had knowledge that $50,000 had been unlawfully offered or used to induce members of said state senate to vote against said bill, and that plaintiff, having such knowledge, then and there approved of or consented to such unlawful act, and was ready and willing to avail himself thereof in accomplishing the defeat of said bill by said state senate, or that he, the plaintiff, aided and abetted the said alleged unlawful use of said alleged fund of $50,000. That the said language aforesaid was and is libelous. That the same was and is false. That the same was and is malicious. That there was no justification therefor, as defendant and its said correspondent well knew. That plaintiff, on April 15, 1889, demanded of defendant a retraction of the said language and charges therein contained, but the defendant to make such retraction declined; and that by reason of the premises plaintiff has been injured and damaged in the sum of fifty thousand dollars, ($50,000,) for which and costs he now prays judgment." The defendant corporation interposed the following demurrer: "Now comes the said defendant, and demurs to the amended petition of said plaintiff, and assigns as grounds of demurrer thereto that the alleged publication set out in said petition does not by any reasonable intendment or construction charge the plaintiff with having been guilty of bribery, or with having offered bribes, or with having been ready to offer bribes, to other members of the state senate of Missouri, to induce them to vote against the bill set out in said petition; nor does said publication by any reasonable or fair intendment or construction charge plaintiff with having received fifty thousand dollars, or any other sum, as a bribe for his own or the votes of other members of said state senate of Missouri in respect to said bill set out in said petition, or with being guilty of any of the other things charged in the innuendoes of said petition. (2) Said alleged publication set out in said plaintiff's petition does not state any libelous or defamatory matter or thing against said plaintiff, either personally or as a member of the state senate of Missouri. (3) Said petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against this defendant. Wherefore, the defendant prays the judgment of the court whether or not it shall further answer said petition." The trial court adjudged the petition insufficient in law, and, the plaintiff declining to plead further, final judgment was entered on the demurrer, and the plaintiff appeals.

Campbell & Ryan, Lubke & Muench, and Chas. Nagel, for appellant. Boyle, Adams & McKeighan, for respondent.

SHERWOOD, C. J., (after stating the facts.)

Our statute defines "libel" to be: "A libel is the malicious defamation of a person, made public by any printing, writing, sign, picture, representation, or effigy, tending to provoke him to wrath, or expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefits of public confidence and social intercourse, or any malicious defamation, made public as aforesaid, designed to blacken and vilify the memory of one who is dead, and tending to scandalize or provoke his surviving relatives and friends." 1 Rev. St. 1889, § 3869. This section was enacted in 1879, (Rev. St. of that year, § 1591,) and finds a place under the head of "Crimes and Punishments;" and perhaps it would not strictly extend to civil actions, except in so far as it might be found correct and in conformity to definitions formulated by eminent jurists and authors. The attempts, however, to define a libel, though practically innumerable, have never been so comprehensive and accurate as to comprehend all cases that may arise. Townsh. Sland. & L. (4th Ed.) § 20. And such attempts, in this regard, in some degree resemble similar attempted definitions of fraud. A definition which has met with frequent approval is that given by PARSONS, C. J., in Com. v. Clap, 4 Mass. 163: "A libel is a malicious publication, expressed either in printing or writing, or by signs and pictures, tending either to blacken the memory of one dead, or the reputation of one who is alive, and expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule." Frequent approval has also been bestowed on a definition uttered by Alexander Hamilton, arguendo, in People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 354: "A libel is a censorious or ridiculing writing, picture, or sign made with a mischievous and malicious intent towards government, magistrates, or individuals." But it is immaterial for the purposes of this case which of the aforesaid definitions enunciated in the cases cited be adopted. Taking them to be sufficiently accurate and comprehensive for the present instance, let us apply them to the case at bar. Do the allegations of the petition in this case bring it within any of the definitions mentioned? And in this connection it must be remembered that the demurrer confesses the malice and falsity of the charge, and also that the meaning supplied by the innuendo is the true meaning of the words charged to be libelous. Belknap v. Ball, (Mich.) 47 N. W. Rep. 674. And the rule that in actions for libel the words must be taken mitiori sensu is now for the most part repudiated. Townsh. Sland. & L. (4th Ed.) p. 216, § 177. "The court, on demurrer, will see if there is anything in the language which by reasonable intendment is actionable." Id. Thus, "where the defendant wrote and published of the plaintiff — an hotel and job coach proprietor by trade, and a Presbyterian by religion — that from mere motives of intolerance he had refused the use of his hearse for the funeral of his deceased servant, because the body was about to be interred in a Roman Catholic cemetery, held, overruling a demurrer to the declaration, that the court could not so clearly see that the language might not be actionable as to justify the withdrawal of the case from a jury." Id.; Teacy v. McKenna, 4 Ir. Com. Law 374.

In determining the force and effect of the alleged libelous words, though the meaning of the words used cannot be extended by innuendo beyond the natural import of the words charged to be defamatory, yet in determining the meaning of the words of which complaint is made it is entirely legitimate to consider the meaning to be imputed to them, while at the same time considering the extrinsic facts and circumstances with which such words are connected. The author already quoted on this subject says: "For the purpose of its construction, language is to be regarded not merely in reference...