Beamon v. Department of Motor Vehicles

• Decision Date: 21 April 1960
• Parties: Robert BEAMON, Petitioner and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Paul Mason, Director, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 23968.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 396

4 Cal.Rptr. 396

180 Cal.App.2d 200

Robert BEAMON, Petitioner and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Paul Mason, Director, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 23968.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

April 21, 1960.

Arthur Shivell, Saugus, for appellant.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., and Warren H. Deering, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

VALLEE, Justice.

Appeal by petitioner from a judgment denying his petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Department of Motor Vehicles to set aside and expunge from its records its order revoking his motor vehicle operator's license. The appeal is on the clerk's transcript consisting of the judgment roll.

On May 21, 1957 the department mailed to petitioner a notice of a hearing to be held before it for the suspension or revocation of his operator's license. Petitioner did not request a formal hearing, and on June 25, 1957 an informal hearing was held before a referee. Petitioner appeared at the hearing. Evidence was introduced; and petitioner's driving record, shown by the department's records, was considered. On June 27, 1957 the referee rendered his report.

The report showed: at the time of the hearing petitioner was 23 years of age, married, the father of one child, and had been a carpenter for 3 1/2 years; he had been driving 6 1/2 years, all of it in California; he drove a total of 30,000 to 40,000 miles (a year, apparently), 75 per cent of which was for business purposes. The report stated his driving record as follows: past 12 months, 9 convictions and one accident; past 24 months, 9 convictions and one accident; past 36 months, 13 convictions and one accident.

The report concluded with the comments and findings set out in the margin. ¹ The referee recommended revocation of petitioner's operator's license.

On July 29, 1957 the department entered its order revoking petitioner's operator's license, effective August 2, 1957. On October 7, 1958 mandamus was sought in the superior court. On March 9, 1959 the cause was heard on the pleadings which included the referee's report plus the testimony of plaintiff. Plaintiff's testimony is not in the record. The court found the facts as stated, and concluded: the department did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably or without just cause, and did not exceed its jurisdiction or abuse its discretion; it afforded petitioner a fair hearing; it proceeded at all times in compliance with the provisions of the Vehicle Code; its decision revoking petitioner's operator's license was supported by the weight of the evidence; the provisions of the Vehicle Code relating to the suspension, and revocation of motor vehicle operators' licenses under which the department acted are constitutional, both on the face thereof and as applied to petitioner. The judgment denied the writ.

Our decision is governed by the provisions of the Vehicle Code with respect to the power of the department to suspend or revoke the privilege of any person to operate a motor vehicle upon the highway after notice and hearing, as they read in 1957. ² We are not concerned with the provisions which made it mandatory on the department to suspend or revoke the privilege of any person to operate a motor vehicle upon the highway on receipt of a record showing he had been convicted of certain public offenses. §§ 304, 305, 307. ^* In such cases the facts have already been determined in the criminal proceeding. Nor are we concerned with the question whether the department had the power to suspend or revoke the privilege in a case in which a court had acted on the question.

it is petitioner's contention that the provisions of the Vehicle Code under which the department revoked his operator's license delegated judicial and legislative power to the department in violation of the state Constitution. There is no merit in this contention.

It is well established that state-wide agencies empowered to revoke licenses, for cause defined by law, are not exercising judicial power as that phrase is used in the Constitution conferring judicial power on the courts; and statutes creating such agencies and conferring upon them such powers are constitutional. Suckow v. Alderson, 182 Cal. 247, 250, 187 P. 965; Dominguez Land Corp. v. Daugherty, 196 Cal. 453, 466, 238 P. 697, 44 A.L.R. 1. It was expressly held in Keck v. Superior Court, 109 Cal.App. 251, 293 P. 128, that the Legislature, by empowering officers of the department of motor vehicles to determine whether a driver's license shall be revoked, does not confer judicial power upon executive officers.

'The delegation of an absolute legislative discretion to an administrative body is not proper, but if the delegating statute establishes an ascertainable standard to guide the administrative agents no objection can properly be made to it.' Wotton v. Bush, 41 Cal.2d 460, 468, 261 P.2d 256, 260. The carefully detailed provisions of the Vehicle Code under which the department acted refute any implication of unlawful delegation of legislative power to the department. Legislation on the subject of operators' and chauffeurs' licenses at the time of the investigation and revocation of petitioner's operator's license constituted a complete division of the Vehicle Code. Division IV, chapters 1-6, §§ 250-339. ^** The applicable sections provided a complete and comprehensive guide for departmental action.

Section 306 provided that the department might revoke a license upon any of the grounds which authorized the refusal to issue a license. Section 271 stated the grounds on which the department might refuse to issue a license. One of these grounds permitted the department to refuse to issue a license if it determined that the applicant was a negligent or incompetent operator of a motor vehicle. § 271(e). As a guide in the determination of whether a person was a 'negligent operator,' section 271.2 ³ established a point-count system to be used in evaluating the traffic record of the person. If his record totaled a specified minimum number of points for a specified period of time, the statute directed that he be prima facie presumed to be a negligent operator.

On receipt of information or on a showing by its records of certain enumerated conditions, the department was authorized by section 314(a) to conduct an investigation to determine whether the license of any person should be suspended, revoked, or restricted. Subsection (3) of section 314(a) authorized such action when the information received or departmental records showed 'that the licensee is a reckless, negligent or incompetent driver of a motor vehicle.' Section 314(b) authorized the department to require the reexamination of the licensee in the event that its information or records indicated any of the enumerated conditions.

Petitioner specifically attacks section 314 ⁴ as an unconstitutional delegation to the department of the power to designate what acts constituted violation of that section for which penalties might be imposed, power to set the penalties, and the power to impose them. The attack is untenable. The statute merely authorized the department upon receipt of certain information or showing of its records to conduct an investigation to determine whether there were grounds for suspension, revocation, or the imposition of conditions or restrictions on the licensee, and permitted the department to reexamine the licensee in any such event. The grounds for suspension and revocation were contained in other sections of the code. See §§ 269, 271, 271.2, 303.1, 304, 305, 305.1 306, 307, 308, 308.1. The authority to initiate an investigation or require reexamination of the licensee is not the authority to state what acts violate the law; the initiation of an investigation or the requirement of reexamination is not the imposition of a penalty. It clearly appears that section 314 was intended to detail the internal procedure to be followed by the department and must be read with other sections which state grounds for suspension or revocation.

Petitioner complains that under the authority of section 314 subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2) the department could and did take action to suspend, revoke, or impose conditions on the license of an operator where he was free from fault. There is nothing in the record to support this claim.

Section 314(c) directed: 'In applying the provisions of this section the department shall give due consideration to the more frequent use of motor vehicles by chauffeurs.' Petitioner contends this subsection denied him equal protection of the law. He argues that there is no reasonable distinction between a licensee in his position who was necessarily required in his occupation to drive many times the number of miles which the Legislature contemplated as the average amount of miles driven by individuals for pleasure, and one who was employed by others for the principal purpose of driving a motor vehicle. Veh.Code, § 71.

'A law is general when it applies equally to all persons embraced in a class founded on some natural, intrinsic, or constitutional distinction. It is special if it confers particular privileges or imposes peculiar disabilities or burdensome conditions in the exercise of a common right on a class of persons arbitrarily selected from the general body of those who stand in precisely the same relation to the subject of the law. [Citation.] The prohibition against special legislation does not preclude classification, but only requires that the classification be reasonable. [Citation.] A legislative determination as to what is a sufficient distinction to warrant a classification will not be overthrown unless it is palpably arbitrary. [Citation.] It must be clear beyond reasonable doubt that no sound reason for the classification exists. [Citation.]' Sawyer v. Barbour, 142 Cal.App.2d 827, 838, 300 P.2d 187, 193.

Classifications of persons authorized to operate motor vehicles have...