Michael Dooley v. James Pease

Decision Date21 January 1901
Docket NumberNo. 97,97
Citation21 S.Ct. 329,180 U.S. 126,45 L.Ed. 457
PartiesMICHAEL F. DOOLEY, as Receiver of the First National Bank of Willimantic, Connecticut, Plff. in Err., v. JAMES PEASE
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Mr. Edward Winslow Paige for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. Lockwood Honor e, A. W. Green, and F. M. Peters for defendant in error.

Statement by Mr. Justice Shiras:

This was an action brought on June 25, 1895, in the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois, by Michael F. Dooley, as receiver of the First National Bank of Willimantic, Connecticut, against James Pease, a citizen of the state of Illinois. The declaration complained of a trespass by the defendant, who was sheriff of Cook county, Illinois, in levying upon and taking possession of a stock of silk goods, in a store room in the city of Chicago, which were claimed by the plaintiff to belong to him. After a plea of not guilty the case was, by consent, tried without a jury.

On May 28, 1897, judgment, under the findings, was entered in favor of the defendant.

The case was then taken to the circuit court of appeals for the seventh circuit, and on July 6, 1898, the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed. A writ of error was thereupon allowed from this court.

Mr. Justice Shiras delivered the opinion of the court:

Among other questions passed upon by the circuit court was whether the alleged sale of goods by the Natchaug Silk Company, through J. D. Chaffee, its president, to Dooley, as receiver of the First National Bank of Willimantic, either as payment in part, or as security for payment, of the debt of the silk company to the bank, was accompanied or followed by the open, visible, and notorious change of possession required by the law of the state of Illinois.

It is conceded, or, if not conceded, we regard it as well established, that the policy of the law in Illinois will not permit the owner of personal property to sell it and still continue in possession of it, so as to exempt it from seizure or attachment at the suit of creditors of the vendor. If, between the parties, without delivery, the sale is valid, it has no effect on third persons who, in good faith, purchase it; and an attaching creditor stands in the light of a purchaser, and as such will be protected. Thornton v. Davenport, 2 Ill. 296, 29 Am. Dec. 358; Jones v. Jones, 16 Ill. 117; Martin v. Dryden, 6 Ill. 187; Burnell v. Robertson, 10 Ill. 282.

It is equally well established that the courts of the United States regard and follow the policy of the state law in cases of this kind. 'Any other rule,' said this court in Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139, 19 L. ed. 109, 'would destroy all safety in derivative titles, and deny to a state the power to regulate the transfer of personal property within its limits.'

In Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664, 671, 23 L. ed. 1003, 1004, it was said:

'It was decided by this court in Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307, 18 L. ed. 599, 7 Wall. 139, 19 L. ed. 109, that the liability of property to be sold under legal process, issuing from the courts of the state where it is situated, must be determined by the law there, rather than that of the jurisdiction where the owner lives. These decisions rest on the ground that every state has the right to regulate the transfer of property within its limits, and that whoever sends property to it impliedly submits to the regulations concerning its transfer in force there, although a different rule of transfer prevails in the jurisdiction where he resides. He has no absolute right to have the transfer of property, lawful in that jurisdiction, respected in the courts of the state where it is found; and it is only on a principle of comity that it is ever allowed. But this principle yields when the laws and policy of the latter state conflict with those of the former.

'The policy of the law in Illinois will not permit the owner of personal property to sell it, either absolutely or conditionally, and still continue in possession of it. Possession is one of the strongest evidences of title to this class of property, and cannot be rightfully separated from the title, except in the manner pointed out by statute. The courts of Illinois say that to suffer, without notice to the world, the real ownership to be in one person, and the ostensible ownership in another, gives a false credit to the latter, and in this way works an injury to third persons. . . . Secret liens which treat the vendor of personal property, who has delivered possession of it to the purchaser as the owner until the payment of the purchase money, cannot be maintained in Illinois. They are held to be constructively fraudulent as to creditors, and the property, so far as their rights are concerned, is considered as belonging to the purchaser holding the possession. McCormick v. Hadden, 37 Ill. 370; Ketchum v. Watson, 24 Ill. 591.' Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 22, 35 L. ed. 616, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 595, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 876.

It being, then, established that, under the policy of the law of Illinois, in order to protect the goods in question from attachment by creditors of the Natchaug Silk Company, an attempted sale must be accompanied by a change of possession, which change must be visible, open, or notorious, did the facts of the transaction between the silk company and Dooley show such a change of possession?

The findings of the circuit court on this feature of the case were as follows:

'Said store had for several years prior to the sale to Dooley been operated by said Natchaug Silk Company as a store for the sale to dealers of its manufactured goods, through one H. L. Stanton, who, down to the date of said sale, April 25, 1895, had acted as its agent for that purpose, and at the time said bill of sale was executed and delivered by said Chaffee to said Lucas,...

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