Freeport Water Company v. City of Freeport
Decision Date | 25 March 1901 |
Docket Number | No. 348,348 |
Citation | 45 L.Ed. 679,180 U.S. 587,21 S.Ct. 493 |
Parties | FREEPORT WATER COMPANY, Plff. in Err. , v. CITY OF FREEPORT |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
This is an action of assumpsit brought by the plaintiff in error against the defendant in error in the circuit court of Stephenson county, state of Illinois, for the price of water delivered by plaintiff in error to defendant in error between January 1, 1896, and July 1, 1896.
The cause of action was based upon a contract arising from an ordinance passed by defendant empowering the plaintiff to construct certain waterworks in the city of Freeport, and the renting from the plaintiff by the city of certain fire hydrants.
To the defenses of a subsequent ordinance reducing the rental of such hydrants, it was replied that the latter ordinance impaired the obligation of the first ordinance as a contract, and therefore violated the Constitution of the United States.
The case was presented upon a demurrer to the pleas of the defendant. The demurrer was overruled by the circuit court, and the plaintiff electing to stand by its demurrer, judgment was entered for the defendant for costs. On appeal to the supreme court the judgment was affirmed (186 Ill. 179, 57 N. E. 862), and to that action this writ of error is directed.
The facts presented by the pleadings are as follows:
The plaintiff is a corporation organized and existing under the general laws of the state, and the defendant is a municipal corporation organized under the general act of the state entitled 'An Act to Provide for the Incorporation of Cities and Villages,' approved April 10, 1872, and in force July 1, 1872, and the acts amendatory thereof.
That on the 6th of June, 1882, defendant enacted an ordinance giving and granting to Nathan Shelton or his assigns the exclusive right and privilege, for the term of thirty years from the 1st of July, 1882, to supply the city of Freeport and its citizens with water suitable for domestic and manufacturing purposes. The city reserved the right of purchasing the works at the end of thirty years. If such right should not be exercised, the rights and privileges of the plaintiff were to be extended for a further period of twenty-five years. There were the usual provisions for the use of the streets, the character of the works and appliances, the quality of the water, and provision was made for the extension of the system as the growth of the city and its needs might require.
Section 7 of the ordinance was as follows:
The city was given the right to use water free of charge from the hydrants on streets curbed and guttered, for flushing and washing the gutters, and from any hydrant, upon giving notice, for flushing any and all sewers; also water free of charge for the use of the fire department and for the city hall, public offices, public schools, churches, and for four public drinking fountains if the city should erect the same.
Maximum rates to consumers were fixed for purposes which were especially enumerated, and it was provided that 'rents for other purposes not herein named will be fixed by meter measurement, as may be agreed upon between the consumer and the water company, not exceeding the following rates.' The rates were specified.
Section 13 was as follows:
'This ordinance shall become binding as a contract between the city of Freeport, Illinois, and Nathan Shelton or his assigns, upon the filing with the city clerk of a written acceptance thereof by Nathan Shelton or his assigns, provided the same shall be done within thirty days from the passage and publication of this ordinance; and this ordinance when so accepted shall not be altered, amended, or changed in any way without the concurrence and consent of both parties thereto and interested therein, or their successors or assigns.'
On June 27, 1882, Shelton filed a written acceptance of the terms and conditions of the ordinance. On August 8, 1882, he assigned all his rights to plaintiff, of which defendant had notice. Plaintiff has complied with all things required of Shelton or of it, has constructed 121 hydrants as required by § 7 and as ordered by defendant, which were in operation on January 1, 1896, and defendant paid all rentals which became due January 1, 1896; and that there was due for rentals subsequent to that date, and up to the 15th of July, 1896, the sum of $5,840.
The pleas of the defendant in substance alleged that it was a municipal corporation organized under the general laws of the state for the incorporation of cities and villages, and that, in pursuance of the statutes of the state relating to waterworks, it passed the ordinance of June 6, 1882.
It was alleged in plea No. 1 that the water rates fixed by such ordinance 'were then unjust, unreasonable, and oppressive to the citizens and taxpayers of said city, and so remained and continued to be unjust, unreasonable, and oppressive from said enactment thereof up and until the subsequent action of the council of said city had in relation thereto. . . . ' This charge was substantially repeated in the other pleas, and it was alleged that the new rates were just and reasonable. The ordinance of February 11, 1896, was set out in full. The following is all that is necessary to be quoted:
'Fire Protection and Public Uses.
The ordinance further established in detail maximum rates for water to be furnished for domestic and manufacturing uses and other uses when furnished without meter; also rates when furnished or measured by meter. There was a penalty provided for charging greater rates than those established.
The ordinance was to take effect from the date of its passage, and the right of further regulation was reserved.
The rates established by the ordinance of February 11, 1896, were considerably less than those established by the ordinance of June, 1882.
The assignment of error presented the contentions in various ways that the ordinance of February 11, 1896, and the statutes in pursuance of which it was claimed to have been passed, violated the Constitution of the United States in that the ordinance and statutes impaired the obligation of the contract made by the ordinances of June, 1882, with plaintiff, and deprived it of its property without due process of law.
The statutes of the states which are urged as applicable to the contentions of the parties are cited in the margin.
Messrs. George C. Fry and James W. Hyde for plaintiff in error.
Mr. A. J. Hopkins for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice McKenna, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court:
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