National Labor Relations Board v. SW Evans & Son

Decision Date31 March 1950
Docket NumberNo. 10021.,10021.
Citation181 F.2d 427
PartiesNATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. S. W. EVANS & SON.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Helen Humphrey, Washington, D. C., (David P. Findling, Associate General Counsel, A. Norman Somers, Assistant General Counsel, Frederick U. Reel, Thomas F. Maher, Attorneys, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D. C., on the brief), for petitioner.

Geoffrey J. Cunniff, Philadelphia, Pa., (Emanuel G. Weiss, Philadelphia, Pa., John Harper, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), attorneys for respondent.

Before MARIS, McLAUGHLIN and KALODNER, Circuit Judges.

KALODNER, Circuit Judge.

This is a petition of the National Labor Relations Board pursuant to Section 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq., to enforce its order against the respondent, issued on January 17, 1949, following proceedings under Section 10 of the amended Act. The findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order of the Board are reported in 81 N.L.R.B. 161. Previously there was a representation proceeding the record of which forms a part of this case, and the decision of the Board together with its certification are reported in 75 N.L.R.B. 811.

The questions at issue here are (1) whether the certification of representatives was proper in view of the denial to the respondent of a pre-election hearing, and (2) whether the respondent was denied a fair hearing with respect to alleged unfair labor practices because of the deletion of a portion of its motion for a bill of particulars.

On February 19, 1947, the American Federation of Labor ("Union") filed with the Board pursuant to Section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act, a petition for certification as exclusive representative of certain employees of the respondent. Its petition declared the appropriate unit to include "Production and Maintenance Employees including leadmen, guards, and/or watchmen, inspectors and factory clerical employees" but excluded foremen and supervisory employees. The respondent sought a pre-election hearing, contending that there existed substantial issues with respect to the appropriate unit and with respect to eligibility to vote. It further appears that the respondent contemplated, and was in the process of, reducing the number of its permanent employees; nevertheless the Regional Director determined to hold the election prior to any hearing, and notice thereof was mailed to the respondent's employees. The notice stated that those employees eligible to vote were "all production and maintenance employees * * * who were employed * * * during the payroll period ending Saturday, March 29, 1947" except, "office clerical employees, foremen, and any other supervisory employees with authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline or otherwise effect changes in the status of employees, or effectively recommend such action." The respondent had, in accordance with the request of the Regional Director, submitted its payroll for the period ending March 29, 1947, but in doing so called attention to the fact that a large number had been permanently discharged.

The election was held on April 30, 1947. A total of 82 of respondent's employees actually voted, of whom 54 cast ballots for, and one against, the Union. The remaining 27 ballots were challenged by a Board representative in the absence of participation in the holding of the election by the respondent.

On June 25, 1947, a hearing was had before a hearing officer. The respondent did not present evidence in its behalf, but moved to dismiss the petition for certification on three grounds, only two of which are here pertinent: (1) the respondent was entitled to a pre-election hearing to determine the appropriate unit and those employees eligible to vote, and (2) the vote as reflected in the tally of ballots did not indicate that the Union had been selected by a representative number of respondent's employees.

In its decision, the Board noted that the payroll list indicated 307 eligible voters. It found, however, that only 176 employees were eligible to vote, since 113 had been laid off by the respondent prior to election and 18 others were supervisors ineligible to vote. Accordingly, of the 27 challenged ballots, the Board found that the challenges to 24 should be sustained because the voters had been permanently released from employment, and that one challenge should be overruled, according to the stipulation of the parties. As to the remaining two challenged ballots, the Board sustained one, as cast by a supervisory employee, and overruled the other, finding as fact that the employee involved was not performing work of a supervisory nature. Further, the Board determined that guards, watchmen and factory as well as office clericals at the respondent's plant should not be included in the collective bargaining unit; this, of course, was contrary to the statement of eligible voters contained in the Notice of Election. Finally, the Board overruled the respondent's contentions that it was entitled to a pre-election hearing and that the election was not representative, and it certified the Union. 75 N.L.R.B. 811.

Thereafter, the respondent refused to bargain with the Union. Upon a charge by the Union, the Board on April 2, 1948, issued its complaint alleging that the respondent had violated Section 8(a) (5) of the amended Act by its refusal to bargain, and additionally alleged other unfair labor practices between November, 1946, and January, 1948, in violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the amended Act. Prior to hearing on the complaint, the respondent presented a motion for a bill of particulars seeking specific information with respect to (1) the names of its officers or employees who allegedly committed the unfair labor practices within Section 8(a) (1), and (2) the times or approximate times thereof. The Trial Examiner required answer to the first request alone.

At the hearing in the complaint proceeding, the respondent sought to justify its refusal to bargain with the Union on the same grounds it asserted throughout the representation proceeding. It sought to show that prior to the election it had insisted that it be heard on the matter of the appropriate unit and on its claim that a current reduction in force would affect the unit and the election. It urged that these were issues of a substantial nature and should have been resolved by the Board before the election was held. The offer was rejected by the Trial Examiner, on the ground the evidence was not new or unavailable at the post-election hearing of June 25, 1947. This position was sustained by the Board, which adopted the Intermediate Report, and directed the respondent to cease and desist from its wrongful practices and to take certain affirmative action typical in such cases. 81 N.L.R.B. 161.

The governing statute on the issue, whether the respondent was entitled to a pre-election hearing, is Section 9(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 453, 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(c).1 We note in this connection that the instant problem is hardly apt to recur, since the amended Act now makes mandatory a pre-election hearing.2

In Inland Empire Dist. Council, Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union, Lewiston, Idaho v. Millis, 1945, 325 U.S. 697, 65 S.Ct. 1316, 89 L.Ed. 1877, the Supreme Court determined that a defective pre-election hearing was cured by an adequate post-election hearing. Although the Court refused to hold that "only a hearing prior to an election can be `appropriate' within the section's meaning",3 it nevertheless did not find it necessary to determine "whether in a situation where no hearing whatever is afforded prior to an election, the failure would be cured by allowing one afterward, whether as a matter of compliance with the statute or with the regulations."4

We may assume, for the purposes of this case, that the statute would not render void, in some instance, a procedure which fails to accord a hearing prior to an election. Moreover, we need not determine whether we are presented with a situation in which the statute may be said to control on the issue of a pre-election hearing. For, in our view, the solution to the problem presented is to be found in the Rules and Regulations of the Board.

Previous to November 27, 1945, the Rules and Regulations of the Board provided for a hearing prior to investigation.5 On that date, an amendment was made which permitted the Regional Director to institute an investigation in proper situations, with the further statement that "At any stage of the investigation, either before hearing or after hearing but before transfer of the case to the Board, the regional director may in cases which present no substantial issues, conduct a secret ballot of the employees,...

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  • Curtiss-Wright Corp., Wright Aero. Div. v. NLRB
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    • June 8, 1965
    ...193 F.2d 782, 800 (7 Cir. 1951). 25 N.L.R.B. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 118 F.2d 780, 788 (9 Cir. 1941). 26 N.L.R.B. v. S. W. Evans & Son, 181 F.2d 427, 431 (3 Cir. 1950). 27 See, e.g., Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Nebraska State Ry. Comm., 297 U.S. 471, 476, 56 S.Ct. 536, 80 L.Ed. 810......
  • Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. National Labor Rel. Bd., 4911.
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    • June 6, 1955
    ...petitioner with the charges of the Board and the issues which would be considered at the hearing. See National Labor Relations Board v. S. W. Evans & Son, 3 Cir., 1950, 181 F.2d 427, 431. The petitioner's contention that the trial examiner was biased and prejudiced against it does not warra......
  • Peabody Coal Company v. NLRB
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    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • September 2, 1960
    ...however, Fry involved only two charging parties and these two had in fact been discharged from a going concern. In N. L. R. B. v. S. W. Evans & Son, 3 Cir., 1950, 181 F.2d 427, to which our attention is also invited by the Board, the Court noted (at page 431) that the complaint there stated......

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