Abdullah v. American Airlines Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 June 1999
• Docket Number: Nos. 98-7055 and 98-7056,s. 98-7055 and 98-7056
• Citation: 181 F.3d 363
• Parties: (3rd Cir. 1999) KHALED ABDULLAH; KHITHAM ABDULLAH; v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. AUDREY JAMES; EARDLEY JAMES; VELMA GEORGE; KOTNIE GEORGE v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. KHALED ABDULLAH AND KHITHAM ABDULLAH, APPELLANTS (NO. 98-7055) AUDREY JAMES, EARDLEY JAMES, VELMA GEORGE AND KOTNIE GEORGE, APPELLANTS (NO. 98-7056)
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 363

181 F.3d 363 (3rd Cir. 1999)

KHALED ABDULLAH; KHITHAM ABDULLAH; v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.

AUDREY JAMES; EARDLEY JAMES; VELMA GEORGE; KOTNIE GEORGE v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.

KHALED ABDULLAH AND KHITHAM ABDULLAH, APPELLANTS (NO. 98-7055)

AUDREY JAMES, EARDLEY JAMES, VELMA GEORGE AND KOTNIE GEORGE, APPELLANTS (NO. 98-7056)

Nos. 98-7055 and 98-7056

U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit

Argued December 10, 1998

Decided June 23, 1999

On Appeal from the Appellate Court of the District Court of the Virgin Islands Division of St. Croix District Judge: Honorable Raymond L. Finch (D.C. Civil Action No. 91-cv-00277) (D.Ct. No. 91-cv-00277) (D.Ct. No. 93-cv-00108)

Gordon C. Rhea, Esquire (Argued) Alkon, Rhea & Hart 2115 Queen Street Christiansted, St. Croix Usvi, 00820 Lee Rohn, Esquire Maurice J. Cusick, Esquire (Argued) Rohn & Cusick 1101 King Street Christiansted, St. Croix Usvi, 00820 Attorneys for Appellants

R. Eric Moore, Esquire Law Office of R. Eric Moore Downtown Station P.o. Box 3086 Christiansted, St. Croix Usvi, 00822 Jeffrey J. Ellis, Esquire (Argued) Quirk & Bakalor 845 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 Attorneys for Appellee

Before: Roth, Lewis and Garth, Circuit Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

Roth, Circuit Judge

After a jury had awarded plaintiffs-appellants Khaled Abdullah, Audrey James, Eardley James, and Velma George damages for injuries sustained during an American Airlines flight, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, Division of Saint Croix, ordered a new trial. The court's action was based on its Conclusion that it had improperly relied upon territorial common law to establish the standards of care that were used by the jury to determine that negligence on the part of American Airlines' employees had caused appellants' injuries. Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 337, 340-41 (D.V.I. 1997). The court found that the 1958 Federal Aviation Act, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731, (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-49105) (FAA), implicitly preempts territorial standards for aviation safety,¹ and that the jury should not have been instructed on a territorial law standard of care. Abdullah, 969 F. Supp. at 341. Concluding that the error regarding federal preemption resulted in the admission of evidence on standards of care that was not limited to federally established standards of care and that this evidence was prejudicial, the court ordered a new trial. Id . at 340. At plaintiffs' request, the District Court then certified the following issue for appeal:

Does federal law preempt the standards for air safety, but preserve State and Territorial damage remedies?

We will answer both parts of this certified question with a "yes." As to the first part of the question, contrary to courts that have found that federal law does not preempt state and territorial air safety standards, or that federal law only preempts discrete aspects thereof, we find implied federal preemption of the entire field of aviation safety. As to the second part, we conclude that, despite federal preemption of the standards of care, state and territorial damage remedies still exist for violation of those standards.

Our finding on preemption is based on our determination that the FAA and relevant federal regulations establish complete and thorough safety standards for interstate and international air transportation and that these standards are not subject to supplementation by, or variation among, jurisdictions. Thus, we agree with the District Court that it was error to rely upon territorial safety standards in determining American Airlines' liability in this case.

In coming to our Conclusion on preemption, we do not, however, agree with the narrow nature of the federal standard set out by the District Court. We conclude instead that there is an overarching general standard of care under the FAA and its regulations. This standard arises in particular from 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a): "No person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another." Thus, we do not agree with the District Court's determination that evidence on "reasonable standard of care" should necessarily have been excluded -- as long as a "reasonable standard of care" is compatible with an avoidance of carelessness or recklessness in the operation of the aircraft.² We will remand this case to the District Court to review both the testimony and the jury instructions on standards of care in order to determine if they are consistent with the standards we set out here. If they are, the jury verdict should be reinstated. If they are not, the District Court should proceed with a new trial, and in that trial the court should follow the federal standards as we establish them here.

I. Background

Plaintiffs Khaled Abdullah, Audrey James, Eardley James, and Velma George were passengers on American Airlines Flight 1473 from New York to San Juan, Puerto Rico, on August 28, 1991. En route, the aircraft encountered severe turbulence which caused serious injuries to a number of passengers, including the plaintiffs. The First Officer had noticed a weather system developing in the flight path and had illuminated the seatbelt sign. He had also gone to the back of the aircraft to warn the flight attendants that the ride could get choppy in ten minutes. None of the crew, however, alerted the passengers of the expected turbulence. Nor did the pilot change course in order to avoid the storm. Some of the injured passengers were wearing their seatbelts; some were not.

Plaintiffs filed two separate lawsuits against defendant American Airlines, Inc., alleging negligence on the part of the pilot and flight crew in failing to take reasonable precautions to avoid the turbulent conditions known to them and in failing to give warnings reasonably calculated to permit plaintiffs to take steps to protect themselves.³

A jury trial commenced on August 7, 1995, in the District Court of the Virgin Islands, Division of Saint Croix. The plaintiffs' cases were consolidated for trial. On August 25, 1995, the jury found American liable, found plaintiffs to be without any contributory fault, and awarded monetary damages aggregating more than two million dollars.

American filed a post-trial motion which requested dismissal and/or a new trial plus attorney's fees and costs. Among the grounds asserted was that the District Court had improperly used territorial common law to establish the standards of care for the pilots, flight attendants, and passengers. American argued that the FAA implicitly preempts the standards for airline safety.

The District Court issued an Opinion on June 5, 1997, holding that the FAA impliedly preempts state and territorial regulation of aviation safety and standards of care for pilots, flight attendants, and passengers, but that plaintiffs may recover under state and territorial law for violation of federal standards. Abdullah, 969 F. Supp. at 341. The District Court held that its error of law regarding preemption, which resulted in admission of evidence regarding standards other than the federal standards, warranted a new trial.

Upon motion of the plaintiffs, the District Court certified this issue for interlocutory review. We granted interlocutory review.

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

Subject matter jurisdiction in the District Court rested on diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

We accepted jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which permits us to accept an interlocutory appeal where there is "substantial ground for a difference of opinion" on an issue and "an immediate appeal . . . may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation."

The appeal involves a question of law, so that the standard of review is plenary. Epwright v. Environmental Resources Management, Inc. Health & Welfare Plan, 81 F.3d 335, 339 (3d Cir. 1996); Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1994).

The scope of review is not limited to the issues articulated in the section 1292(b) certification motion. "As the text of § 1292(b) indicates, appellate jurisdiction applies to the order certified to the court of appeals, and is not tied to the particular question formulated by the district court." Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205 (1996). "[T]he appellate court may address any issue fairly included within the certified order because `it is the order that is appealable, and not the controlling question identified by the district court.' " Id. (quoting 9 J. Moore & B. Ward, Moore's Federal Practice para 110.25[1], p. 300 (2d ed. 1995)).

III. Discussion

The power of Congress to preempt state law derives from the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. "Consideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause `start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by . . . Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress'." Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). "Accordingly, `[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' of pre-emption analysis." Id. (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has cautioned that "despite the variety of these opportunities for federal preeminence, we have never assumed lightly that Congress has derogated state regulation, but instead have addressed claims of pre-emption with the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law." New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654, 1671 131 L.Ed.2d 695, (1995). The Court in Cipollone stated...