St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Allen

Decision Date18 August 1910
Citation181 F. 710
PartiesST. LOUIS & S.F.R. CO. v. ALLEN et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas

The facts alleged in the bill are substantially as follows: The complainant is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Missouri, and is a citizen of that state. The defendants R. P. Allen and W. A. Falconer and J. W. Crockett are citizens and residents of Arkansas, and constitute the Railroad Commission of the state of Arkansas. D. B. Horsley prosecuting attorney for the Fourth judicial circuit of Arkansas, including the counties of Washington and Benton, is a citizen and resident of the Western district of Arkansas and the amount in controversy includes, exclusive of costs $2,000. The bill then alleges that complainant owns and operates a line of railroad extending from the city of St Louis, in the state of Missouri, in a southwesterly direction to Seligman, in the state of Missouri, near which point it enters the state of Arkansas, passing through the counties of Benton and Washington, in which latter county the station of Johnson is located; thence through Crawford and Sebastian counties, in the state of Arkansas, to the city of Ft. Smith, in the latter county; thence in a southerly direction, crossing and re-crossing the line between the state of Arkansas and the state of Oklahoma, to a point at or near the town of Jenson; thence, continuing in the state of Oklahoma, to the town of Poteau, Okl., at which point freight destined to De Queen in Sevier county, Ark., is transferred to the Kansas City Southern Railway Company, a connecting line, and is by said line transported to a point on the Oklahoma and Arkansas state line near the northwest corner of Polk county in the state of Arkansas, where it crosses the Arkansas state line into the county of Polk, in the state of Arkansas, and through said county into the county of Sevier to De Queen, in the state of Arkansas.

The bill alleges: That the Railroad Commission prior to the filing of the bill adopted what is known as rule 44, in the words and figures as follows: 'In case of failure on the part of the shipper to give routing instructions, it shall be the duty of the railroad receiving the shipment to forward it via such route as will make the lowest rate. ' Plaintiff alleges that the object of the Commission in passing said rule was to compel plaintiff and other railroads to ship freight which would naturally and properly be shipped by interstate shipment according to the rate fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commission under the laws of the United States a much greater distance without allowing the freight to pass beyond the state limits, and at a rate fixed by the State Commission far below the rate fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commission for the same class and character of freight between the same points, and to make a state rate in competition with the rates fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commission far below the rate fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commission at points where the state rate comes which was in competition with the rates so fixed for interstate shipments. That in pursuance of said determination, after having adopted and promulgated said rule, the said Railroad Commission on the 8th day of December, 1908, caused D. B. Horsley, the prosecuting attorney for the Fourth judicial district, to bring suit for a penalty of $3,000 against this plaintiff in the Washington circuit court, alleging and claiming that this plaintiff had incurred a liability in the sum of $3,000 for a failure to observe said rule, in that it on the 30th day of October, 1907, received a shipment of lime from the Ozark White Lime Company at Johnson, aforesaid, which was billed to and to be shipped to De Queen in Sevier county, Ark., a point on the Kansas City Southern Railway Company's line, and to which point plaintiff's line did not extend, alleging and claiming that the shipper did not give routing instructions, and alleging and claiming that it was the duty of this plaintiff to have routed said shipment from Johnson, Ark., to Van Buren, Ark., a distance of 63 miles, there to have been transferred and delivered to the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company, and by it transported to Little Rock, Ark., a distance of 158 miles, and there to be transferred to the main line of the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway, to be by it transported to the town of Hope, in Hempstead county, Ark., a distance of 112 miles, there to be delivered to the St. Louis, San Francisco & New Orleans Railway Company, and by it to be transported to Ashdown, in Little River county, Ark., a distance of 32 miles, there to be delivered to the Kansas City Southern Railway Company to be by it transported in a due north direction, a distance of 35 miles to De Queen, in Sevier county, Ark., the total distance to be transported over a very circuitous route being 400 miles for a rate fixed for the entire distance by the State Railroad Commission of 12 cents per hundred pounds. That the act of this plaintiff which was complained of by said Commission was the transportation of said shipment from Johnson, in Washington county, Ark., by interstate lines on an interstate rate to Poteau, in the state of Oklahoma, a distance of 97 miles, where it delivered said shipment to the Kansas City Southern Railway Company, to be by it transported a distance of 107 miles to De Queen, in Sevier county, in the state of Arkansas, at a rate of 23 cents per hundred pounds, which was the rate fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commission under the act of Congress for that class of shipments for the entire distance, which rate was posted by plaintiff at its various stations, according to the act of Congress and rules prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Plaintiff alleges that De Queen is almost in a direct line south from Johnson, and by the route which shipment moved was 204 miles from the point of origin to destination; that the route selected by plaintiff for said consignment was the usual and ordinary route for the shipment of freight between said points; that there was no other route by which the plaintiff could reasonably have made said shipment; that the defendant Railroad Commission is insisting that, instead of sending said shipment by said route, this plaintiff should have routed said shipment to Van Buren, Ark., in a southerly direction, a distance of 63 miles, from Van Buren to Little Rock in an almost easterly direction, a distance of 158 miles, from Little Rock to Hope in a southwesterly direction, a distance of 112 miles, from Hope to Ashdown in a northwesterly direction, a distance of 32 miles, and from Ashdown to De Queen in an almost due north course, and in direct line toward the point of origin of said shipment, a distance of 35 miles.

Plaintiff alleges that no shipment had ever been made between said points over this circuitous line of which it is aware; that no shippers, to plaintiff's knowledge, have desired that any shipment should move over such line; and that the only object that the Commission could have in trying to force the shipment to be made in this way was to bring the interstate rate of 23 cents per hundred pounds for this shipment, a distance of 204 miles, in direct competition with the rate fixed by this Commission on lines 400 miles in length, requiring many changes, at the rate of 12 cents per hundred pounds, thereby compelling the railroads to perform nearly double the service for a fraction more than one-half of the rate fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commission as a reasonable rate for the performance of this service.

Plaintiff alleges that said Railroad Commission has been insisting upon and pressing the trial of said suit by D. B. Horsley, prosecuting attorney, and endeavoring to force the collection of a penalty of $3,000 for the failure of this plaintiff to observe said rule; that the said Railroad Commission is insisting and claiming that said rule is a valid rule in full force and effect, and that plaintiff should observe the same in all shipments, and plaintiff alleges, if it should comply with said rule, it would thereby violate the act of Congress requiring it to ship at no greater or less rate between said points than that fixed for that class of freight.

Plaintiff alleges that no authority has been conferred upon said Commission to make, promulgate, and enforce said rule either by state or national legislation, and that said Commission does not possess such authority; that the rule is in direct conflict with the laws of the United States and the regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and is void.

Plaintiff alleges that there are a large number of points upon its line within the state of Arkansas that are similarly situated, and that said rule, if enforced, would compel it to make constant shipments contrary to the rates established with the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the interstate commerce law, with which law the said rule directly conflicts, and plaintiff alleges that, should it not conform to said rule, it is threatened with innumerable suits for shipments made under like circumstances for penalties which are so severe that the complainant, in the event the rule is upheld, must suffer great and irreparable damages; that said rule was intended to deter plaintiff from obeying the interstate commerce law, and deter it from a compliance with the rules and rates fixed, and which have been approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and which rates had been posted by plaintiff as required by the interstate commerce act.

Plaintiff alleges that it has its regular rates which have been approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission of the United States and are...

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2 cases
  • Van Camp Sea Food Co. v. Westgate Sea Products Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • November 5, 1928
    ...upon motion; but a like rule is applicable generally to bills in equity. Failey v. Talbee (C. C.) 55 F 892; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v Allen (C. C.) 181 F. 710, 723. When it is clear that under no state of the evidence can plaintiff make a case of infringement, it would be idle to go furthe......
  • Steel v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • May 7, 1912
    ... ... 222; ... Hanley v. Railroad, 187 U.S. 617; Railroad v ... Pennsylvania, 145 U.S. 192; Railroad v ... Illinois, 118 U.S. 557; Railroad v. Allen, 181 ... F. 710; Railroad v. Hadley, 168 F. 340. (2) Action ... of the kind described in plaintiff's petition are ... governed by the Interstate ... ...

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