Nelson v. Traders' Ins. Co. of Chicago

• Decision Date: 30 May 1905
• Citation: 181 N.Y. 472,74 N.E. 421
• Parties: NELSON et al. v. TRADERS' INS. CO. OF CHICAGO.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

181 N.Y. 472

74 N.E. 421

NELSON et al.

v.TRADERS' INS. CO. OF CHICAGO.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 30, 1905.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Action by Leroy E. Nelson and others against the Traders' Insurance Company of Chicago. From an order of the Appellate Division (83 N. Y. Supp. 220) sustaining defendant's exceptions ordered to be held in the first instance by the Appellate Division after verdict directed in favor of plaintiffs, and granting a motion for a new trial, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

J. N. Hammond, for appellants.

Hiram R. Wood, for respondent.

GRAY, J.

The policy of fire insurance, upon which the plaintiffs sue, was issued by the defendant in the New York standard form, and covered a stock of goods in a store and basement occupied by them in the village of Seneca Falls, in this state. The defense made to the suit was that the insurance had ceased, by reason of the fall of the building, prior to the breaking out of the fire. The facts are not in dispute, and but a question of law is raised. The plaintiffs' premises were in a part of a brick building, the four exterior walls of which were of brick. The interior of the building was subdivided by lath and plaster partitions. The first floor was upon, and level with, the street. In the center, a hall and stairway led from the street to the upper stories, and, with a partition extending to the rear, divided the floor. To the west of the stairway was the plaintiffs' store, and beneath it was their basement. The part east of the stairway and the upper floors of the entire building, as well as the basement on the east side, were used for hotel purposes. In March, 1902, the east wall of the building collapsed, and fell outwards and into a vacant lot upon that side, and with it fell not only the whole easterly half of the building, but also a portion of that which was over the plaintiffs' store. A range, in which there had been a fire, was precipitated into the mass of débris, and a fire broke out, which did not, however, reach to plaintiffs' premises. It was conceded that it occurred after the collapse of the building, and, whatever the damage sustained by the plaintiffs, it was caused in the main by the efforts of the fire department to subdue the flames. The policy of insurance by its language covered the plaintiffs' stock of merchandise ‘while contained in the three story brick metal roof building, with basement, situated on the south side of Fall street,’ etc. It contained this condition: ‘If the building, or any part thereof, fall, except as the result of fire, the insurance by this policy on such building, or its contents, shall immediately cease.’

I have not been referred to any decision by this court relating to this latter clause, and, so far as my examination has gone, there is none. It is argued for the appellants, in effect, that to give a literal reading to this condition of the policy, in such a case as these facts present, is unreasonable, and that it should be construed as referring to the ‘particular structure occupied by itself as a store for any special business,’ and not to the general building. Such was the view taken by the dissenting justices below. In my opinion, the determination of the Appellate Division, that the insurance had ceased, was right. This was a contract, which, like any other contract, should be enforced according to its plain provisions. Its language is clear and unambiguous, and the provision or condition in question cannot be construed otherwise than it has been, without twisting the words, and thus rendering nugatory a limitation of the hazard, which it was not improper nor unfair for the insurer to impose. It was for the purpose of...