Commonwealth v. Regan

Decision Date18 June 1902
Citation182 Mass. 22,64 N.E. 407
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. REGAN et al.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
COUNSEL

George

A. Sanderson, for the Commonwealth.

Nathan D. Pratt, for defendants.

OPINION

HOLMES C.J.

This is a complaint for exposing and keeping for sale intoxicating liquors with intent unlawfully to sell the same. The defendants justified under licenses as innholders and also licenses of the first and fourth class to sell liquors. At the trial it appeared that the defendants sold intoxicating liquors on Sunday, in the dining rooms of their hotel, to persons who first had ordered and had been served with food for which a separate charge was made and which was paid for. The main question of the case is raised by the fourth and fifth requests for instructions, and by the charge upon that point by the judge. The instructions requested were in substance that if a person seemingly in good faith orders food for which he has to pay and expects to pay, the licensed innholder lawfully may serve him intoxicating liquor with it if that also is ordered. The presiding justice on the other hand instructed the jury that if a man 'ordered a turkey dinner,' still he would not be a guest resorting to the hotel for food within the meaning of the statute if his object in going there was to get the liquor and his ordering the food a mere means of obtaining it. The distinction it will be seen is very important. A majority of the Court is of opinion that the exceptions must be sustained.

The business of an innholder is not put under a ban by the law. It must be assumed to be respectable even when involving the sale of liquors by license. We cannot suppose that the Legislature meant to make its license illusory and the innholder's liability to fine a pure matter of chance, as they would be if the innholder is responsible whenever a guest wants the food he pays for only as a means of obtaining his drink. The statute imposes a penalty and it should be construed in a reasonable, practical way rather than so as to make the business impossible or a lottery.

The language of the section is 'if the licensee is also licensed as an innholder, he may supply such liquor to guests who have resorted to his house for food or lodging.' Pub St. c. 100, § 9, cl. 2; Rev. Laws, c. 100, § 17, cl. 2. According to the common usage of English speech, the word 'guest' signifies a relation determined by outward circumstances, not by inward intent. No doubt the instruction was based upon the words 'who have resorted to his house for food.' But those words are satisfied if to purchase food is the actual purpose of the one who resorts to his house. They do not require the purpose mentioned to be the final motive. A man resorts to a house for food who goes there intending to buy food and eat it, and none the less that the motive of his intent is an ulterior desire. Were it otherwise it might be hard to state why a distinction should be taken between the case where the motive of the intent is desire for drink and where it is desire for conversation with a friend.

The proposition may be illustrated further by the alternative case of guests who have resorted to the house for lodging. It hardly would be maintained that a person did not resort to the inn for that purpose because the object to his lodging there was fornication or to concoct a scheme for housebreaking. Conversely, no one would say that if a man gave another poison he did not administer it for poisoning because his only motive for wishing to poison was some desire which was virtuous apart from the means employed.

The decisions about the purchase of food as a mere subterfuge turn not on the ultimate motive but on the external visible facts. When the transaction in its visible form is, or may be found to be, in substance, merely a sale of liquor, it is not helped by adding a cracker and a bit of cheese, or by calling it a sale of the latter and a gift of the drink. Com. v Hagan, 140 Mass. 289, 3 N.E. 207; In Com. v. Moore...

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5 cases
  • Commonwealth v. Nickerson
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • September 17, 1920
    ......Upon a complaint for an illegal sale the commonwealth makes out its case by showing a sale of intoxicating liquor. The defendant, in order to escape conviction, must prove his license. R. L. c. 219, § 7; Commonwealth v. Regan, 182 Mass. 22, 25, 64 N. E. 407. As matter of statutory construction, the prohibition is general, the license is exceptional. The latter is dependent upon the efficacy of a valid local vote and a genuine license. This being the purpose and plan of the statute, its prohibitory features are not so ......
  • Commonwealth v. Nickerson
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • September 17, 1920
    ...a sale of intoxicating liquor. The defendant, in order to escape conviction, must prove his license. R.L.c. 219, Section 7. Commonwealth v. Regan, 182 Mass. 22 , 25. As of statutory construction, the prohibition is general, the license is exceptional. The latter is dependent upon the effica......
  • Commonwealth v. Coughlin
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • February 24, 1903
    ...was properly refused. The burden of proving that the sales made were sales within the license was on the prisoner. Com. v. Regan (Mass.) 64 N. E. 407. Exceptions...
  • Commonwealth v. Coughlin
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • February 24, 1903
    ...tenth ruling was properly refused. The burden of proving that the sales made were sales within the license was on the prisoner. Com. v. Regan (Mass.) 64 N.E. 407. sustained. ...
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