McQuail v. Shell Oil Co.
| Decision Date | 12 July 1962 |
| Parties | John H. McQUAIL and Helen McQuail, his wife, who brought suit with John W. Dukes, et al., Plaintiffs Below, Appellants, v. SHELL OIL COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Joseph S. Dayton, Harry H. Lambert and Harry B. Roberts, Jr., constituting the Levy Court of New Castle County; and Bayard A. Vandegrift, William R. Manning, John F. Porter, Charles C. Gammons, and Harvey G. Cole, constituting the New Castle County Zoning Commission, and Grey M. Budd, Frances K. Budd, Edward R. Cordery, Lucy C. Cordery, Mary C. Derrickson, Lone Manor Farms, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Harry W. Lynch, Jr., Mary T. Lynch, Ruth F. Vogel, Susanna C. Wallace, Augustus E. Sheats, Elizabeth S. Sheats, Daniel C. Casapulla, Dorothy L. Casapulla, Nolan V. Williams, Meta Williams, Freeman Segars, Ruby B. Segars, Joseph A. Krejci, William H. Brady, Jr., Edith F. Brady, Michael Kitschik and Elena Kitschik, Defendants Below, Appellees. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Delaware |
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Chancery of New Castle County dismissing a complaint for an injunction against a rezoning order. Affirmed.
William Prickett, Jr., of Prickett, Prickett & Tybout, Wilmington, for appellants.
Edmund N. Carpenter, II, and Richard J. Abrams, of Richards, Layton & Finger, Wilmington, for appellee Shell Oil Company.
Clarence W. Taylor and Robert C. O'Hora, Wilmington, for Levy Court of New Castle County and New Castle County Zoning Commission.
William F. Lynch, II, of Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams, Wilmington, for certain individual appellees.
Clair J. Killoran, of Killoran & VanBrunt, Wilmington, for certain individual appellees.
David F. Anderson, of Berl, Potter & Anderson, Wilmington, for appellee Ruth F. Vogel.
Foseph Donald Craven, Wilmington, for appellee Joseph A. Krejci.
Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the Court of Chancery upholding the decisions of the Levy Court of New Castle County and the New Castle County Zoning Commission, which approved a change of zone of land for Shell Oil Company from R-2 (agricultural and general purposes) to M-3 (heavy industry). The Court denied plaintiffs' prayers for injunctive relief against the defendants to prevent the reclassification from becoming effective because of the alleged invalid action of the Levy Court and the Zoning Commission.
Shell Oil Company is a large oil company with refineries in other parts of the United States, but not on the east coast. It wishes to operate a refinery in the east since the east coast is one of the largest petroleum markets in the United States. It submitted to experts the problem of locating a site. As a consequence of their recommendation, Shell, in the latter part of 1960 and early in 1961, procured options to purchase fourteen parcels of land in the Deakyneville area of Blackbird Hundred, totaling approximately 3,345 acres, from their owners. This acreage comprised two large irregular-shaped tracts of land with a 'corridor' of land between. The area in question is five miles from the nearest thickly populated area and is sparsely inhabited. It was zoned R-2 in 1954 by the Levy Court when that body adopted a zoning plan and regulations for those portions of the county lying outside of incorporated municipalities, pursuant to an enactment of the General Assembly. 9 Del.Code, Chap. 26.
The land optioned by Shell is especially suited to its purposes because of its water frontage on the Delaware River, which will provide water transportation for large tankers. At the same time, the site is elevated sufficiently over the water so as not to be subject to floods and disasters. Furthermore, the affluence of water is desirable for the use of the refinery.
Since all of the properties that Shell desires are classified R-2, Shell and the owners of the land petitioned the New Castle County Zoning Commission on May 5, 1961, to reclassify the land in question to heavy industrial use (M-3), in accordance with 9 Del.Code, Chap. 26. A hearing was had before the Commission on May 24, 1961. The Commission reserved decision in order to give the matter thorough study and to give the public an opportunity to submit their views. The majority of the Commission concluded that the entire land under consideration would find its best use in industrial purposes. The dissenting member of the Commission felt that the rezoning of some of the land involved was desirable but that something less than the entire area should be rezoned at that time.
The recommendations of the Commission, together with a map showing the change suggested by the Commission, were submitted to the Levy Court of New Castle County by report dated July 17, 1961, in compliance with the law. A further hearing was held before the Levy Court on August 8, 1961. This hearing excited great local interest. After extensive testimony and public debate, the Levy Court, on August 29, 1961, by majority vote, made the legislative decision to rezone 2,625 acres of the lands held on option by Shell to M-3 classification.
On September 11, 1961, a complaint was filed in the Court of Chancery by ten plaintiffs 1 requesting that Court to direct the Levy Court to rescind its resolution of August 29, 1961, and praying for injunctive relief against the use of the said parcels of land for any purpose in violation of the R-2 classification.
It was agreed that the Court would, at this time, consider only Count 1 of the complaint, 2 and the matter was submitted to the Court for decision on the record before the Zoning Commission and the Levy Court, together with depositions and other documents agreed upon by the parties.
On January 19, 1962, the Court of Chancery rendered its decision dismissing the first count of the complaint, Dukes v. Shell Oil Company, Del.Ch., 177 A.2d 785, and consequently upholding the action of the Levy Court. Reversal is here sought chiefly on the ground that the Levy Court failed to comply with the Delaware statute that the proposed use be in accordance with a plan for the area. In addition, plaintiffs contend that the Vice-Chancellor erred in excluding from his consideration the deposition testimony of the Levy Court Commissioners; that the proceedings before the Levy Court should be declared invalid because the Levy Court's attorneys, at the direction of the Commissioners, held a private meeting with Shell's attorney; and lastly, that the Levy Court improperly placed the burden of proof on the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs' principal contention is that the Levy Court's action is invalid because it did not comply with the statute in that it failed to establish a plan for the area involved prior to or contemporaneously with the application to rezone the lands involved in the petition. The plaintiffs contend, in effect, that the Levy Court failed to establish a plan for the area for the future and acted solely for the benefit of Shell by spot-zoning only those lands in which Shell had a private interest.
Originally, Shell petitioned to have 3,345 acres rezoned from R-2 to M-3. The Zoning Commission approved this request. The Levy Court subtracted approximately 600 acres from this request after acquiring the consent of Shell to do so, and finally approved a reclassification for 2,625 acres to M-3. The majority of the Levy Court wished this change so that a portion of the marshlands could be continued in its present use as a wildlife habitat. However, many acres of marshland were rezoned to M-3. The final decision of the Levy Court resulted in the reclassification of two large, irregular tracts which were separated from each other by a corridor. Plaintiffs contend that this 'corridor' should have been taken into consideration by the Levy Court, and that it should have been rezoned at the same time as Shell's tracts. Thus, plaintiffs claim that the Levy Court did not rezone enough land. At the same time, they claim that the Levy Court rezoned too much land for Shell because Shell had no immediate use for much of the rezoned lands in the construction and operation of its refinery, and will hold much of the land for future industrial development, either for its own intended uses or for the use of other industries as it shall choose in the future who may purchase from Shell. Plaintiffs claim there is no inconsistency in their positions that 'too much land was reclassified' or that 'too little land was reclassified' for the reason that this merely establishes the fact that the Levy Court did not make a rational decision with a plan in mind for the future development of the entire area, but simply gave Shell substantially the rezoning requested because Shell would not accept less.
The General Assembly, pursuant to its power derived from the Constitution of the State of Delaware, 3 enacted legislation 4 which empowered the Levy Court to zone and control land use in New Castle County outside of any incorporated municipality. This legislation gave the Levy Court power to create zoning districts and to regulate the use of buildings and lands in those districts (§§ 2601 and 2602). In Section 2603, the following declaration of legislative policy in adoption of zoning regulations appears:
'Regulations * * * shall be designated and adopted for the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, convenience, order, prosperity or welfare of the present and future inhabitants of this State * * *'.
Section 2603 also establishes standards which require that such regulations be designed to lessen congestion in streets or roads; to secure safety from fires and other dangers; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent overcrowding of land; to prevent undue concentration or scattering of population; and to promote distribution of population and classification of land uses and distribution of land development which will tend to facilitate and provide adequate provisions for public...
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