Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Louisiana

• Decision Date: 22 December 1910
• Docket Number: 55.
• Parties: TEXAS & PAC. RY. CO. et al. v. RAILROAD COMMISSION OF LOUISIANA.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

183 F. 1005

TEXAS & PAC. RY. CO. et al. v. RAILROAD COMMISSION OF LOUISIANA.

No. 55.

United States Circuit Court, E.D. Louisiana, Baton Rouge Division.

December 22, 1910

Howe Spencer & Cocke, Hudson, Potts & Bernstein, and Alexander &amp Wilkinson, for plaintiffs.

Walter Guion, Atty. Gen., and E. H. McCaleb, Jr., for defendant.

FOSTER District Judge.

It appears that the Texas & Pacific Railway Company, the St Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company, and the Kansas City Southern Railway Company, complainants herein, had filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission a schedule of rates for the carriage from points in Louisiana to New Orleans on export shipments. The Railway Commission of Louisiana had also fixed a schedule of different and lower rates on local shipments between the same points. By order of the Railway Commission of Louisiana, 4 days free storage was allowed on local shipments, and 20 days on shipments intended for export. The railroads acquiesced in allowing 20 days free storage on freight intended for export and also delivered same at ship's side free of charge for switching.

Thereafter some 21 cars of staves and poplar logs intended for export were shipped from interior points in Louisiana to New Orleans on bills of lading of substantially the local form. On arrival the consignees demanded, and received, the free storage accorded export shipments, and in due course, at their request, the freight was switched to ship's side without additional cost, and was never out of the physical possession of the carriers until actually delivered to the ship. In collecting charges, the said railroads applied the higher rate fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commission for export shipments. On complaint of the consignees, the Railroad Commission of Louisiana assessed certain fines, exceeding $2,000, against complainants, and complainants seek by this proceeding to have the collection of those fines enjoined.

It is contended by complainants that the said shipments constituted foreign commerce, and therefore the Interstate Commerce Commission had jurisdiction over their movement, and the Louisiana Railroad Commission had not. They rely upon the cases of The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 19 L.Ed. 999, Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 524, 6 Sup.Ct. 475, 29 L.Ed. 715, Swift & Co. v. U.S., 196 U.S. 375, 25 Sup.Ct. 276, 49 L.Ed. 518, Armour Packing Co. v. U.S., 209 U.S. 56, 28 Sup.Ct. 428, 52 L.Ed. 681, General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 28 Sup.Ct. 475, 52 L.Ed. 754, and Cutting v. Florida R. & Nav. Co. (C.C.) 46 F. 641, and various other decisions to the same effect not necessary to more fully cite. The defendants, on the other hand, say the shipments must be considered intrastate commerce, that the cases above cited do not apply, except the Cutting Case, and this decision is overruled by the case of Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Texas, 204 U.S. 403, 27 Sup.Ct. 360, 51 L.Ed. 540, hereafter referred to as the Texas Case, which must be considered the controlling authority.

On the facts as found by him, which are not disputed, the master adopted the contention of defendants, and, basing his conclusions of law entirely on the Texas Case, has recommended that the bill be dismissed. The matter is before me on exceptions of complainants to the master's conclusions of law, and the sole question to be determined is whether the shipments constitute intrastate or foreign commerce.

Undoubtedly the Interstate Commerce Commission has jurisdiction and authority to regulate rates on freight actually moving in foreign commerce, for that part of the carriage through the United States, whether such transportation be interstate or wholly within one state. So, too, the Railroad Commission of Louisiana has authority to regulate rates of transportation on all shipments beginning and ending in the state. In their respective spheres each is supreme, and neither can infringe the authority of the other. But it is plain that both railroad and shipper should be enabled to decide with certainty as to which rules to obey when there is conflict between them, and neither should be permitted to take advantage of the incidental conditions imposed, or privileges allowed, in connection with one rate when applying the other rate to the shipment.

Under the bills of lading, in the instant case, the consignee might have demanded delivery at New Orleans on payment of the lower rate; but he would have received the goods at the depot, or the usual place of delivery, and the railroad was under no obligation to deliver anywhere else; and he would not have been entitled to more than 4 days free...