Grant v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 08 January 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A.00-12186-JGD.,CIV.A.00-12186-JGD. |
| Citation | 183 F.Supp.2d 344 |
| Parties | Larry J. GRANT, Plaintiff, v. JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL, LIFE INSURANCE CO., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Matthew Cobb, Law Firm of Matthew Cobb, Boston, MA, for Plaintiff.
Harry T. Daniels, Danielle Y. Vanderzanden, Hale and Dorr LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendants.
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket # 46). The plaintiff, Larry Grant ("Grant"), has brought suit against John Hancock Life Insurance Company ("Hancock") and two Hancock security officers, John Glancy ("Glancy") and Steven O'Brien ("O'Brien"), alleging constitutional and common law claims resulting from Grant's initial employment with Hancock, a physical altercation between Grant and the security officers shortly after the termination of his employment with Hancock, and the subsequent criminal prosecution of Grant for assault and battery. Fourteen claims are being pressed against the defendants:1 claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Glancy and O'Brien (Count I), against all three defendants (Count II), and against Hancock alone (Count III), common law claims for malicious prosecution (Count V), assault (Count VI), battery (Count VII), civil conspiracy (Count XII), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count XIII), and false imprisonment (Count XV) against all defendants; a claim under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act against all defendants (Count VIII); and claims of negligence (Count IX), negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count XIV), promissory estoppel (Count X), and fraud or deceit (Count XI) solely against Hancock.
For the reasons detailed herein, the motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS2
Larry Grant began working for John Hancock Life Insurance Company in July of 1996. (PF ¶ 13). Grant contends that during the interview process he had been promised that his job duties would not include actuarial modeling using a software program called "PTS," a fact which Hancock disputes. (PF ¶¶ 3, 6, 10; DF ¶¶ 20-27). It is undisputed that Grant was immediately assigned duties involving PTS modeling. (PF ¶ 14; DF ¶ 28). Grant allegedly voiced complaints about having to perform this work beginning in December 1996 (PF ¶¶ 17, 18, 21), but was nevertheless given other projects involving PTS modeling. (PF ¶¶ 18, 20, 25). In the Spring or Summer of 1998, Grant began seeking work elsewhere, and eventually secured a position with another employer to begin on September 14, 1998. (PF ¶¶ 31, 34; see DF ¶ 28).
On September 1, 1998, Grant allegedly informed his Hancock supervisor, William Hines, that he was resigning and that his last day of work would be September 11, 1998. (PF ¶¶ 30, 35-38). He sent an e-mail to Hines on September 2, 1998, stating that his "resignation will commence as of September 1, 1998." (DF App. at 187; PF ¶ 41). Grant did not report to work on September 8 and 9, 1998 due to illness. (PF ¶¶ 42, 44). On September 11, 1998, Grant reported to work, he claims for the purpose of collecting his personal belongings. (PF ¶ 45). It is undisputed that on the afternoon of September 11, 1998, Hines told Grant that he was immediately terminated due to unexplained absences, and instructed Grant to collect his belongings and leave. (PF ¶¶ 48, 51; DF ¶ 32).
After Grant had packed some of his belongings from his cubicle, Hancock security officer Steven O'Brien told Grant that Grant's bags would have to be searched before Grant could leave. (PF ¶¶ 52-54). When Grant refused to let O'Brien search his bags without a police officer present, O'Brien summoned his supervisor. (PF ¶ 56). Grant was allowed to leave and told O'Brien's supervisor that he would soon return to collect the balance of his possessions. (PF ¶¶ 57-58). Grant went home, dropped off his personal belongings and then returned to the Stuart Street entrance at Hancock, as he had been instructed by O'Brien's supervisor. (PF ¶¶ 58-59). When Grant returned, he was escorted to his cubicle by O'Brien and John Glancy, another Hancock security officer. (PF ¶ 59). At Grant's cubicle, Grant began to retrieve his belongings and then tried to close down a computer application. (PF ¶ 63). The precise details as to what occurred next are in dispute, although it is undisputed that Grant and the security officers got involved in a physical altercation which resulted in Grant being arrested without a warrant and taken to the police station, where he was booked, processed and released. That evening, Grant went to Brigham and Women's Hospital, where he received a physical and psychological exam and then was released. (DF ¶¶ 44, 67).
According to Grant, at his cubicle, while he was trying to shut down his computer, Glancy told him not to use the computer, struck Grant in the arm, and then turned off the computer. (PF ¶ 64). Grant then used the telephone at the cubicle to call directory assistance to get the number for a police station, and was told by Glancy that "I am the police," "I am the Boston Police, I work for the Boston Police Department." (PF ¶¶ 67, 69). See also Incident Report completed by Glancy where Glancy wrote "SO Glancy informed Mr Grant he was a Special Officer." (DF App. at 216). In fact, Glancy is a Boston Special Police Officer. (PF ¶ 80).
According to Grant, during the altercation Glancy told Grant he was trespassing. (PF ¶ 68). While Grant was holding the phone, Glancy grabbed Grant, hung up the telephone, pushed Grant onto the desk, hit Grant several times, and sprayed him with pepper spray. (PF ¶¶ 70-73). According to Grant, Glancy and O'Brien threw Grant to the floor, and O'Brien put him in a headlock while Glancy held his arms and handcuffed him. (PF ¶¶ 74-75, 77). After cuffing Grant, Glancy again hit Grant in the face and sprayed him with pepper spray. (PF ¶ 78). O'Brien jumped on Grant's back with his knees. (PF ¶ 79). The Boston police were called to the scene, and Grant was taken to the police station where he was booked and released. (PF ¶ 81, DF ¶ 42).
Grant was arraigned on September 15, 1998 for assault and battery, at which time he was represented by counsel. (PF ¶ 84; DF App. at 218). By November 1998, Grant, through his then counsel, informed Hancock of Grant's intention to sue Hancock. (PF ¶ 85). Grant was tried for five days, ending on April 6, 1999, for assault and battery. (DF ¶ 53). The trial ended in a hung jury. (Id.) Grant was tried again and was acquitted on November 8, 1999. (DF ¶ 64). Grant was represented by new counsel during this trial. (See PF ¶ 92). Grant contends that the Assistant District Attorney who prosecuted both cases, Corey Flashner, took the position that the criminal action would be dropped if Grant released all of his claims against Hancock. (See PF ¶¶ 85-101). Grant contends that Karen Morton, Vice President and Corporate Counsel for Hancock, knew that the claims against Grant were baseless, yet continued to pursue them in an attempt to get a release from Grant. (See PF ¶¶ 85, 94). Grant also contends that Hancock assisted the State in prosecuting him and in helping prepare the State's case against him. (PF ¶ 101). Hancock strenuously denies that it offered to drop any claims in exchange for a release or that it was in any way responsible for the decision to pursue the criminal prosecutions of Grant. (See DF ¶¶ 50-63). Rather, it is Hancock's position, that the District Attorney's Office alone made the decision to prosecute. (Id.)
III. DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A material fact is one which has the "potential to affect the outcome of the suit under applicable law." Sanchez v. Alvarado, 101 F.3d 223, 227 (1st Cir.1996) (citations omitted). A genuine issue is "one that must be decided at trial because the evidence, viewed in the light most flattering to the nonmovant, would permit a rational fact finder to resolve the issue in favor of either party." Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990) (citations omitted).
Therefore, to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, "the moving party must show that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's position." Rogers v. Fair, 902 F.2d 140, 143 (1st Cir.1990). In order to defeat the entry of summary judgment, the nonmoving party must submit "sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute to require a choice between the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1018, 114 S.Ct. 1398, 128 L.Ed.2d 72 (1994) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Grant has brought three separate counts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count I arises out of the altercation on September 11, 1998 and is against Glancy and O'Brien only. Count II is based on claims of malicious prosecution, and is against all three defendants. Count III, against Hancock only, is based on an alleged conspiracy between Hancock and the District Attorney's Office in connection with the criminal prosecutions brought against Grant. For the reasons detailed herein, the motion for summary...
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