Reed v. The Yaka

• Decision Date: 04 May 1960
• Docket Number: No. 123 of 1958.,123 of 1958.
• Parties: Elijah REED, Libellant, v. THE Steamship YAKA, her engines, boilers, machinery, etc., Respondent (Waterman Steamship Corporation, Owner and Claimant) v. PAN-ATLANTIC STEAMSHIP CORPORATION, Impleaded Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

183 F. Supp. 69

Elijah REED, Libellant, v. THE Steamship YAKA, her engines, boilers, machinery, etc., Respondent (Waterman Steamship Corporation, Owner and Claimant) v. PAN-ATLANTIC STEAMSHIP CORPORATION, Impleaded Respondent.

No. 123 of 1958.

United States District Court E. D. Pennsylvania.

April 29, 1960.

As Amended May 4, 1960.

Joseph Boardman, Freedman, Landy & Lorry, Philadelphia, Pa., for libellant.

Harrison G. Kildare, Rawle & Henderson, Philadelphia, Pa., for respondent, owner and claimant.

T. E. Byrne, Jr., Krusen, Evans & Shaw, Philadelphia, Pa., for impleaded respondent.

CLARY, District Judge.

This is a libel in rem against the S. S. "Yaka" to recover for injuries sustained by the libellant on March 23rd, 1956, while employed as a longshoreman on board that vessel. From the pleadings and proof, the Court makes the following

Findings of Fact

1. The Court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of this proceeding.

2. Libellant is a citizen and resident of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and at all times mentioned herein was employed as a longshoreman by the Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation (hereinafter known as "Pan-Atlantic" to assist in the loading and unloading of cargo aboard the S.S. "Yaka".

3. On March 19, 1956, Waterman Steamship Corporation (hereinafter known as "Waterman"), as owner of the S. S. "Yaka" had delivered that vessel to Pan-Atlantic under a written bare boat charter.

4. As part of the charter agreement, Pan-Atlantic agreed to indemnify and hold harmless Waterman against any liens of whatsoever nature and against any claims arising out of the operation of the vessel by Pan-Atlantic or out of any act or neglect of Pan-Atlantic in relation to the vessel.

5. On March 23, 1956, the S. S. "Yaka" was in possession and control of Pan-Atlantic under the terms of the said bare boat charter, and was lying in navigable waters at Pier A, Port Richmond, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

6. On that day Pan-Atlantic undertook to load a cargo of chocolate in cans and cartons aboard the vessel.

7. It provided its own facilities and longshoremen for the loading.

8. Libellant was one of these longshoremen assigned to stow the said chocolate in No. 2 lower 'tween deck of the S. S. "Yaka".

9. At about 2 p. m. on March 23rd, 1956, libellant and other longshoremen laid a floor of the cases of chocolate syrup to act as insulation for the chocolate candy.

10. Cases of chocolate syrup were, therefore, stowed on the deck of the 'tween deck about 2½ feet high in the forward end of the hatch and in the wings.

11. The hatch square of the 'tween deck contained no cargo.

12. The cartons of chocolate candy were then brought aboard on wooden pallets, using ship's winches, and lowered into the hold where the individual cartons were to be removed and stowed by hand.

13. The wooden pallets or cargo trays were constructed of strips of boards approximately an inch thick nailed to blocks at each end and reinforced at the corners, making a hollow rectangular pallet about 4 feet wide, 6 feet long and 4 inches high. Pallets of this type are commonly used for loading cargo in the Port of Philadelphia.

14. These particular pallets belonged to Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation.

15. Certain of these pallets were used to make up a staging or platform equal in height to the cases of chocolate used for insulating, so that the drafts of chocolate could be landed at a height equal to the top of the insulating cargo and were thus more easily and quickly stowed.

16. The use of such pallets in this way was the customary, accepted and proper practice when loading cargo of this nature.

17. The pallets used were old and dirty in appearance but were apparantly adequate for the purpose.

18. As the draft of chocolate would be let down into the square of the hatch by the winch, it would be grabbed by three longshoremen and steadied above the deck.

19. One of these longshoremen would then give the winchman instructions to move the draft inshore toward the staging.

20. When the draft was in front of the staging, and still suspended in the air, the three longshoremen would push the draft over the staging.

21. At this point, libellant, who was standing on the staging area, would come forward and assist the other three longshoremen by pulling the draft onto the staging, while they pushed it forward.

22. When the draft was so suspended over the staging, it was the practice for any one of these four longshoremen to yell up to the winchman to lower the draft onto the staging, since he was not in a position to see the draft from on top deck.

23. At this signal, the winchman lowered the draft upon the staging and the four longshoremen would then unload and stow the chocolate by hand.

24. The operation was thereafter repeated until loading was complete.

25. The operation described, including the use of the pallets for staging, was the usual, customary, proper and accepted practice used in loading cartons of Hershey chocolate candy.

26. At approximately 4:30 p. m., after the staging had been in place and use for more than one hour, a draft came down into the square of the hatch and was moved in front of the inshore staging.

27. The three longshoremen pushed the draft over to the staging.

28. The libellant walked out on the staging in order to grab the draft, and did in fact have his hand on the draft in anticipation of pulling it back on the staging

29. At that moment one of the facing boards of the top pallet of the staging upon which libellant was standing broke, and libellant's right foot fell through onto the boards of the pallet underneath.

30. His foot twisted and became entrapped in the pallet.

31. The pain in his foot caused him to let out a yell.

32. The winchman, hearing the yell and supposing it to be a signal to him, landed the draft in accordance with his prior practice.

33. The draft landed on libellant, throwing him down onto the pallet.

34. The draft was soon removed from libellant.

35. Only that board of the pallet through which libellant's foot had fallen was broken.

36. After the draft was removed it was necessary for libellant's foot to be pried out of the broken pallet by the use of a crowbar.

37. Libellant was removed from the hold and taken to Northeastern Hospital for treatment.

38. The pallet which broke contained a latent defect, which defect existed when the pallet was brought onto the ship.

39. Libellant was not guilty of any negligence in this loading operation.

40. The sole cause of this injury was the latent defect in this wooden pallet being used for staging.

41. The S. S. "Yaka" was unseaworthy.

42. This unseaworthiness caused the injury to libellant.

43. Libellant sustained personal injuries for which he is entitled to be compensated.

Discussion

As pointed out by counsel, the facts of this case are simple, but they nevertheless present two important questions of admiralty law. The first question we will take up is: Did the presence of the defect in the pallet being used by the longshoremen in the hold of the S. S. "Yaka" for staging render that ship unseaworthy?

The question of unseaworthiness

The development of the doctrine of unseaworthiness has been left entirely to the courts rather than to the legislature. Whether the result is a happy one is at least debatable.¹ There has been some uncertainty as to what constitutes unseaworthiness and at times it is difficult to discover the essential factors which a district court should look to when asked to resolve this issue. Since it is not our task to remake the law in this area, but only to resolve it within the narrow limits of the case at hand, we simply examine those few cases close in point, to determine which are controlling here. If there appears to be a conflict in the law after our opinion, the parties of course have recourse to a higher tribunal than our own to resolve it.

There are at least two recent cases whose holding clearly encompass the present situation. The first is Considine v. Black Diamond Steamship Corp., D.C.D.Mass.1958, 163 F.Supp. 107. There a longshoreman was injured by a defective "chisel truck", a hydraulically-operated truck with a platformed device for handling heavy bales, etc., which was property of the stevedoring firm and expressly found not to be part of the ship's regular equipment. The District Court held that a defect in this truck caused the ship to be unseaworthy, relying upon several recent Supreme Court opinions (hereinafter discussed). The second case is Di Salvo v. Cunard Steamship Co., D.C.S.D.N.Y.1959, 171 F.Supp. 813. There it was held that a passenger baggage chute (which was regularly stored on the dock and was not kept on the ship at all) when improperly attached to the ship, so as to cause injury to a longshoreman while unloading baggage, rendered the ship unseaworthy.

Moreover there are two cases in our own District which, although they do not go as far as the above cases, are nevertheless indistinguishable in principle from the present case. In Litwinowicz and Matyas v. Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co., D.C.E.D.Pa.1959, 179 F.Supp. 812, Judge Kraft held that where a longshoreman was injured while loading steel beams as a result of a defective "Baltimore dog" (i. e., an "L" shaped device supplied by the stevedoring firm and attached to a hook at the end of the ship's cable, to be used to break out the steel beams), he could recover for unseaworthiness. Also in De Van v. Pennsylvania R. Co., D.C.E.D.Pa.1958, 167 F.Supp. 336, 337, Judge Van Dusen held that where a longshoreman was injured as a result of a cargo hook which had been supplied by the stevedoring firm (and which proved to be unfit for the purpose for which it was used), he could recover for unseaworthiness.

Finally, there are two recent Supreme Court cases which held that where equipment which was supplied by the stevedoring firm for performing the ship's work proves incapable of performing its...