Lutz v. Chicago Transit Authority

• Decision Date: 28 March 1962
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 48538
• Parties: Rose LUTZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 579

183 N.E.2d 579

36 Ill.App.2d 79

Rose LUTZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a Municipal Corporation Defendant-Appellee.

Gen. No. 48538.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

March 28, 1962.

Meyer L. Cherkas, Chicago, for appellant.

William J. Lynch, William S. Allen, Jerome F. Dixon, Chicago, for appellee.

DEMPSEY, Justice.

At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, in her suit against the Chicago Transit Authority for personal injury, the court sustained the defendant's motion for a directed verdict and instructed the jury to find the issues for the defendant. Rose Lutz, the plaintiff, appeals from the judgment entered upon the verdict of not guilty.

Mrs. Lutz, a widow who had been working for 36 years, left her place of employment at Diversey and Damen Avenues at 4:30 p. m., November 18, 1954. She boarded the defendant's eastbound Diversey Avenue bus and sat near the front door in the middle of the three-place seat on the south side of the bus, facing north. She lived on Seminary Avenue a few blocks north of Diversey, and it was her custom to take the bus to Sheffield Avenue, which is a block east of Seminary, and change there to a bus going north. Diversey and Sheffield is also a transfer point for the nearby elevated line and people desiring to transfer to the 'L' get off Diversey buses and hurry at that hour to the elevated station.

The Diversey bus became very crowded before it arrived at Sheffield. As it approached that intersection Mrs. Lutz prepared to get off. Because of the crowded aisle it was difficult for her to do so and she was assisted to her feet by a man seated next to her who gave her his arm for support. She reached the front door and was standing on the top step, waiting for the bus to stop at the southeast corner which was the normal practice. There were people on the bus who wanted to take the 'L'. A woman farther back started pushing through the crowd, calling that she wanted to get off and for the driver to stop so that she could catch an elevated train. Some woman behind Mrs. Lutz placed her hands on Mrs. Lutz's shoulders and pushed her just as the bus was coming to an unexpected stop, on the southwest instead of the southeast corner; then the door opened and Mrs. Lutz was shoved out. She fell over the curb, bruising her head, breaking her elbow and injuring her ribs. A passenger, who was farther back on the bus and who was also getting off, corroborated Mrs. Lutz's story. He and the bus driver took her to a drug store. From there, she was taken to a hospital by policemen.

The test to be applied to a defendant's motion for a directed verdict is whether there is any evidence or reasonable inferences arising from the evidence, tending to prove the cause of action alleged in the complaint. On such a motion, in a jury trial, the court does not weigh the evidence or the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. These are questions for the jury and not for the court to consider. The court must decide if the plaintiff's evidence fails as a matter of law to establish the claim. It becomes a question of law only where the evidence is such that all reasonable men would reach the same conclusion or where there is a total failure to prove one or more of the elements necessary to the cause of action. If it appears that all reasonable men might not agree in their conclusions, a jury question is presented. Hughes v. Bandy, 404 Ill. 74, 87 N.E.2d 885; Beckett v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 376 Ill. 470, 34 N.E.2d 427; Molloy v. Chicago R. T. Co., 335 Ill. 164, 166 N.E. 530; Tabor v. Tazewell Service Co., 18 Ill.App.2d 593, 153 N.E.2d 98.

The issue in the present case then, is whether Mrs. Lutz adduced any evidence to support the single charge of negligence in her complaint, which was that the defendant permitted its bus to become dangerously overcrowded and that this caused her to be forcefully pushed from the bus to the street. Her testimony and that of another passenger as to the overcrowded condition of the bus was sufficient to make out a prima facie case in this respect. She was able to sit down when she boarded the bus, but it had taken on so many passengers by the time she was to get off, that she had trouble finding room to rise to her feet and a man next to her had to aid her. She said the people standing near the door 'were just like sardines' and that a person had to squeeze to get through the aisle. The more difficult question is whether a causal relation has been shown between the overcrowding and her being pushed out the front door.

A common carrier of passengers is required to do all that human care, vigilance and foresight can reasonably do to carry a passenger safely, consistent with the mode of conveyance adopted and the practical operation of its business. Sandy v. Lake Street El. R. R. Co., 235 Ill. 194, 85 N.E. 300; Alton Light and Traction Co. v. Oliver, 217 Ill. 15, 75 N.E. 419, 4 L.R.A.,N.S., 399. It cannot be held liable, however, for negligence unless there is a causal connection between its negligence and the passenger's injury. For there to be a causal connection, the negligence of the carrier need not be the only cause, nor the last or nearest cause of the passenger's injury. It is sufficient...