Bundy v. Wetzel

Decision Date04 May 2018
Docket NumberNo. 2 WAP 2017,2 WAP 2017
Citation184 A.3d 551
Parties Kevin A. BUNDY, Appellant v. John E. WETZEL, Secretary, PA Department of Corrections, Tammy Ferguson, Superintendent, SCI Benner Township and Frank Dougherty, Business Manager, SCI Benner Township, Appellees
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

184 A.3d 551

Kevin A. BUNDY, Appellant
v.
John E. WETZEL, Secretary, PA Department of Corrections, Tammy Ferguson, Superintendent, SCI Benner Township and Frank Dougherty, Business Manager, SCI Benner Township, Appellees

No. 2 WAP 2017

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted: May 2, 2018
Decided: May 4, 2018


Kevin A. Bundy, Appellant pro se.

Chase M. Defelice, Esq., Theron Richard Perez, Esq., Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, for Appellees John E. Wetzel, Tammy Ferguson, Frank Dougherty.

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR

This pro se direct appeal arises from Appellant's challenge to the deduction of funds from his prisoner account to satisfy financial obligations imposed as part of his criminal sentences. He contends, primarily, that he was constitutionally entitled to pre-deprivation notice and a hearing before such deductions began.

Appellant is an inmate confined at SCI–Benner Township. After exhausting administrative remedies, he initiated the present litigation by filing a complaint in the Centre County Court of Common Pleas,1 naming as defendants various officials of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections in their official capacity. The primary focus of the complaint concerned the Department's withdrawals from his inmate account to satisfy obligations imposed on him at sentencing.2 The Department made the deductions pursuant to Section 9728(b)(5) of the Sentencing Code, which states:

The county correctional facility to which the offender has been sentenced or the Department of Corrections shall be authorized to make monetary deductions from inmate personal accounts for the purpose of collecting restitution or any other court-ordered obligation or costs .... Any amount deducted shall be transmitted ... to the probation department of the county or other agent designated
184 A.3d 554
by the county commissioners of the county with the approval of the president judge of the county in which the offender was convicted. The Department of Corrections shall develop guidelines relating to its responsibilities under this paragraph.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9728(b)(5). Withdrawals made per this statutory authorization are known as "Act 84 deductions" because the provision was added to Section 9728 by Act 84 of 1998. See Act of June 18, 1998, P.L. 640, No. 84, § 4.

According to the allegations in Appellant's complaint,3 Appellant was subject to financial obligations based on criminal convictions in Jefferson and Clearfield Counties. As a result of the Jefferson County prosecution, he was responsible to pay a total of $1,135; in Clearfield County, the sum was $8,033. Consistent with Act 84 and the Department's policy statement entitled DC–ADM–005 (relating to the collection of inmate debts), to recover these costs the Department began deducting twenty percent of all deposits into Appellant's account, which have solely consisted of monetary gifts from friends and relatives. Deductions made as of the complaint's filing have totaled $681.19, and they have only pertained to the Jefferson County matter.

Appellant has no tangible assets and no source of income other than the occasional gifts mentioned above. He needs to use these gifted funds, inter alia , to litigate a PCRA petition he previously filed.

At his sentencing hearing in Jefferson County, the common pleas court did not consider his ability to pay the financial obligations imposed, and it did not inform him the Department would be making deductions from his inmate account to satisfy those obligations. That tribunal subsequently rejected Appellant's "Petition to Vacate Fine or Extend Time to Pay Fines, Costs and Restitution" on jurisdictional grounds.

In light of these circumstances, Appellant claimed he was not afforded any pre-deprivation process—as required by Montanez v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections , 773 F.3d 472 (3d Cir. 2014) —by either the sentencing court or the Department before the first deduction occurred. He thus asserted a violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellant additionally questioned whether the Department could make deductions from monies gifted to him by others, as his criminal sentences were imposed on him personally and not on the individuals making the gifts.

In terms of relief, Appellant sought an injunction preventing further deductions from his account, a declaratory judgment, compensatory damages in the form of a return of all funds already deducted, and the costs of litigation. He additionally couched his request for a return of the deducted funds in terms of an action of replevin. See generally Pa.R.C.P. No. 1071 (prescribing that the procedure in actions of replevin is to conform with the rules for civil actions).

Appellees filed a preliminary objection challenging the county court's jurisdiction over the dispute, and another in the nature of a demurrer. The common pleas court agreed it lacked jurisdiction and transferred the matter to the Commonwealth Court because the complaint was filed against Commonwealth officers acting in

184 A.3d 555

their official capacity. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1), (b) (giving the Commonwealth Court exclusive original jurisdiction over actions against Commonwealth officers acting in their official capacity).

In a two-page unsigned filing, the Commonwealth Court sustained Appellees' preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer and dismissed the complaint. See Bundy v. Wetzel , No. 553 M.D. 2016, Memorandum and Order, slip op. at 1 (Pa. Cmwlth. Oct. 19, 2016). The court explained that: the Department is statutorily authorized to collect court-ordered costs, see id. at 2 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9728(b) ); an inmate is not entitled to a hearing on his ability to pay, see id. (citing Buck v. Beard , 583 Pa. 431, 879 A.2d 157 (2005) ); and the fact that the funds originated from gifts is of no moment because the General Assembly has not created an exception for gifts made to an inmate's account, see id. (citing Danysh v. Dep't of Corr. , 845 A.2d 260 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) ). Also, the court rejected Appellant's due process argument under Montanez , reasoning that Appellant was aware of the amounts he owed and had unsuccessfully sought relief from those obligations in the common pleas court. See id.

On appeal to this Court, Appellant first challenges the Commonwealth Court's jurisdiction to entertain this matter, stating that replevin actions are governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure. He references the venue rule, which vests venue in the county in which the property to be replevied is located. See Pa.R.C.P. No. 1072. Appellant also indicates that the Commonwealth Court referred to his filing as a Petition for Review, which he construes as implicating appellate principles. See Brief of Appellant at 13 (citing Pa.R.A.P. 1513 ).

As to the latter contention, Appellant initially fails to recognize that Rule 1513 discusses both appellate and original jurisdiction petitions for review before the Commonwealth Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 1513(e) (relating to the content of an original-jurisdiction petition for review). More particularly, appellate rule 1502 directs that, insofar as governmental determinations are concerned, certain traditional original-jurisdiction actions, including replevin, are abolished and a petition for review under Chapter 15 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure "shall be the exclusive procedure for judicial review of a determination of a government unit." Pa.R.A.P. 1502. Notably, as well, Appellant filed his action against state-government officers, thereby invoking the Commonwealth Court's original, exclusive jurisdiction. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1), (b).

Having resolved the jurisdictional question, we turn to the due process issue at the center of this appeal.

Appellant argues he was never made aware of the amount of his financial obligations imposed in the Jefferson County sentence, claiming that neither the sentencing court nor the Department conveyed that information to him or informed him that the latter would deduct funds from his inmate account. These circumstances, Appellant maintains, are inconsistent with the Third Circuit's analysis in Montanez , under which the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires notice and an opportunity for the prisoner to object prior to the first deduction. See Montanez , 773 F.3d at 486. Appellant also asserts that the deductions from personal gifts violates the legislative intent underlying Act 84. In this regard, he maintains that fines, restitution, and the like, are ordered against the defendant and not his relatives and friends.

Finally, Appellant proceeds to discuss a statutory provision that exempts wages,

184 A.3d 556

salaries, and commissions still in the hands of an employer from attachment. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8127. He indicates that this provision should extend to Act 84 to make personal gifts immune from deduction. Appellant acknowledges that Act 84 authorizes the Department to develop guidelines for the deductions, see id. § 9728(b)(5), but he contends that the Department,...

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