Douglas v. State

Citation184 P.3d 1037
Decision Date05 June 2008
Docket NumberNo. 49346.,49346.
PartiesEric Todd DOUGLAS, a/k/a Eric Douglas, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
CourtSupreme Court of Nevada

Eric Todd Douglas, Carson City, in Proper Person.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, and Joseph L. Ward Jr., Chief Deputy Attorney General, Carson City; David J. Roger, District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.

BEFORE MAUPIN, CHERRY and SAITTA, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, CHERRY, J.:

In this proper person appeal we decide whether NRS 213.1214 provides the State Board of Parole Commissioners (Parole Board) with the authority to require Psychological Panel (Psych Panel) certification prior to a prisoner's release on parole from a sentence involving a nonsexual offense if that prisoner has ever been convicted of a sexual offense.1 Appellant Eric Douglas claimed that the Parole Board violated a statutory duty regarding his parole when it required him to obtain Psych Panel certification, pursuant to NRS 213.1214, on an offense not enumerated in NRS 213.1214(5). The State, however, contends that it was proper for the Parole Board to require Psych Panel certification because Douglas was previously convicted of a sex offense.

We disagree with the State and conclude that the district court abused its discretion when it denied Douglas's petition. NRS 213.1214(1) requires a Psych Panel to certify "that the prisoner was under observation while confined in an institution of the Department of Corrections and does not represent a high risk to reoffend based upon a currently accepted standard of assessment." This requirement applies to the enumerated offenses set forth in NRS 213.1214(5). Significantly, the crime of attempted burglary is not one of the offenses set forth in NRS 213.1214(5). Moreover, neither NRS 205.060 (burglary) nor NRS 193.330 (punishment for attempts) require appellant to receive Psych Panel certification before he is eligible for parole on his sentence for attempted burglary.

We further reject the State's contention that NRS 213.1214 provides the Parole Board with the broad authority to require Psych Panel certification so long as a prisoner has ever been convicted of a sex offense. To the extent this court's opinion in Stockmeier v. Psychological Review Panel2 implied that Psych Panel certification is required on the last offense prior to being released into society for anyone ever convicted of a sex offense, regardless of whether the last offense is a sex offense, we now take the opportunity to clarify that Psych Panel certification is required on an offender's last sex offense sentence, whether this will involve a release to the street or an institutional parole to serve a sentence on a nonsexual offense.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In June 1996, Douglas was convicted of robbery and attempted sexual assault in district court case number C124118 and was subsequently paroled from his sentence in that case. In February 2005, Douglas committed an attempted burglary while on parole, and as a result, the district court revoked Douglas's parole for ten months and Douglas returned to prison.

Subsequently, the district court convicted Douglas of one count of attempted burglary in district court case number C210217 and sentenced him to serve a term in the Nevada State Prison of 14 to 48 months, to run consecutively with Douglas's sentence for robbery and attempted sexual assault in district court case number C124118. Shortly thereafter, in October 2005, the Psych Panel recertified Douglas on his attempted sexual assault charge and he was institutionally paroled to serve his sentence in C210217 for attempted burglary.

Douglas was scheduled to appear before the Parole Board on January 23, 2007, seeking to be paroled on the attempted burglary charge. At that hearing, the Parole Board declined to take any action; instead, they informed Douglas that he was required to receive Psych Panel certification and scheduled his Psych Panel review for February 2007. Confused, Douglas contacted a case worker at the prison and complained that he should not be required to undergo a Psych Panel evaluation on his attempted burglary charge because he had already received Psych Panel certification on his attempted sexual assault charge and had been institutionally paroled as to that charge. The case worker responded, "I spoke with the Parole Commissioner office and the new ruling is if you ever had a sex offense (even if it is not what you are currently serving) you must go to the [P]sych [P]anel."

On February 23, 2007, the Psych Panel denied Douglas certification. Douglas then filed a proper person petition for a writ of mandamus in the district court challenging the Parole Board's decision to require Psych Panel certification. Douglas argued that the State violated a statutory duty when it required him to be certified by the Psych Panel on a nonsexual offense before he would be allowed to appear before the Parole Board. The State did not oppose the petition below.3 The district court summarily concluded that NRS 213.1214(2) provided authority for requiring Douglas to obtain Psych Panel certification and denied Douglas's petition. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion.4 We review the district court's denial of a writ petition for an abuse of discretion.5 Douglas contends that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his petition. We agree.

Recertification pursuant to NRS 213.1214

The district court summarily denied Douglas's petition "pursuant to NRS 213.1214(2)." NRS 213.1214(2) provides that "[a] prisoner who has been certified pursuant to subsection 1 and who returns for any reason to the custody of the Department of Corrections may not be paroled unless a panel recertifies him in the manner set forth in subsection 1." The statutory language addressing recertification is unambiguous and clearly requires recertification only when a prisoner previously convicted of a sex offense receives certification, is paroled to the street, and then returns to the custody of the Department of Corrections. Significantly, Douglas was recertified on the attempted sexual assault offense after his parole was revoked in district court case number C124118 and he was returned to prison. NRS 213.1214(2) does not provide authority for requiring Douglas to obtain yet another Psych Panel certification on his attempted burglary charge. Douglas was institutionally paroled from the sentence imposed in district court case number C124118; thus, he remained in custody and clearly did not "return" to prison for the purposes of certification and parole on his attempted burglary offense in district court case number C210217. Further, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that the certification on the attempted sexual assault obtained after Douglas returned to prison was ever revoked.6 Therefore, we conclude that the district court's reliance on NRS 213.1214(2) was misplaced as this provision was inapplicable in the instant case.

The State further contends that Psych Panel certification was appropriate in the instant case because certification is not valid in "perpetuity" and may be revoked by the Psych Panel pursuant to NRS 213.1214(3) at any time.7 This argument is irrelevant in the instant case because, as noted above, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the Psych Panel revoked Douglas's certification. Moreover, nothing in NRS 213.1214(3) indicates that the revocation of certification on an offense requiring certification would in turn require certification for an offense not enumerated in NRS 213.1214(5). Therefore, NRS 213.1214(3) does not support the State's argument that the Parole Board may require Douglas to receive Psych Panel certification on his attempted burglary charge. Further, to the extent a prisoner has discharged his sentence on a sex offense, the Psych Panel may not revoke a prisoner's certification on that charge because the Psych Panel lacks jurisdiction over that sentence.8

The scope of NRS 213.1214

Next, we examine Douglas's challenge to the State's interpretation of NRS 213.1214. Douglas claimed that the Parole Board violated a statutory duty by requiring him to obtain Psych Panel certification on a nonsexual offense. The State, however, argues that NRS 213.1214 requires a prisoner to obtain Psych Panel certification prior to release on parole if that offender has ever been convicted of a crime listed in NRS 213.1214, even if the offender is seeking parole on a nonsexual offense. The State argues that this court should read NRS 213.1214 and NRS 213.1099(2)(b) together to reach this result.9

We disagree with the State, and we conclude that such a broad reading of NRS 213.1214 is untenable because it would produce absurd results.10 For example, if NRS 213.1214 was interpreted to allow Psych Panel certification for any offender previously convicted of a sex offense, the State could require a prisoner convicted of a sex offense years earlier, who had fully discharged his sentence on the sex offense, to obtain Psych Panel certification on a present conviction involving a nonsexual crime. There is simply no support in the legislative history for such an expansive reading of NRS 213.1214. To the contrary, the Legislature grappled with the question of whether it should expand the list of offenses set forth in NRS 213.1214(5) because it was concerned with the added expense of providing Psych Panel review for the additional offenses.11 Therefore, it is unlikely that the Legislature intended to require sex offenders to be continuously certified when an offender subsequently commits a nonsexual offense long after the sex offense has been discharged.

We further reject the State's suggestion that Psych Panel certification should...

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5 cases
  • Roberts v. State
    • United States
    • Nevada Court of Appeals
    • November 5, 2019
    ...property. We review the district court's denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus for an abuse of discretion. Douglas v. State, 124 Nev. 379, 383, 184 P.3d 1037, 1039 (2008). A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act which the law requires as a duty resulting fr......
  • Deeds v. Baker, Case No. 3:13-cv-00715-RCJ-VPC
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Nevada
    • March 24, 2015
    ...346, 351 (1989)). Instead, a petition for a writ of mandamus filed in the state district court is the correct method. See Douglas v. State, 184 P.3d 1037 (Nev. 2008); Stockmeier v. Psychological Review Panel, 135 P.3d 807 (Nev. 2006). Petitioner has not demonstrated that mandamus is unavail......
  • Bayot v. State
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    • Nevada Court of Appeals
    • November 12, 2019
    ...We review the district court's denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus for an abuse of discretion. Douglas v. State, 124 Nev. 379, 383, 184 P.3d 1037, 1039 (2008). A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act which the law requires as a duty resulting from an offi......
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    ...doctrine.We review the district court’s denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus for an abuse of discretion. Douglas v. State , 124 Nev. 379, 383, 184 P.3d 1037, 1039 (2008). A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act which the law requires as a duty resulting fr......
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