State v. Gladden, 94
Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina |
Citation | 184 S.E.2d 249,279 N.C. 566 |
Decision Date | 10 November 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 94,94 |
Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Geraldine GLADDEN. |
Atty. Gen. Robert Morgan, Asst. Atty. Gen. Claude W. Harris, and Trial Atty. H. A. Cole, Jr., for the State.
Bell, Ogburn & Redding by John N. Ogburn, Jr., and J. Howard Redding, Asheboro, for defendant appellant.
Defendant excepted to the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by Judge Collier at the conclusion of a Voir dire hearing that was held to determine the admissibility of Cockerham's testimony about statements made to him by defendant. Defendant assigns error on the ground the evidence did not support the court's findings and conclusions.
On Voir dire Cockerham testified that before he permitted defendant to tell what had occurred, he advised her in detail of each of her constitutional rights in the manner required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966), as a prerequisite to an in-custody interrogation. Defendant did not testify at Voir dire or at trial. Judge Collier made findings of fact and conclusions of law to the effect that defendant had been fully advised as to her constitutional rights and that any statement she made was freely and voluntarily made without any threats against her or any promise of reward. Cockerham's testimony on Voir dire provided ample evidence to support the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
If considered an in-custody interrogation, Cockerham's testimony as to statements made by defendant was competent. However, under the circumstances of this case, we are of opinion and hold that the conversation of defendant with Cockerham in defendant's own home was not an incustody interrogation. Apparently, having called the police, defendant wanted an opportunity to explain what had happened. Defendant had known Cockerham as an officer for at least fifteen years; and, upon his arrival, she invited him into her home where the conversation occurred. Nothing in the record indicates defendant was in custody or otherwise deprived of her freedom of action prior to or during her conversation with Cockerham. Nor is there any indication that defendant at that time had been charged with any criminal offense.
Miranda involved custodial interrogations. The majority opinion, delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Warren, states: 'By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' Id. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706, 10 A.L.R.3d at 993. The opinion states further: Id. at 477--478, 86 S.Ct. at 1629--1630, 16 L.Ed.2d at 725--726, 10 A.L.R.3d at 1013. The opinion also states: 'Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.' Id. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d at 726, 10 A.L.R.3d at 1014. See State v. Meadows, 272 N.C. 327, 336, 158 S.E.2d 638, 644 (1968).
In our view, the requirements of Miranda prerequisite to an in-custody interrogation do not apply to the present factual situation. Thus, Cockerham's testimony about what defendant said was competent for two separate reasons: compliance with Miranda and inapplicability of Miranda.
Defendant assigns as error the denial of her motion at the conclusion of all the evidence for judgment as in cause of nonsuit. Her contention is based on the asserted incompetency of Cockerham's testimony as to her statements. Absent this testimony, she contends the evidence shows she acted in self-defense. Since Cockerham's testimony was competent, we need not consider whether the evidence offered by defendant, if accepted by the jury, was sufficient to exonerate her on the ground of self-defense.
Defendant excepted to the following portion of the court's charge, Viz.: ...
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