State v. Gladden, 94

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
Citation184 S.E.2d 249,279 N.C. 566
Decision Date10 November 1971
Docket NumberNo. 94,94
PartiesSTATE of North Carolina v. Geraldine GLADDEN.

Atty. Gen. Robert Morgan, Asst. Atty. Gen. Claude W. Harris, and Trial Atty. H. A. Cole, Jr., for the State.

Bell, Ogburn & Redding by John N. Ogburn, Jr., and J. Howard Redding, Asheboro, for defendant appellant.

BOBBITT, Chief Justice.

Defendant excepted to the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by Judge Collier at the conclusion of a Voir dire hearing that was held to determine the admissibility of Cockerham's testimony about statements made to him by defendant. Defendant assigns error on the ground the evidence did not support the court's findings and conclusions.

On Voir dire Cockerham testified that before he permitted defendant to tell what had occurred, he advised her in detail of each of her constitutional rights in the manner required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966), as a prerequisite to an in-custody interrogation. Defendant did not testify at Voir dire or at trial. Judge Collier made findings of fact and conclusions of law to the effect that defendant had been fully advised as to her constitutional rights and that any statement she made was freely and voluntarily made without any threats against her or any promise of reward. Cockerham's testimony on Voir dire provided ample evidence to support the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.

If considered an in-custody interrogation, Cockerham's testimony as to statements made by defendant was competent. However, under the circumstances of this case, we are of opinion and hold that the conversation of defendant with Cockerham in defendant's own home was not an incustody interrogation. Apparently, having called the police, defendant wanted an opportunity to explain what had happened. Defendant had known Cockerham as an officer for at least fifteen years; and, upon his arrival, she invited him into her home where the conversation occurred. Nothing in the record indicates defendant was in custody or otherwise deprived of her freedom of action prior to or during her conversation with Cockerham. Nor is there any indication that defendant at that time had been charged with any criminal offense.

Miranda involved custodial interrogations. The majority opinion, delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Warren, states: 'By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' Id. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706, 10 A.L.R.3d at 993. The opinion states further: 'Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime. * * * Such investigation may include inquiry of persons not under restraint. General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our holding. It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement. In such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present.' Id. at 477--478, 86 S.Ct. at 1629--1630, 16 L.Ed.2d at 725--726, 10 A.L.R.3d at 1013. The opinion also states: 'Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.' Id. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d at 726, 10 A.L.R.3d at 1014. See State v. Meadows, 272 N.C. 327, 336, 158 S.E.2d 638, 644 (1968).

In our view, the requirements of Miranda prerequisite to an in-custody interrogation do not apply to the present factual situation. Thus, Cockerham's testimony about what defendant said was competent for two separate reasons: compliance with Miranda and inapplicability of Miranda.

Defendant assigns as error the denial of her motion at the conclusion of all the evidence for judgment as in cause of nonsuit. Her contention is based on the asserted incompetency of Cockerham's testimony as to her statements. Absent this testimony, she contends the evidence shows she acted in self-defense. Since Cockerham's testimony was competent, we need not consider whether the evidence offered by defendant, if accepted by the jury, was sufficient to exonerate her on the ground of self-defense.

Defendant excepted to the following portion of the court's charge, Viz.: 'Now, I charge you, Members of the Jury, for you to find the Defendant guilty of murder in the second degree, the State must prove two things beyond a reasonable doubt; first, that the Defendant shot Aaron Robert Colston with a deadly weapon, and I instruct you that a firearm is a deadly weapon; and, second, that the deceased, excuse me, Aaron Robert Colston's death was a natural and probable result of the Defendant's act. Now, to find the Defendant guilty of murder in the second...

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25 cases
  • State v. Hooper
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • November 4, 2022
    ...jury from the facts and circumstances as they appeared to him at the time" he used force against his adversary. State v. Gladden , 279 N.C. 566, 572, 184 S.E.2d 249 (1971). ¶ 31 A careful review of the record persuades us that the record contains no evidence tending to show that defendant a......
  • State v. Herbin
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • November 6, 1979
    ...the full benefit of the doctrine of apparent necessity. State v. Jackson,284 N.C. 383, 200 S.E.2d 596 (1973); State v. Gladden, 279 N.C. 566, 184 S.E.2d 249 (1971). Under the same circumstances, Justice Huskins, quoting former Chief Justice Bobbitt, said that defendant's contention "relates......
  • State v. Morgan
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • February 18, 1986
    ...as to the apparent necessity for, and reasonableness of, the force used to repel an attack upon his person. See State v. Gladden, 279 N.C. 566, 184 S.E.2d 249 (1971). The fact that defendant may have pointed a gun at another person sometime in the past, without more, has no tendency to show......
  • State v. Pruitt
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • March 12, 1975
    ...of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere.' . . .' Accord: State v. Sykes, 285 N.C. 202, 203 S.E.2d 849; State v. Gladden, 279 N.C. 566, 184 S.E.2d 249; State v. Shedd, 274 N.C. 95, 161 S.E.2d 477; State v. Hayes, 273 N.C. 712, 161 S.E.2d A careful contextual reading of the testimony ......
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