Ramsey v. Huck

• Decision Date: 30 March 1916
• Docket Number: No. 19297.,19297.
• Citation: 267 Mo. 333,184 S.W. 966
• Parties: RAMSEY v. HUCK, Judge, et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

184 S.W. 966

267 Mo. 333

RAMSEY v. HUCK, Judge, et al.

No. 19297.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March 30, 1916.

In Banc. Prohibition by R. G. Ramsey against Hon. Peter H. Huck, Judge of the Twenty-Seventh Judicial Circuit and ex officio Judge of the Circuit Court of St. Francois County, and George W. Covington. Preliminary writ of prohibition made absolute.

Edward A. Rozier, B. H. Boyer, and Clyde Morsey, all of Farmington, for relator. Benj. H. Marbury, of Farmington, for respondents.

WALKER, J.

Prohibition. Relator invokes this writ to prevent the circuit court of St. Francois county from entertaining jurisdiction in a proceeding to contest the right to the office of justice of the peace.

At the general election held in November, 1914, Ramsey, the relator, and Covington, one of the respondents, were opposing candidates for the office of justice of the peace in one of the townships of said county. Ramsey at said election received the greater number of votes, a commission was delivered to him, and he was inducted into office. On November 25, 1914, Covington notified Ramsey, by delivering to him a copy of the petition in the proceeding, that "at the next term of the county court of St. Francois county, to wit, on Monday, December 7, 1914, he would contest Ramsey's right to said office." On said day Ramsey, appearing to plead to the jurisdiction of the court, filed a motion therein which alleged, among other things, that the return of the sheriff of the service of notice of contest showed upon its face that it was served on the 25th day of November, 1914, and that he was, in fact, served on said day, or only 12 days before the next term of said county court, whereas section 5924, R. S. 1909, provides that in all such matters a notice shall be served upon the contestee 15 days before the term of court at which such election is to be contested, and hence said county court was without authority to hear said cause. Covington thereupon asked leave to amend the notice which constituted the petition by striking out these words "on Monday, December 7, 1914," and by inserting in lieu thereof the following: "And on the first day of said term which shall be held 15 days or more after November 25, 1914, or the day of the service of this notice of contest." The court refused to permit this amendment to be made, and sustained Ramsey's plea to the jurisdiction, and dismissed the proceeding. Covington thereupon applied for and was granted an appeal to the circuit court. Upon the perfecting of this appeal Ramsey appeared therein and challenged the jurisdiction of the circuit court to hear said cause on the ground that the county court had no authority to hear same and that the circuit court had acquired none by reason of the appeal. This motion was by the circuit court overruled, whereupon Ramsey applied for the writ herein.

It has been questioned whether this is the proper forum in which to invoke this writ in a case of this character. The Constitution (section 8, art. 6, Amend. 1884) gives express power to this court to issue the writ to regulate the actions of the Courts of Appeals, but such power is not expressly given in regard to other inferior tribunals; the provision in regard thereto being as follows:

"The Supreme Court shall have a general superintending control over all inferior courts. It shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari and other original remedial writs, and to hear and determine the same." Section 3, art. 6, Const. Mo.

However, the general words "and other original remedial writs" were held in Thomas v. Mead, 36 Mo. 232, to authorize the issuance of the writ of prohibition against a circuit court in a case involving title to the office of clerk of the Supreme Court. This ruling has been followed in a number of subsequent cases in which the court has supervised circuit courts and other inferior tribunals; the last expression on the subject being found in State ex rel. v. Williams, 221 Mo. loc. cit. 256, 120 S. W. 740.

Whatever individual opinion may therefore be entertained as to the correctness of the construction of the rule in regard to general words following particular words as announced in Thomas v. Mead, supra, must be subordinated to the conclusion reached in that case and subsequent cases, and discussion in regard thereto is foreclosed, and the right of the court to issue the writ in the exercise of its supervisory control over any inferior tribunal is completely established.

The proceeding sought to be prohibited involves title to the office of justice of the peace. The Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction "in cases involving title to any office under this state." Section 12, art. 6, Const. Mo.; section 5, art. 6, Amend. 1884. This provision means any office held under the authority of the laws of this state, and has been held to apply to give this court jurisdiction in contests involving title to the following offices: Clerk of the circuit court (State ex rel. Blakemore v. Rombauer, 101 Mo. loc. cit. 502, 14 S. W. 726); members of a school board (State ex rel. Macklin v. Rombauer, 104 Mo. 619, 15 S. W. 850, 16 S. W. 502; State ex rel. Rogers v. Rombauer, 105 Mo. 103, 16 S. W. 695; State ex rel. Walker v. Bus, 135 Mo. 325, 36 S. W. 636, 33 L. R. A. 616); school directors (State ex rel. Sutton v. Fasse, 189 Mo. 532, 88 S. W. 1; State ex rel. Frisby v. Stone, 152 Mo. loc. cit. 204, 53 S. W. 1069; State ex rel. Frisby v. Hill, 152 Mo. 234, 53 S. W. 1062); and county collector (Sanders v. Lacks, 142 Mo. 255, 43 S. W. 653); and certain township officers (Macrae v. Coles, 183 S. W. 578). Under these rulings the conclusion is authorized that the office of justice of the peace is one held under the authority of the laws of this state, and hence this court has jurisdiction.

The court's power in the premises, as defined in the cases cited, is based primarily upon its jurisdiction to hear and determine upon appeal the original cases out of which the application for the writs arose. Such appellate jurisdiction, however, is not a prerequisite to the right of this court to issue the writ herein. State ex rel. v. Eby, 170 Mo. loc. cit. 516, 71 S. W. 52.

We come now to a consideration of the jurisdiction of the county court to hear and determine the contest proceedings upon which the application for the writ herein is based. The Constitution provides in this regard that:

"The General Assembly shall, by general law, designate the court or judge by whom the several classes of election contests shall be tried," etc. Section 9, art. 8, Const. Mo.

Under this provision section 5924, R. S. 1909, was enacted, giving county courts, except in cities now or...