Missouri, Kansas Texas Railway Company v. John Elliott

• Decision Date: 10 March 1902
• Docket Number: No. 148,148
• Citation: 22 S.Ct. 446,184 U.S. 530,46 L.Ed. 673
• Parties: MISSOURI, KANSAS, & TEXAS RAILWAY COMPANY, Plff, in Err. , v. JOHN S. ELLIOTT
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

184 U.S. 530

22 S.Ct. 446

46 L.Ed. 673

MISSOURI, KANSAS, & TEXAS RAILWAY COMPANY, Plff, in Err.,

v JOHN S. ELLIOTT.

No. 148.

Argued and Submitted January 29, 30, 1902.

Decided March 10, 1902.

The action below was brought by Elliott in the state circuit court of Cooper county, Missouri, against the railway company, plaintiff in error herein. Recovery was sought upon an injunction bond given in an equity cause in a suit in the circuit court of the United States for the central division of the western district of Missouri. The railway company was complainant in the equity cause, and Elliott was defendant. The circuit court of the United States, as the result of a mandate of the circuit court of appeals, entered an order dissolving the injunction, and thereupon this action was equity cause, and Elliott was defendant. The were embraced in the condition of the bond were averred to consist of payments made for attorneys' fees, traveling and other similar expenses of the plaintiff, asserted to have been disbursed during the course of the litigation in the United States court.

The answer consisted of a general denial, and alleged that the equity suit in which the bond was given was made necessary to enable the defendant to make its defense to an action at law, which had prior to the equity suit been brought against the railway company by Elliott. The cause was tried by the court without a jury. It appeared on the trial that in dismissing the bill in the equity cause the statutory allowance to attorneys and other costs had been taxed, and paid by the complainants in the equity cause in the United States circuit court. No objection was interposed at the trial to evidence introduced for the plaintiff as to the value of attorneys' services and the other sums disbursed for the expenses alleged in the petition. At the close of the trial the court, over the objection of the defendant, declared the law to be that the plaintiff was entitled to recover his reasonable personal expenses and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred for the services of attorneys in procuring the dissolution of the injunction. The following, among other prayers asked by the defendant, were refused:

'2. The court declares the law to be that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover as damages on the injunction bond sued on any sum which he may have paid out or become liable for as attorneys' fees.'

'5. The court declares the law to be that the plaintiff, having received the amount taxed in his favor as attorneys' fees as part of the costs in the equity suit mentioned in the pleadings and evidence in this case, he cannot now recover anything on account of attorneys' fees in this case.'

Judgment having been entered in favor of plaintiff and a motion for a new trial having been overruled, an appeal was taken to the Kansas City court of appeals, and the judgment was affirmed. In the course of its opinion the court recited the contentions of the defendant, and held each of them to be untenable. These contentions were thus stated by the court:

'1. Defendant's objections to the judgment below may be thus stated: First, that there was no breach of the conditions of the bond in that it was not alleged or proved that any damages had been previously adjudged against the defendant, whereas the condition of the bond is that defendant 'should pay all sums of money damages and costs that shall be adjudged against it,' etc.; and, secondly, it is contended that as the injunction bond was given in a proceeding pending in the United States court, the damages must be fixed and determined according to the rules and practice of the Federal courts; that attorneys' fees are not there considered elements of damage in suits on injunction bonds, and that therefore our state courts should apply the same rule in suits on bonds given in the Federal courts; and thirdly, it is insisted that the trial court erroneously allowed as damages attorneys' fees for defending the entire case—that the injunction was merely incidental to the principal case, and no attorneys' fees were paid to secure its dissolution.'

A motion for a rehearing was thereafter filed, in which, among other things, it was contended that the cause involved a Federal question, 'for the reason that the controversy in this suit arises under the authority of the United States, and under the laws of the United States governing and applicable to United States courts,' and the court was asked in the event that it should refuse to grant a rehearing, to transfer the case to the supreme court of the state of Missouri, 'for the reason that a Federal question is involved, and because the subject of the controversy of this suit arises under the authority of the United States and under the exercise of such authority, and under the laws of the United States governing and controlling the courts of the United States and the proceedings therein.' The motion for a rehearing having been overruled, it appears from a stipulation contained in the record that an application was made to the supreme court of the state of Missouri for a writ of prohibition against the judges of the said Kansas City court of appeals to restrain the further exercise of jurisdiction in the cause, and to require the record and proceedings to be certified to the supreme court. This application was denied. 154 Mo. 300, 55 S. W. 470.

Thereupon the present writ of error was allowed, and the record of the cause was brought here from the Kansas City court of appeals.

Mr. George P. B. Jackson for plaintiff in error.

Mr. W. M. Williams submitted the case for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice White, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court:

The proposition relied upon to secure the reversal of the judgment below is that the state court erroneously allowed, as an element of damage upon an injunction bond given in a court of the United States, the sum of alleged counsel fees for procuring a dissolution of the injunction, and that as such fees under the rule prevailing in the equity courts of the United States are not properly allowable, therefore the state court denied an immunity asserted in favor of the defendant below and arising from an authority exercised under the United States.

We are at the outset met by an objection that there is no jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Kansas City court of appeals. It is contended on behalf of the defendant in error that the Federal question relied upon was not raised below, and therefore is not reviewable here.

The general rule undoubtedly is that those Federal questions which are required to be specially set up and claimed must be so distinctly asserted below as to place it beyond question that the party bringing the case here from the state court intended to and did assert such a Federal right in the state court. But it is equally true that even although the allegations of Federal right made in the state court were so general and ambiguous in their character that they would not in and of themselves necessitate the conclusion that a right of a Federal nature was brought to the attention of the state court, yet if the state court in deciding the case has actually considered and determined a Federal question, although arising on ambiguous averments, then, a Federal controversy having been actually decided, the right of this court to review obtains. F. G. Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler County, 166 U. S. 648, 660, 41 L. ed. 1149, 1153, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 709. All that is essential is that the Federal questions must be presented in the state court in such a manner as to bring them to the attention of that tribunal. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 41 L. ed. 979, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581. And of course where it is shown by the record that the state court considered and decided the Federal question, the purpose of the statute is subserved. And so controlling as to the existence of the Federal question is the fact that it was actually considered and decided by the state court, that it has been held, although the general rule is that the raising of a Federal question in a petition for rehearing in the highest court of the state is too late, yet when a question is thus raised, and it is actually considered and decided by the state court, the right to review exists. Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U. S. 589, 592, 45 L. ed. 1015, 1017, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730.

Now, it plainly appears that the Kansas City court of appeals considered that there was presented to it for decision the question whether, in an action brought in a state court on an injunction bond given in a court of the United States, the state court was bound to apply to such a bond the rule prevailing in the courts of equity of the United States, viz., that attorneys' fees are not a proper element of damage. We say this is undoubted, since the opinion of the Kansas City court of appeals recites that such was the contention, and court proceeded to consider and decide it. That this contention involved a claim of immunity under an authority exercised under the United States, reviewable in this court, we have recently decided in Tullock v. Mulvane, 184 U. S.—, ante, p. 372,...