Barnes v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 30 October 1986
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Danny Charles BARNES, Jr., Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the City and County of San Francisco, Respondent; The PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest. AO34672.

Page 158

231 Cal.Rptr. 158

186 Cal.App.3d 969

Danny Charles BARNES, Jr., Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the City and County of San Francisco, Respondent;

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest.

AO34672.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

Oct. 30, 1986.

Review Denied Jan. 22, 1987.

Jeff Brown, Public Defender, Melody Fujimori, Estella W. Dooley, Deputy Public Defenders, San Francisco, for petitioner.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Dane R. Gillette, Ann K. Jensen, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for respondent and real party in interest.

CHANNELL, Associate Justice.

Petitioner Danny Charles Barnes, Jr. was confined in Atascadero State Hospital after being found not guilty by reason of insanity. In a case of first impression, he seeks a writ of mandate to require respondent superior court to afford him a jury trial on the issue of whether he should be placed in a local mental health program for one year. (Pen.Code, § 1026.2, subd. (e).) ¹ Under current law, ² Barnes must complete the one-year program before a determination may be made of whether he has been restored to sanity, entitling him to full release. (Ibid.) Having concluded that Barnes is not entitled to a jury trial at this preliminary stage of the proceedings, we deny the petition for a writ of mandate.

I. FACTS

Petitioner Danny Charles Barnes, Jr. was charged with assault with intent to commit a sex offense (§ 220), false imprisonment (§ 236), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)), and a firearm enhancement (§ 12022). In 1980, he was found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to Atascadero State Hospital for a maximum term of confinement of 8 years and 8 months, or until his sanity has been restored.

In 1983 and 1985, Barnes applied for release--contending that his sanity was restored--pursuant to former section 1026.2. On both occasions, juries found that Barnes had not met his burden of proof. In 1986, applying the present version of section 1026.2, respondent Superior Court for the City and County of San Francisco refused to grant Barnes' demand to have a jury determine whether he was suitable for one-year placement in a local mental health program. The superior court found that, under present law, section 1026.2 does not require a jury trial at this stage of the proceedings. Barnes petitioned this court for a writ of mandate to compel the superior court to afford him a jury trial on this question, on due process and equal protection grounds. We issued an alternative writ to allow the parties to argue this matter.

II. DISCUSSION

Section 1026.2 states the procedure by which a person, committed to a state hospital after having been found not guilty of a criminal offense by reason of insanity, may be released on the ground that he or she has been restored to sanity. The person applies for release to the superior court of the county from which the commitment was made. (§ 1026.2, subd. (a).) Once the person has served an initial 180-day commitment period (§ 1026.2, subd. (d)), the court must hold a "hearing" to determine if the applicant "would no longer be a danger to the health and safety of others, including himself or herself, if under supervision and treatment in the community." (§ 1026.2, subd. (e).) If the court makes this determination, it must order the applicant placed in an appropriate local mental health program for one year. All or a substantial portion of the program must include outpatient supervision and treatment, with the court retaining jurisdiction over the applicant. At the end of one year, the court must conduct a "trial" to determine if the applicant's sanity has been restored--that is, if "the applicant is no longer a danger to the health and safety of others, including himself or herself." The court has no authority to determine whether the applicant has been restored to sanity until he or she has completed one year in the local program. (Ibid.) "If the court denies the application to place the [applicant] in an appropriate local mental health program or if restoration of sanity is denied, no new application may be filed by the [applicant] until one year has elapsed from the date of the denial." (§ 1026.2, subd. (j), emphasis added.) During the year when the applicant is placed with the local mental health program, he or she may be returned to the state facility after a hearing if determined dangerous to others while in the program. (§ 1609.) ³

Subdivision (e) of section 1026.2 sets up a two-step process for processing an application for release: first, a determination of whether the applicant should be placed in a local program, and later, after a year in such a program, a determination of whether the applicant's sanity has been restored. (Ibid.) Under an earlier version of this provision--one that did not require the one-year placement period--the California Supreme Court found that a jury trial on the issue of restoration of sanity was constitutionally mandated. (In re Franklin (1972) 7 Cal.3d 126, 148-149, 101 Cal.Rptr. 553, 496 P.2d 465; see former § 1026a [amended and renumbered Stats. 1979, ch. 1114, § 2, p. 4051].) Under the present law, until the applicant satisfies the threshold test at the first proceeding, he or she will not be placed in the local program and will not reach a jury on the ultimate issue of restoration of sanity. (§ 1026.2, subd. (e); see In re Franklin, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 148-149, 101 Cal.Rptr. 553, 496 P.2d 465.) For this reason, Barnes contends that, under Franklin, a jury must also make the initial determination of whether an applicant should be placed in the local program in order for the statutory procedure to comply with due process and equal protection. (See U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.)

Initially, we note that section 1026.2 is silent on whether a jury trial is required for either of the two proceedings described in subdivision (e). Clearly, the statute anticipates that an applicant must face two proceedings, each with its own test. The first proceeding--at which the issue is whether the applicant would not be dangerous if under supervision and treatment--requires the applicant to satisfy a significantly lesser test than he or she must meet at the second proceeding, when the issue is whether the applicant would not be dangerous if unconditionally released. (§ 1026.2, subds. (e), (k).) Unless the applicant meets this threshold test, he or she will not advance to the second proceeding. (§ 1026.2 subd. (e).) In addition, within the same subsection, the Legislature describes the first proceeding as a hearing and the second as a trial. (Ibid.) The combination of these factors--the differing standards to be applied at the two proceedings, the fact that the test at the initial hearing is a threshold test, and the Legislature's reference to the first proceeding as a hearing and the second as a trial--satisfy us that the Legislature did not intend that the initial determination of the applicant's suitability for local placement should be made by a jury. ⁴

Having determined that the Legislature did not intend that a jury make the initial placement decision, we turn to the question of whether a jury trial of this issue is constitutionally mandated. First, Barnes contends that In re Franklin, supra, 7 Cal.3d 126, 101 Cal.Rptr. 553, 496 P.2d 465 compels this conclusion. We disagree. Clearly, Franklin compels a jury trial at the second proceeding, when the issue is whether the applicant has been restored to sanity. (Id., at pp. 148-149, 101 Cal.Rptr. 553, 496 P.2d 465.) But the question of suitability for placement in a local mental health program is different from the issue of restoration of sanity. (See § 1026.2, subd. (e) [stating different tests to be applied at each hearing].) As such, Franklin is not dispositive of the issue on appeal.

In the alternative, Barnes contends that procedural due process and equal protection require that the issue of suitability for placement be tried before a jury. We find that court trial of the placement question violates neither constitutional principle.

As the California Supreme Court has stated, "[d]ue process is a flexible concept; the precise procedures necessary to prevent the arbitrary deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest vary 'with the subject-matter and the necessities of the situation.' " (In re Bye (1974) 12 Cal.3d 96, 103, 115 Cal.Rptr. 382, 524 P.2d 854, cert. den., 420 U.S. 966, 95 S.Ct. 1437, 43 L.Ed.2d 679; see In re Franklin, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 135, 101 Cal.Rptr. 553, 496 P.2d 465; Baber v. Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 996, 964-965, 170 Cal.Rptr. 353.) The statutory provisions on commitment of persons found not guilty by reason of insanity represent a "delicate balance between a society's right to be protected from potentially mental ill and dangerous individuals, on the one hand, and the individual's right to be protected from improvident confinement on the other." (Mills v. State (Del.1969) 256 A.2d 752, 757 [cited in In re Franklin, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 148-149, 101 Cal.Rptr. 553, 496 P.2d 465]; see Baber v. Superior Court, supra, 113 Cal.App.3d at p. 965, 170 Cal.Rptr. 353.) A person who has committed a criminal offense is committed to a state hospital only after a jury has determined that he or she was insane at the time of the commission of the offense. (§ 1026, subd. (a).) After 180 days of commitment, he or she is entitled to petition for release on the ground of restoration of sanity. (§ 1026.2, subd. (d).) The ultimate decision whether the applicant has actually been restored to sanity must be made by a jury. (In re Franklin, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 148-149, 101 Cal.Rptr. 553, 496 P.2d 465.) If the court denies the applicant's request for placement or if the jury finds against the applicant on the issue of restoration of sanity, a new application may be filed one year later. (§ 1026.2, subd. ...