EEO Comm'n v. Joint Apprenticeship Comm.

• Decision Date: 01 August 1998
• Docket Number: Docket Nos. 97-6193
• Citation: 186 F.3d 110
• Parties: (2nd Cir. 1999) EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, v. JOINT APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE OF THE JOINT INDUSTRY BOARD OF THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY, Defendant-Appellee-Cross Appellant, (L), 97-6203 (XAP)
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 110

186 F.3d 110 (2nd Cir. 1999)

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, v. JOINT APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE OF THE JOINT INDUSTRY BOARD OF THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY, Defendant-Appellee-Cross Appellant,

Docket Nos. 97-6193 (L), 97-6203 (XAP)

August Term, 1998

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Argued: March 30, 1998

Decided: December 18, 1998

Amended: July 9, 1999

Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Knapp, Senior District Judge) denying plaintiff's motion to enjoin defendant from requiring applicants to its apprentice training program to possess a high school diploma or the equivalent, and denying back pay to certain individual claimants. Cross-appeal from the district court's decision granting plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment as to liability and from the district court's award of back pay to one individual claimant. Vacated and remanded. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] C. GREGORY STEWART, J. RAY TERRY, JR., VINCENT J. BLACKWOOD, CAROLYN L. WHEELER, JOHN F. SUHRE, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.

NORMAN ROTHFELD, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant.

Before: PARKER, Circuit Judge, EGINTON,^* and GLASSER,^** Senior District Judges^***

EGINTON, Senior District Judge:

Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") appeals from an order of the district court (Knapp, Senior District Judge) denying EEOC's motion to enjoin defendant Joint Apprenticeship Committee of the Joint Industry Board of the Electrical Industry ("JAC") from requiring applicants to its apprentice training program to possess a high school diploma or General Equivalency Diploma ("GED"), and denying back pay to certain individual claimants. JAC cross-appeals from the district court's decision granting EEOC's motion for partial summary judgment as to liability and from the district court's award of back pay to individual claimant Beverly Mundle. We vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The JAC Apprentice Training Program

JAC, a committee of the Joint Industry Board of the Electrical Industry, administers a four-year electrician apprentice training program. At the time this action was commenced in 1984, JAC required applicants to its apprentice training program to be between the ages of 19 and 22 and to possess a high school diploma or GED. JAC eliminated the age requirement in 1985 pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a) and (b), a state law prohibiting upper age limits for admission to apprenticeship programs. JAC continues to implement the education requirement.

JAC Recruitment announcements issued in 1981 and 1993 bore the caveat that "[a]nyone who does not meet the age, educational or any other requirement outlined in the notice should not request an application." The recruitment announcements also stated in bold capital letters that "[A]LL APPLICANTS MUST MEET THE FOLLOWING MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS IN ORDER TO QUALIFY," with age and education being the first two qualifications listed.

Applicants meeting these and other preliminary criteria were interviewed and given an aptitude test.¹ JAC would then offer apprenticeships to those applicants achieving the highest scores on the test and interview. Individuals failing to meet these preliminary criteria who nonetheless applied to the program were subject to rejection solely based on their age or educational status, and were not afforded the opportunity to interview or take the aptitude test.

JAC apprenticeships were and are paid positions, with compensation increasing as an apprentice garners skills and experience. For instance, from June 13, 1985 to June 12, 1986, a first-year apprentice earned $6.55 per hour, a second-year apprentice earned $7.60 per hour, a third-year apprentice earned $8.55 per hour, and a fourth-year apprentice earned $9.50 per hour. Upon successful completion of his or her apprenticeship, an individual is deemed an intermediate journey worker for a period of 18 months, and thereafter becomes a full journey worker. Between 1985 and 1986, an intermediate journey worker earned $11.50 per hour, and a full journey worker earned $23.50 per hour.

Successful completion of JAC's apprentice training program also entitles an individual to membership in the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 3, which is an electrical workers union (the "IBEW"). Most, but not all, IBEW members have gained admission to the union through JAC's apprentice training program. A person need not possess a high school diploma or GED, however, to become an IBEW member.

B. The Proceedings Below

EEOC brought this action in 1984 pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., alleging that JAC's education requirement had a disparate impact on Blacks and that its age requirement had a disparate impact on women. EEOC relied heavily on statistical evidence to support its claims.

On March 16, 1988, EEOC moved for partial summary judgment as to liability. Faced with this motion, JAC's counsel made the strategic choice to attack the validity of EEOC's prima facie case without making any timely showing of business justifications for the age and education requirements. After oral argument on EEOC's motion for partial summary judgment, however, JAC attempted to proffer an affidavit which JAC claimed showed business justifications for the challenged requirements. The district court struck the affidavit as untimely. On May 1, 1989, the district court granted summary judgment as to liability in favor of EEOC, finding that EEOC had established a prima facie case and that JAC had failed to show any business justification for the challenged requirements.

JAC appealed. This Court vacated the district court's May 1, 1989 decision and remanded on the grounds that the district court had failed to find, as required by Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), that the challenged requirements had caused the statistical disparities. In that opinion, this Court expressed no view as to the sufficiency of EEOC's statistics. EEOC v. Joint Apprenticeship Committee of the Joint Industry Board of the Electrical Industry, 985 F.2d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 1990).

On remand, the district court made the requisite finding of causation, and once again entered summary judgment in favor of EEOC. In so doing, the district court refused to reconsider JAC's previously stricken affidavit or to allow the introduction of new evidence of business justification. Consequently, the district court's decision rested entirely on its conclusion that EEOC had successfully established each prima facie case of Title VII discrimination. EEOC v. Joint Apprenticeship Committee of the Joint Board of the Electrical Industry, 828 F. Supp. 264, 266-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).

The case was thereafter referred to Magistrate Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald for consideration of whether eight female individual claimants who had been denied entrance to the JAC apprentice training program solely on the basis of age should be awarded back pay. After hearing three days of testimony, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the district court not award back pay to any of the individual claimants. On May 29, 1996, Judge Knapp adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendations as to all claimants except for Beverly Mundle, to whom the district court awarded back pay for the years 1983-1985.

On June 4, 1997, the district court granted EEOC's application for an injunction prohibiting JAC from implementing its age requirement, but declined, without explanation, to enjoin JAC from utilizing its education requirement. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

EEOC's primary basis for appeal is that the district court erred when it refused to enjoin JAC from continuing to implement its education requirement. EEOC argues that because the district court found JAC liable for race discrimination in violation of Title VII, the court was under a duty to grant the injunction. See, e.g., United States v. Gregory, 871 F.2d 1239, 1246 (4th Cir. 1989)(when a plaintiff establishes a defendant's liability under Title VII, there is no discretion to deny injunctive relief completely). At first blush, this situation might appear to require a fairly straightforward and facile analysis, with the likely outcome being a mandate directing the district court to enter the sought-after injunction.

JAC, however, cross-appeals from the underlying grant of partial summary judgment as to the race claim, urging that because judgment for EEOC was made in error, no injunction should issue. Moreover, JAC counters EEOC's second basis for appeal -- the denial of back pay -- by cross-appealing from the judgment entered in favor of EEOC as to the sex discrimination claim.

For the reasons discussed below, we find that the district court erred in not allowing JAC to present any evidence of business justification on remand. We therefore vacate judgment in favor of EEOC as to both Title VII claims, and once again remand the case to the district court, this time for consideration of the business justification issue. We reach this conclusion not because we believe that the district court abused its discretion in striking JAC's late-filed affidavit. Rather, we conclude that this court's somewhat ambiguous January 31, 1990 opinion was intended to have the effect of re-opening the business justification inquiry. We stress that although we are troubled by the longevity of this litigation, we are loathe to hold the education requirement invalid absent the full hearing on the merits that was this Court's intention. We further emphasize that we do not fault Judge Knapp for misreading this Court's imprecise 1990 ruling.

A. The Statistical Evidence

Before...