Jackson v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York
| Decision Date | 24 March 1911 |
| Docket Number | 3,345. |
| Citation | 186 F. 447 |
| Parties | JACKSON v. MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
J. T Allensworth, for plaintiff in error.
John S Dean (James McKeen, on the brief), for defendant in error.
Before SANBORN and ADAMS, Circuit Judges, and WILLIAM H. MUNGER District Judge.
This was a suit in five counts on five separate policies of insurance on the life of Don W. Jackson, who died October 13 1903. The defense was that the policies lapsed by the nonpayment of premiums of $13.30 on each policy, which fell due July 8, 1903. By way of anticipating this defense the beneficiary, Sarah A. Jackson, plaintiff in error, in her amended and second amended petitions alleged:
'That prior to the date when the July 8, 1903, premium became due and payable by the terms of said policies, the said defendant company granted an extension of 60 days' time to the said Don W. Jackson for the payment of the July 8th extension, by the terms thereof and the conditions of said policies; and on, to wit, the 5th day of October, 1903, one J. D. Hutchings made full and complete tender thereof, together with all subsequent premiums, as above alleged, which said tender was wholly refused by said company as aforesaid; * * * that the 60-day extension for the payment of the July 8, 1903, premium, as therein alleged, was granted both by written and oral communication from said defendant company, and took effect and began on the 8th day of August, 1903, and expired on the 8th day of October, 1903.'
The defendant denied:
'That it extended the time for payment of the quarterly premiums due on said policies from the 8th day of August, 1903, to the 8th day of October, 1903, as alleged in said original and amended petition, nor for any other period of time, except a 60-day extension from July 8, 1903.' A jury was duly waived, and the cause submitted to the court on the proof taken. A general judgment, without any finding of facts, was rendered in favor of the defendant. No exception was taken to any ruling of the court in the progress of the trial on the admission or exclusion of evidence or otherwise. Neither was there any request for a ruling upon the legal sufficiency or effect of the evidence.
A certain definite issue of fact was joined in the case, whether the agreement of the parties, taken in connection with the terms and conditions of the policies, extended the time of payment of the July premium to September 8th or October 8th. The trial court heard the proof, both oral and written, and from it all found and decided that the extension was to September 8th only.
No exceptions having been taken to any rulings of the court in the progress of the trial, the finding of this fact is conclusive. No question of law is presented for review. Hughes County v. Livingston, 43 C.C.A. 541, 104 F. 306; York v. Washburn, 64 C.C.A. 132, 129 F. 564, and cases cited.
But it is assigned for error that the court should have rendered a judgment for plaintiff on the pleadings. This presents a question of law for our consideration. Lehnen v. Dickson, 148 U.S. 71, 13 Sup.Ct. 481, 37 L.Ed. 373.
The policies gave 30 days, called 'days of grace,' within which premiums might be paid after the times specified for their payment. In view of this provision, it is contended that that part of defendants' answer following its denial of the alleged extension to October 8th, wherein it is said, 'Nor for any other period of time except a 60-day extension from July 8, 1903,' was an averment that the admitted extension of 60 days should be supplemented by the 30 days of grace, and, as so supplemented, would extend to October 8th.
We think this is far-fetched. Pleadings must receive a rational construction. The obvious purpose of the defendant's answer was to deny the allegation of the petition that there had been an extension of time given the insured to pay the July premium until October 8th. This became an...
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