Hayes v. Harvey

• Decision Date: 10 May 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-2617
• Parties: Theodore Hayes, et al., Plaintiffs v. Philip E. Harvey, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

186 F.Supp.3d 427

Theodore Hayes, et al., Plaintiffs

v.Philip E. Harvey, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-2617

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed May 10, 2016

Rachel Garland, Michael Donahue, Community Legal Services, Inc., Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Susanna Randazzo, Kolber Freiman & Randazzo, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, USDC J.

INTRODUCTION

This is an action seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief under the United States Housing Act of 1937 (the "Housing Act"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f. Presently, before this Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, [ECF 16 and 17], which have fully briefed the issues.¹ The parties' dispute arose from the decision of Philip E. Harvey ("Defendant") in February 2015, to not renew the Section 8 tenant-based housing assistance payment contract and the related lease agreement with Theodore Hayes and Aqeela Fogle (collectively "Plaintiffs" or the "Hayes Family"), set to expire naturally on April 30, 2015. Specifically, the parties disagree as to their respective rights and obligations as owner/landlord and tenant under various provisions of the Housing Act.

For the reasons set forth, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied, and Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.

BACKGROUND

The relevant facts in this case were drawn from the "Statement of Undisputed Facts," submitted by Plaintiffs, [ECF 16-1], which Defendant does not contest but, instead, supplements with additional facts.

[ECF 17]. These facts are summarized as follows:

Plaintiffs Theodore Hayes and Aqeela Fogle are a Section 8 voucher tenant family who live at 538B Pine Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (the "Property"). This residence was built in 1982 as part of Washington Square East, a Section 8 project-based housing development in the Society Hill area of Philadelphia, and was federally subsidized pursuant to Section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f. The Washington Square East complex consisted of three duplex row homes, totaling six units, and covered 536-540 Pine Street.

In 2008, Pine Street Associates, the owners of Washington Square East, chose not to renew its project-based Section 8 contract and sent the then existing tenants a one-year opt-out notice advising the tenants that the Section 8 contract was set to expire on January 17, 2009. Thereafter, the Philadelphia Housing Authority (the "PHA"), the local public housing authority charged with administering tenant-based assistance programs, provided each of the Washington Square East tenants, including Plaintiffs, with Enhanced Vouchers, in accordance with the Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t). Plaintiffs chose to remain in 538B Pine Street.²

In August 2010, Pine Street Associates sold the Property, (536-540 Pine Street), to Defendant for $1.2 million, free and clear of any impediments, encumbrances, liens and/or restrictions. The recorded deed contains no restrictions on the residential rental use of the premises.

On November 8, 2010, Defendant signed a Section 8 voucher lease (the "Lease") with Mrs. Florence Hayes, the head of household at the time for the Hayes Family, regarding the 538B Pine Street unit. The term of the Lease was retroactive to May 11, 2010, with an initial termination date of April 30, 2011, but subject to automatic renewal for another one-year term. The Lease, however, is silent as to the timing of any notice requirement by the landlord/owner for the termination of the Lease at the end of a term. The parties renewed the Lease in 2011 for a two-year term and again in 2013. The most recent Lease term ended on April 30, 2015.

In its pertinent section, the Lease provides that the owner may only terminate the tenancy or lease on the following grounds:

1. Serious or repeated violation of the terms and conditions of the lease.

2. Violation of Federal, State or local law that impose obligations on the Tenant in connection with the occupancy, the contract unit and the premises.

3. Criminal activity ...

4. Other good cause. "Other good cause" may include, but is not limited to, any of the following examples:

I. Failure by the Tenant family to accept the offer of a new lease or revision after the first year of the lease;

II. A family history of disturbance of neighbors or destruction of property, or of living or housekeeping habits resulting in damage to the unit or property;III. The Owner's desire to utilize the unit for personal or family use or for a purpose other than use as a residential unit after the first year of the lease;

IV. A business or economic reason for termination of the tenancy (such as sale of property, renovation of the unit, desire to rent the unit at a higher rental) after the first year of the lease.

Note: The Owner must give PHA a copy of any Owner eviction notice of Tenant at the same time that the Owner gives notice to Tenant.

On the date the parties entered into the Lease, Defendant also entered into a Housing Assistance Payments Contract (the "HAP Contract"), with the PHA, pursuant to the "Section 8 Tenant-Based Assistance Housing Choice Voucher Program." (See Exhibit S) (emphasis added). Under its stated "purpose" provision, the HAP Contract provided:

This is a HAP contract between the PHA and the owner. The HAP contract is entered to provide assistance for the family under the Section 8 voucher program (see HUD program regulations at 24 Code of Federal Regulations Part 982).

The HAP Contract similarly restricts the grounds on which an owner can terminate the Lease.

On February 2, 2015, Mrs. Florence Hayes, the original head of household on the Lease, passed away. The PHA removed Mrs. Hayes' name from the Lease and issued an addendum, listing and identifying Plaintiff Theodore Hayes on the Lease as the head of household.

On February 17, 2015, Defendant sent a "Nonrenewal Letter" to the Hayes Family indicating his intention to not renew the Lease due to the death of Mrs. Florence Hayes (the named head of household), and requiring that the apartment be vacated by the end of the current term, April 30, 2015. The letter also advised the Hayes Family of Defendant's intention to fully renovate the apartment after they vacated the premises. A copy of the letter was also sent to the PHA.

On May 1, 2015, Defendant sent the Hayes Family a "Notice to Vacate," which referenced the earlier letter and repeated Defendant's intention to not renew the Lease. This notice again advised the Hayes Family of Defendant's intention to renovate the property and to have a family member move into the premises. The letter provided the Hayes Family five additional days to vacate the premises before eviction proceedings would be initiated.

On May 12, 2015, Plaintiffs filed the instant complaint, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief; to wit : an injunction precluding Defendant from evicting Plaintiffs from the Property.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 56 governs the summary judgment motion practice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Specifically, this rule provides that summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or non-existence might affect the outcome of the litigation, and a dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Under Rule 56, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Galena v. Leone , 638 F.3d 186, 196 (3d Cir.2011).

Rule 56(c) provides that the movant bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record which the movant "believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). This burden can be met by showing that the nonmoving party has "fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case." Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

After the moving party has met its initial burden, summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party fails to rebut the moving party's claim by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" that show a genuine issue of material fact or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute." See Fed. R.C.P. 56(c)(1)(A–B). The nonmoving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The nonmoving party may not rely on bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions, Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark v. DuFresne , 676 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir.1982), nor rest on the allegations in the pleadings. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Rather, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings" and either by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file, "designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ " Id.

Here, the parties agree that there are no genuine issues of material fact; however, they each argue that the undisputed facts require the entry of judgment in their respective favor. The parties' dispute is premised upon their differing interpretation of their respective rights and obligations under various provisions of the Housing Act. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the "enhanced voucher" provision in ...