Marr v. Fisher et al.
| Citation | 182 Or. 383,187 P.2d 966 |
| Parties | MARR <I>v.</I> FISHER ET AL. |
| Decision Date | 18 December 1947 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Oregon |
5. The constitutional provision that no law shall be passed, the taking effect of which shall be made to depend upon any authority except as provided in this Constitution, seeks to prevent unlawful delegation of legislative authority. Const. art. 1, § 21.
Constitutional law — Legislature — Function
6. It is the constitutional function of the Legislature to declare whether there is to be a law and if so what are its terms.
7. Generally where an act is clothed with all the forms of law and is complete in and of itself, it is fairly within scope of the legislative power to prescribe that it shall become operative only on happening of some specified contingency, or succession of contingencies, and such a statute lies dormant until called into active force by the existence of the conditions on which it is intended to operate.
Constitutional law — Statutes — Legislation declaration — Statutory provision
8. There is a distinction between a legislative declaration that an enactment shall not become a law until approved by some authority other than the General Assembly itself, and a statutory provision which has become law, but depends for its execution upon a contingency or an eventuality, the former being prohibited and the latter not.
Constitutional law — Taxation — Income tax exemption act and Income tax withholding act — Sales tax act
9. The Income Tax Exemption Act and Income Tax Withholding Act are not violative of constitutional provision prohibiting passage of any law taking effect of which shall be made to depend upon any authority except as provided in Constitution and provision reserving to the people powers of initiative and referendum because operation thereof is made contingent upon approval or rejection of Sales Tax Act by referendum where acts were complete in themselves, passed by Legislature and approved by the Governor and were merely dormant until brought into operation by rejection of the Sales Tax Act by the people. Laws 1947, cc. 536, 539, 540, Const. art. 1, §§ 21, 22; art. 4, §§ 1, 1.
See note, 166 A.L.R. 516
27 Am. Jur. 319
16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 141
Appeal from Circuit Court, Marion County.
Carl H. Francis, of Dayton, and Elliott B. Cummins, of McMinnville, for appellants.
George Neuner, Attorney General, of Salem, and Dean Ellis, Assistant Attorney General, of Salem, for respondents.
Before ROSSMAN, Chief Justice, and LUSK, BELT, KELLY, BAILEY and WINSLOW, Justices.
Suit by James T. Marr, individually, and James T. Marr in a representative capacity, as executive secretary-treasurer of the Oregon State Federation of Labor, a voluntary association, against Earl L. Fisher, Carl Chambers and Wallace S. Wharton, constituting the State Tax Commission of the State of Oregon, challenging the constitutionality of Chapters 536 and 539, Oregon Laws of 1947, relating to the withholding of income tax and certain tax exemptions. From the decree, plaintiffs appeal.
AFFIRMED.
This is a suit challenging the constitutionality of Chapters 536 and 539, Oregon Laws 1947. Chapter 536 pertains to the withholding by employers of income tax from wages and salaries of employees. Chapter 539 relates to personal income tax exemptions. These two Acts were passed by the legislature in conjunction with the Sales Tax Act, Chapter 540, Oregon Laws 1947, all of which were filed in the office of the Secretary of State on April 19, 1947. The legislature specifically referred the Sales Tax Act to the people for their approval or rejection at a special election held throughout the state on October 7, 1947, and the electorate at such election rejected the Act.
Chapter 539, § 1 provides, so far as material herein, that for tax years (or periods) beginning on or after January 1, 1947, "and in the event that a general sales tax * * * is enacted and is in full force and effect in this state on and after January 1, 1948, there shall be deducted * * * the following personal exemptions and credits * * *." The Act then sets forth a schedule of exemptions and credits resulting in lower personal income taxes. In other words, the exemptions and credits were increased over those provided in the income tax law prior to amendment.
Section 2 of the Act provides in substance that in the event a general sales tax "is not enacted and is not in full force and effect in this state on and after January 1, 1948, there shall be deducted * * * the following exemptions and credits * * *." Then follows a schedule of lower exemptions and credits, resulting in higher personal income taxes.
Chapter 536 requires employers to withhold one per cent of the gross amount of wages and salaries paid to employees and to pay the same to the State Tax Commission to be credited to the income tax liability of the individual employees. The pertinent provision of this Act is as follows:
In other words, the withholding of such wages and salaries would not be operative if the income tax was lowered. Whether the income tax would be increased or decreased depended on the result of the referendum of the Sales Tax Act at the special election above mentioned.
Assuming the constitutionality of Chapters 536 and 539, these two Acts became laws on July 5, 1947, or ninety days after final adjournment of the legislature.
Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Chapter 539 (Income Tax Act) on two grounds: (1) That the Act violates Article I, Section 21 of the Constitution of Oregon, which provides: "* * * Nor shall any law be passed, the taking effect of which shall be made to depend upon any authority, except as provided in this constitution * * *." More specifically plaintiffs contend that the taking effect of Chapter 539 was made to depend upon the action of the people in approving or rejecting Chapter 540 (Sales Tax Act) and that such legislative procedure is in contravention of the above constitutional provision. (2) That the Act, as related to Chapter 540, denied to the people the right of exercising the referendum concerning such legislative enactment and, therefore, was violative of Art. IV, § 1 of the Constitution of Oregon, reserving to the people the powers of the Initiative and Referendum.
Plaintiffs contend that Chapter 536 (Withholding Income Tax Act) is unconstitutional for the same reasons urged against Chapter 539. Since the same legal principles are applicable to these two Acts, it follows that the conclusion reached relative to one will control the other. In this opinion we will consider primarily the law as applied to Chapter 539 — the Income Tax Exemption Act.
1-4. The State Constitution is an instrument of limitations and not an instrument of grant, as is the Federal Constitution, and the legislative assembly can enact any legislation not prohibited. State v. Hecker, 109 Or. 520, 221 P. 808; Wright v. Beveridge, 120 Or. 244, 251 P. 895. The legislature has all powers of legislation, except in so far as it may be restrained, expressly or by necessary implication, by the Constitution of the State, or of the United States. We are concerned not with the motives of the law-making body in enacting the legislation in question, but with its power to do so. As Justice HUGHES said in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 55 L.ed. 328, 31 Sup. Ct. 259:
"The mere fact * * * that judges may hold views inconsistent with the propriety of the legislation in question, affords no ground for judicial interference, unless the act in question is unmistakably and palpably in excess of legislative power."
It is also a fundamental rule — for which no authorities need be cited — that courts are reluctant to declare a legislative enactment void and will do so only when its invalidity is clearly established.
5, 6. The purpose of the constitutional provision (Art. I, § 21), relied upon by plaintiffs, is to prevent unlawful delegation of legislative authority. The law-making power, under the Constitution of Oregon (Art. IV, § 1) is vested in the legislature, but the people have reserved unto themselves the power to initiate laws and to approve or reject at the polls any act of the legislative assembly. The people, having thus vested the legislative assembly with the law-making power, have in effect said that ...
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