Simeon Grin v. John Shine
Decision Date | 01 December 1902 |
Docket Number | No. 303,303 |
Citation | 187 U.S. 181,47 L.Ed. 130,23 S.Ct. 98 |
Parties | SIMEON I. GRIN, Appt. , v. JOHN H. SHINE |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
This was an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for the northern district of California, dismissing a writ of habeas corpus sued out by Grin, and remanding him to the custody of the defendant, marshal for the northern district of California, who held him under a mittimus issued by a commissioner in certain proceedings under a treaty with the Emperor of Russia for the extradition of criminals, proclaimed June 5, 1893. 28 Stat. at L. 1071.
These proceedings were begun by a complaint of Paul Kosakevitch, Russian consul at the city of San Francisco, stating, in substance, that on March 6, 1901, Grin, a Cossack of the Don and a Russian subject, in the employment of the firm of E. L. Zeefo & Co., doing business in the city of Rostov, on the river Don, in the Empire of Russia, embezzled the sum of 25,000 roubles, 'intrusted to and received by' him in his capacity as 'clerk' of such firm, and that he had subsequently absconded and taken refuge in San Francisco; that he had been indicted in Russia for the embezzlement of the money, and that a mandate had been issued by the Department of State in Washington directing the necessary proceedings to be had in pursuance of the laws of the United States, in order that the evidence of his criminality might be heard and considered. The complaint was sworn to before George E. Morse, United States commissioner, with the usual power to take affidavits, but not specially authorized by any court of the United States to take proceedings in extradition; that upon such complaint the judge of the district court for the northern district of California issued a warrant of arrest, and directed that petitioner, when arrested, should be brought before E. H. Heacock, Esquire, United States commissioner, for examination and further proceedings; that, at the time such warrant was issued, Heacock was not authorized to take jurisdiction of extradition proceedings, and that the evidence before him failed to show that the petitioner had committed the crime of embezzlement.
Several other defects in the extradition proceedings are set forth in the petition, and so far as they are deemed material, appear hereafter in the opinion.
Upon a hearing upon this petition the circuit court made an order remanding the petitioner to the custody of the marshal, and an appeal was thereupon taken to this court. Re Grin, 112 Fed. 790.
Mr. George D. Collins for appellant.
Messrs. H. G. Platt and Richard Bayne for the Russian Government.
We shall only notice such alleged defects in the extradition proceedings as are pressed upon our attention in the briefs of counsel. While these defects are of a technical character, they are certainly entitled to respectful and deliberate consideration. Good faith toward foreign powers, with which we have entered into treaties of extradition, does not require us to surrender persons charged with crime in violation of those well-settled principles of criminal procedure which from time immemorial have characterized Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. Persons charged with crime in foreign countries, who have taken refuge here, are entitled to the same defenses as others accused of crime within our own jurisdiction.
We are not prepared, however, to yield our assent to the suggestion that treaties of extradition are invasions of the right of political habitation within our territory, or that every intendment in proceedings to carry out these treaties shall be in favor of the party accused. Such treaties are rather exceptions to the general right of political asylum, and an extension of our immigration laws prohibiting the introduction of persons convicted of crimes (18 Stat. at L. 477 [chap. 141, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1285]), by providing for their deportation and return to their own country, even before conviction, when their surrender is demanded in the interests of public justice. There is such a general acknowledgment of the necessity of such treaties that of late, and since the facilities for the escape of criminals have so greatly increased, most civilized powers have entered into conventions for the mutual surrender of persons charged with the most serious nonpolitical crimes. These treaties should be faithfully observed, and interpreted with a view to fulfil our just obligations to other powers, without sacrificing the legal or constitutional rights of the accused.
In the construction and carrying out of such treaties the ordinary technicalities of criminal proceedings are applicable only to a limited extent. Foreign powers are not expected to be versed in the niceties of our criminal laws, and proceedings for a surrender are not such as put in issue the life or liberty of the accused. They simply demand of him that he shall do what all good citizens are required, and ought to be willing to do, viz., submit themselves to the laws of their country. Care should doubtless be taken that the treaty be not made a pretext for collecting private debts, wreaking individual malice, or forcing the surrender of political offenders; but where the proceeding is manifestly taken in good faith, a technical noncompliance with some formality of criminal procedure should not be allowed to stand in the way of a faithful discharge of our obligations. Presumably at least, no injustice is contemplated, and a proceeding which may have the effect of relieving the country from the presence of one who is likely to threaten the peace and good order of the community is rather to be welcomed than discouraged.
1. The first assignment of error is that the commissioner had no jurisdiction over the case, inasmuch as at the time the warrant of arrest was issued he had not been authorized to act in extradition proceedings by any of the courts of the United States under Rev. Stat. § 5270 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3591], which reads as follows:
Under this section it is plain, first, that the commissioner must be specially authorized to act in extradition cases; second, that a complaint must be made under oath charging the crime; third, that a warrant must issue for the apprehension of the person; fourth, that he must be brought before such justice, judge, or commissioner to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered; fifth, that the commissioner shall certify the evidence to the Secretary of State, that a warrant may issue for the surrender. There is certainly no requirement here that the commissioner shall be authorized to act before he assumes to act, and in this case there is no evidence that he assumed to act until after October 17, 1901, when he was specially appointed for that purpose. The day upon which the petitioner was brought before the commissioner, Heacock, does not appear, but his commitment is dated November 19, 1901. The warrant upon which he was arrested was issued October 17, the day upon which the commissioner was specially authorized to act.
It is true that a warrant of arrest can only issue under § 5270 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3591], upon a complaint made under oath; but there is no requirement that the oath shall be taken before a commissioner authorized to act in extradition proceedings, or even before the judge or commissioner who issues the warrant of arrest. While we are bound to give the person accused the benefit of every statutory provision, we are not bound to import words into the statute which are not found there, or to say that the judge issuing the warrant may not receive an oath taken before a commissioner authorized generally to take affidavits. There is no evidence that Mr. Morse, who took this complaint, was not a United States commissioner appointed under the act of May 28, 1896 (29 Stat. at L. 184 [chap. 252, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 499]), and the fact that he signs his name as such, and that he was recognized as such by the circuit court in this proceeding, is sufficient evidence of his authority. It is true the district judge, who issued this warrant of arrest, might himself have administered the oath, but he was equally at liberty to act upon a complaint sworn to before a United States commissioner.
2. Nor did the district judge, who issued the warrant, exceed his powers in making it returnable before a commissioner, who upon the same day was specially designated to act in extradition proceedings. It is true that the statute provides (§ 5270 [U. S....
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