Knights Templars Masons Life Indemnity Company v. Rosa Jarman

• Citation: 23 S.Ct. 108,187 U.S. 197,47 L.Ed. 139
• Decision Date: 08 December 1902
• Docket Number: No. 48,48
• Parties: KNIGHTS TEMPLARS' & MASONS' LIFE INDEMNITY COMPANY, Petitioner , v. ROSA B. JARMAN
• Court: United States Supreme Court

187 U.S. 197

23 S.Ct. 108

47 L.Ed. 139

KNIGHTS TEMPLARS' & MASONS' LIFE INDEMNITY COMPANY, Petitioner,

v ROSA B. JARMAN.

No. 48.

Argued October 17, 1902.

Decided December 8, 1902.

This was a writ of certiorari to review a judgment of the circuit court of appeals affirming a judgment of the circuit court for the western district of Missouri, overruling the defense of suicide to an action upon a policy of life insurance, and awarding plaintiff judgment for the amount of the policy and assessments thereon.

An agreed statement of facts shows defendant to be an Illinois corporation, organized 'for the purpose of furnishing life indemnity or pecuniary benefits to widows,' etc.; and that on October 19, 1885, it issued to John P. Jarman, plaintiff's husband, and a citizen of Missouri, a policy of insurance or certificate of membership, subject to the constitution and by-laws of the company and certain conditions in the policy, one of which provided for its avoidance in case of self-destruction, 'whether voluntary or involuntary, sane or insane.' The seventh stipulation was that 'John P. Jarman, while insane to such an extent as to be incapable of understanding the nature or consequences of his act, took his own life, and came to his death on the 12th day of September, 1898, by a gunshot wound, inflicted by himself. It is not contended, however, by plaintiff that such self-destruction was the result of accident.' The further material facts are set forth in the opinion.

Defendant having refused to pay the amount of the policy on account of the suicide of the insured, Rosa B. Jarman, his widow and beneficiary, brought an action January 19, 1899, in the circuit court of Grundy county to recover the amount of the policy, $5,000, and assessments, which action was subsequently removed to the circuit court of the United States for the western district of Missouri, upon the ground of diversity of citizenship. The case was submitted to the court without the intervention of a jury, and resulted in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $6,006.30, which was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. Whereupon petitioner sued out a writ of certiorari from this court.

Messrs. S. S. Gregory and Hervey Bryan Hicks for petitioner.

Messrs. Frederick H. Bacon, E. M. Harber, and A. G. Knight for respondent.

Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the court:

This case turns principally upon the applicability to the policy in question of § 5982 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1879, afterwards Rev. Stat. 1889, § 5855 (hereinafter termed the suicide statute), which was in force in 1885, when this policy was written. The section is as follows:

'In all suits upon policies of insurance on life hereafter issued by any company doing business in this state, it shall be no defense that the insured committed suicide, unless it shall be shown to the satisfaction of the court or jury trying the cause that the insured contemplated suicide at the time he made his application for the policy, and any stipulation in the policy to the contrary shall be void.'

1. The first defense in order of time is that Jarman did not commit suicide within the meaning of this act, since the stipulated fact was that he shot himself while insane to such an extent as to be incapable of understanding the nature or conse- quences of his act. The position of the company in this connection is that the enactment above quoted, that 'it shall be no defense that the insured committed suicide,' relates only to cases where the insured takes his own life voluntarily, while sane, and in full possession of his mental faculties; and hence, the provision of the policy, that 'in case of the self-destruction of the holder of this policy, whether voluntary or involuntary, sane or insane, . . . this policy shall become null and void,' applies, and exonerates the company from all liability beyond that provided in the policy, 'that in the case of the suicide of the holder of this policy, then this company will pay to his widow and heirs or devisees such an amount of his policy as the member shall have paid to this company on the policy in assessments on the same without interest.'

This contention is founded upon the ruling of this court in Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580, 21 L. ed. 236, and cognate cases, to the effect that a similar provision avoiding a policy in case the insured should 'die by his own hand' applied only where the insured intentionally takes his own life, while in possession of his ordinary reasoning faculties, and does not apply when he is unable to understand the moral character, the general nature, consequences and effects of the act he is about to commit, or when he is impelled thereto by an insane impulse, which he has not the power to resist.

But we are of opinion that the word 'suicide' is not used in this statute in its technical and legal sense of self-destruction by a sane person, but according to its popular meaning of death by one's own hand, irrespective of the mental condition of the person committing the act. The result of the construction urged by the defendant would be that, if a perfectly sane man voluntarily and from anger, pride, or jealousy, or a mere desire to escape from the ills of life, puts an end to his life, and thereby becomes guilty of the cirme of self-murder, and of a fraud upon the insurance company, the company would still be responsible, unless it could be shown that the insured contemplated suicide at the time he made his application for the policy; while, if he committed the same act while insane, and therefore irresponsible, the statute would not apply, and the company would not be liable under the terms of the policy, which provided that it should become void 'in case of the self-destruction of the holder . . . whether voluntary or involuntary, sane or insane.' In the one case, as we held in Ritter v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 169 U. S. 139, 42 L. ed. 693, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 300, that is, of self-destruction by a sane man, not only would the policy be void, whether there were a provision to that effect or not, but even a contract that it should be valid under such circumstances was thought to be against public policy and subversive of sound morality (p. 154, L. ed. p. 698, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 505), while in the other case of a suicide by an insane person, the insured is guilty of no wrong to the company if he be incapable of understanding the moral consequences of his own act, and there is no reason in law or morals why the company should not pay. It is impossible to suppose that the legislature could have contemplated such a contingency, and a construction that would lead to this result should be deemed inadmissible, unless the language of the statute were too plain to be misunderstood.

The statute was manifestly intended to apply to all cases of self-destruction or suicide, unless the same were contemplated at the time application was made for the policy, and the fact that we may have given a different construction to the same words when used in a policy of insurance does not militate against this theory. The same words may require a different construction when used in different documents, as, for instance, in a contract, and a statute; and identity of words is not decisive of identity of meaning where they are used in different connections and for different purposes. In a contract, the technical rights of the parties only are involved; in a statute, an important question of public policy. If this statute were read alone and disembarrassed by the construction given to these words in policies of insurance, not a doubt would arise as to its application to all cases of self-destruction; and when we examine the theory of the defendant, and find that it leads to the conclusion that the company would be liable if the insured had committed a fraud upon it, and would not be liable if he had taken his life, though guilty of no fraud, the theory must be rejected without hesitation. The construction we have given to the words 'committed suicide' in this act is fortified by reference to § 6570, Mo. Rev. Stat. 1889, referring to the construction of statutes, which provides that 'words and phrases shall be taken in their plain, or ordinary and usual, sense; but technical words and phrases, having a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, shall be understood according to their technical import.' Undoubtedly the word 'suicide' in its usual sense includes all cases of self-destruction.

2. We are next brought to the consideration of the applicability of the suicide statute (§ 5982) to policies of this company issued at this time. This act, upon its face, applies to all insurance companies 'doing business in this state,' and to all policies issued by such companies after the date of the act. It undoubtedly governs the rights of the parties in this case, except so far as the same may have been modified by an act passed in 1887, authorizing the incorporation of insurance companies on the assessment plan. Section 10 of this act (Laws 1887, pp. 199, 204) is now known as § 5869 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1889, and provides that corporations 'doing business under this article' shall make certain annual statements, which, as well as other requirements, are also made applicable to foreign companies, with the following proviso: 'Provided, always, That nothing herein contained shall subject any corporation doing business under this article to any other provisions or requirements of the general insurance laws of this state, except as distinctly herein set forth.' It appears that the defendant in this case, which is a citizen of Illinois, elected to take advantage of this law, and on June 18, 1888, received from the insurance department of the state authority to do business thereunder upon the assessment plan. As to policies issued upon the assessment plan subsequent to this date and prior to 1897, the supreme court...