Miltenberger Lawder v. William Stone
Decision Date | 01 December 1902 |
Docket Number | No. 82,82 |
Citation | 47 L.Ed. 178,23 S.Ct. 79,187 U.S. 281 |
Parties | MILTENBERGER LAWDER et al., Petitioners , v. WILLIAM F. STONE, Collector |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
In the months of May, June, and July, 1897, the petitioners, copartners trading as S. M. Lawder & Sons, imported into the port of Baltimore from the British West Indies several cargoes of pineapples, invoiced as a specified number of dozens.
Upon the discharge of the cargo at Baltimore, after the pine- apples had been taken out of the vessels and their number estimated by the inspectors, there remained in the holds a quantity of what was described as 'slush,' consisting of decomposed vegetable matter, mixed with bilge water and other d ebris of the cargo, some of it in a semi-liquid condition. This slush was brought up from the holds in baskets and included by the inspectors in their appraisement of the cargoes. The pineapples alleged to be contained in the slush were uncountable, and their number was roughly estimated by the inspectors by counting the pineapple tops and butts contained in a number of baskets of the slush, striking an average of those baskets, and then calculating the number contained in the whole quantity of slush according to that average. The material thus removed from the vessels was commercially valueless, and under the sanitary regulations of the city of Baltimore was taken down the river on a scow and dumped overboard. The number of pineapples so estimated by the inspectors to be contained in the slush was less than 10 per cent of the total invoice, and the collector treated the loss as a case of damage to the cargo within the meaning of § 23 of the customs administrative act of June 10, 1890, and assessed duty on the whole number of pineapples estimated by the inspectors to be contained in the cargoes, including this quantity of slush.
The board of general appraisers sustained a protest of the importers against the assessment of duties on the worthless and indistinguishable mass referred to, and this decision was affirmed, on appeal of the collector, by the circuit court of the United States for the district of Maryland. On a further appeal by the collector the circuit court of appeals for the fourth circuit reversed the decisions which had been made in favor of the importers and sustained the action of the collector. 41 C. C. A. 621, 101 Fed. 710. The case was then brought to this court by writ of certiorari.
Mr. Edward S. Hatch for petitioners.
Assistant Attorney General Hoyt and Messrs. James A. Finch, John C. Rose, and Solicitor General Richards for respondent.
Mr. Justic White, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court:
As mentioned in the preceding statement, the collector of customs for the district of Baltimore treated the loss arising from the worthless condition of the portion of the cargo in question as a case of damage to the entire cargoes, within the meaning of § 23 of the customs administrative act of June 10, 1890. That section reads as follows:
'That no allowance for damage to goods, wares, and merchandise imported into the United States shall hereafter be made in the estimation and liquidation of duties thereon; but the importer thereof may, within ten days after entry, abandon to the United States all or any portion of goods, wares, and merchandise included in any invoice, and be relieved from the payment of the duties on the portion so abandoned: Provided, That the portion so abandoned shall amount to 10 per centum or over of the total value or quantity of the invoice; and the property so abandoned shall be sold by public auction, or otherwise disposed of for the account and credit of the United States under such regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe.' [26 Stat. at L. 140, chap. 407, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1930.]
Do pineapples, which, on the voyage to this country, become so decayed as to be utterly worthless, constitute, upon arrival within the limits of a port of entry of the United States, goods, wares, and merchandise imported into the United States, within the meaning of this expression as employed in the section above quoted? is the question for decision.
In Marriott v. Brune (1850) 9 How. 619, 13 L. ed. 282, it was held that, under the 11th section of the tariff act of July 30, 1846, where a portion of a cargo of sugar and molasses was lost by leakage on the voyage to this country, duty should be exacted only upon the quantity of sugar and molasses which arrived here, and not upon the quantity which appeared to have been shipped. In the course of the opinion the court said (p. 632, L. ed. p. 288):
'The general principle applicable to such a case would seem to be, that revenue should be collected only from the quantity or weight which arrives here. That is, what is imported,—for nothing is imported till it comes within the limits of a port. See cases cited in Harrison v. Vose, 9 How. 372, 13 L. ed. 179. And by express provision in all our revenue laws, duties are imposed only on imports from foreign countries; or the importation from them, or what is imported. 5 Stat. at L. 548, 558, chap. 270. The very act of 1846 under consideration imposes the duty on what is 'imported from foreign countries.' [9 Stat. at L. chap. 74] p. 68 [48]. The Constitution uses like language on this subject. Art. 1, §§ 8, 9. Indeed, the general definition of customs confirms this view; for says McCulloch (vol. 1, p. 548): 'Customs are duties charged upon commodities on their being imported into or exported from a country.'
After instancing certain cases provided for in a statute where a fixed percentage was directed to be deducted for leakage and breakage and a reduction in weight for tare and draff, the court further said (p. 633, L. ed. p. 288):
'But much more should duties not be exacted on what was lost or destroyed on its way hither, and which never came even into the possession or control of the customhouse...
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