Caldwell v. State of North Carolina

• Citation: 187 U.S. 622,23 S.Ct. 229,47 L.Ed. 336
• Decision Date: 12 January 1903
• Docket Number: No. 54,54
• Parties: E. M. CALDWELL, Plff. in Err. , v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA and the City of Greensboro
• Court: United States Supreme Court

187 U.S. 622

23 S.Ct. 229

47 L.Ed. 336

E. M. CALDWELL, Plff. in Err.,

v STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA and the City of Greensboro.

No. 54.

Argued October 22, 1902.

Decided January 12, 1903.

At June term, 1900, of the superior court of Guilford county, state of North Carolina, E. M. Caldwell was tried before a court and jury for an alleged offense in having engaged in the business of delivering pictures without having first obtained a license so to do. The jury found a special verdict as follows:

'The business mentioned in the ordinance following is not named in the charter of the city, other than in the above section.

'That the following is an ordinance duly passed by the board of aldermen of the city of Greensboro under and by virtue of the foregoing section of said charter, and prior to any of the orders being taken:

"Be it ordained by the board of aldermen of the city of Greensboro, North Darolina:

'That every person engaged in the business of selling or delivering picture frames, pictures, photographs, or likenesses of the human face, in the city of Greensboro, whether an order for the same shall have been previously taken or not, unless the said business is carried on by the same person in connection with some other business for which a license has already been paid to the city, shall pay a license tax of $10 for each year.

"Any person engaging in said business without having paid the license tax required herein shall be fined $20, and each and every sale or delivery shall constitute a

'That neither the defendant, the Chicago Portrait Company, nor any of the employees of the Chicago Portrait Company, have paid the city any license tax.

'If, upon the foregoing facts, the court shall be of opinion that the defendant is guilty, the jury say that he is guilty; otherwise they say that he is not guilty.

'That on the ___ day of _____, 1900, the defendant, being employed by the Chicago Portrait Company, a foreign corporation, of Chicago, Illinois, came to Greensboro for the purpose of delivering certain pictures and frames for which contracts of sale had previously been made by other employees of the Chicago Portrait Company, who had preceded the defendant in Greersboro;

'That the defendant went to the Southern Railway freight station and took therefrom large packages of pictures and frames which had been shipped to Greensboro, North Carolina, addressed to the Chicago Portrait Company, carried these packages to the rooms of the defendant in the Woods House, a hotel in the city of Greensboro, and there broke the bulk, placing said pictures in their proper frames, and from this point delivered the pictures one at a time to the purchasers in the city of Greensboro;

'The defendant had been engaged in this work two days when arrested;

'That § 57 of the charter of the city of Greensboro, North Carolina, is as follows:

"That, in addition to the subjects listed for taxation, the aldermen may levy a tax on the following subjects, the amount of which taxed, when fixed, shall be collected by the collector of taxes, and if it be not paid on demand, the same may be re- covered by suit, or the articles upon which the tax is imposed, or any other property of the owner made by forthwith distrained and sold to satisfy the same, namely:

"21. Upon all subjects taxed under schedule B, chapter 136, Laws of North Carolina, session of 1883, not heretofore provided for, shall pay a license or privilege tax of $10. And the board of aldermen shall have power to impose a license tax on any business carried on in the city of Greensboro, not before enumerated herein, not to exceed $10 a year."

Upon this special verdict the court adjudged that defendant was guilty, and sentenced him to pay a fine of $20 and costs of the action. From this judgment the defendant appealed to the supreme court of North Carolina. [127 N. C. 521, 37 S. E. 138]. That court, Faircloth, Ch. J., and Clark, J., dissenting, on November 7, 1900, affirmed the judgment of the superior court; and thereupon the cause was brought to this court by a writ of error allowed by the chief justice of the supreme court of North Carolina.

Messrs. Charles M. Stedman and W. R. Plum for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Alfred M. Scales for defendants in error.

Mr. Justice Shiras delivered the opinion of the court:

It might fairly be contended that, upon the facts found by the special verdict, the defendant was not guilty of engaging in the business of delivering pictures without a license, within the purview of the ordinance in question. But as the supreme court of North Carolina has held otherwise, we must accept that conclusion as a question of construction belonging to that court. Our task is to determine whether the ordinance, as so construed, is invalid as an attempt to interfere with and to regulate interstate commerce, and can be speedily performed, for we think the case falls within previous decisions of this court on this subject.

Such decisions are numerous, but we do not deem it necessary to refer to but a few of them.

The subject was elaborately considered in Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist. 120 U. S. 489, 30 L. ed. 694, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 45, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 592. The case was brought here on a writ of error to the supreme court of Tennessee, which had held valid a statute of that state, by which it was enacted that 'all drummers and all persons not having a regular licensed house of business in the taxing district, offering for sale or selling goods, wares, or merchandise therein by sample, shall be required to pay to the county trustee the sum of $10 per week or $25 per month for such privilege, and no license shall be issued for a longer period of three months.' Robbins, the plaintiff in error, was a citizen and resident of the city of Cincinnati, Ohio, and was convicted of having offered for sale articles of merchandise belonging to a firm in Cincinnati without having procured a license. In his discussion of the case Mr. Justice Bradley stated the following principles, as already established by this court: The Constitution of the United States having given to Congress the power to regulate commerce, not only with foreign nations, but among the several states, that power is necessarily exclusive whenever the subjects of it are national in their character, or admit only of one uniform system or plan of regulation; that where the power of Congress to regulate is exclusive, the failure of Congress to make express regulations indicates its will that the subject shall be left free from any restrictions or impositions, and any regulation of the subject by the states, except in matters of local concern only, is repugnant to such freedom; that the only way in which commerce between the states can be legitimately affected by state laws is when, by virtue of its police power, and its jurisdiction over persons and property within its limits, a state provides for the security of the lives, health, and comfort of persons and the protection of property, and imposes taxes upon persons residing within the state or belonging to its population, and upon vocations and employments pursued therein, not directly connected with foreign or interstate commerce, or with some other employment or business exercised under authority of the Constitution and laws of the United States; and imposes taxes upon all property within the state, mingled with and forming part of the great mass of property therein; but that, in making such internal regulations, a state cannot impose taxes upon persons passing through the state, or coming into it merely for a temporary purpose, especially if connected with interstate or foreign commerce; nor can it impose such taxes upon property imported into the state from abroad, or from another state, and not become part of the common mass of property therein; and no discrimination can be made, by such regulations, adversely to the persons or property of other states; and no regulations can be made directly affecting interstate commerce.

Upon these established principles the conclusion was reached that the state statute in question was invalid, and the following observations are pertinent to the question before us:

'It would not be difficult, however, to show that the tax authorized by the state of Tennessee in the present case is discriminative against the merchants and manufacturers of other states. They can only sell their goods in Memphis by the employment of drummers and by means of samples, whilst the merchants and manufacturers of Memphis, having regular licensed houses of business there, have no occasion for such agents, and, if they had, they are not subject to any tax therefor. They are taxed for their licensed houses, it is true, but so, it is presumable, are the merchants and manufacturers of other states in the places where they reside; and the tax on drummers operates greatly to their disadvantage in comparison with the merchants and manufacturers of Memphis. And such was undoubtedly one of its objects. This kind of taxation is usually imposed at the instance and solicitation of domestic dealers, as a means of protecting them from foreign competition. And in many cases there may be some reason in their desire for such protection. But this shows in a still stronger light the unconstitutionality of the tax. It shows that it not only operates as a restriction upon interstate commerce, but that it is intended to have that effect as one of its principal objects. And if a state can, in this way, impose restrictions upon interstate commerce for the benefit and protection of its own citizens we are brought back to the condition of things which existed before the adoption of the Constitution, and which was one of the principal causes that led to it. If the selling of goods by sample and the employment of drummers for that purpose injuriously affect the local interest of the states, Congress, if applied to, will undoubtedly make such reasonable...