State v. Lemeunier-Fitzgerald

• Decision Date: 03 July 2018
• Docket Number: Docket: Ken–16–503
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Lyanne LEMEUNIER–FITZGERALD
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

188 A.3d 183

STATE of Maine

v.Lyanne LEMEUNIER–FITZGERALD

Docket: Ken–16–503

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: May 12, 2017

Decided: July 3, 2018

Revised: July 17, 2018

Jamesa J. Drake, Esq. (orally), and Zachary L. Heiden, Esq., American Civil Liberties Union of Maine Foundation, Portland, and Darrick X. Banda, Esq., Law Offices of Ronald W. Bourget, Augusta, for appellant Lyanne Lemunier–Fitzgerald

Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, and Kate E. Marshall, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), Prosecutorial District IV, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

Tyler J. Smith, Esq., Libby O'Brien Kingsley & Champion, LLC, Kennebunk, for amicus curiae Maine Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys

Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of the Attorney General, Augusta, for amicus curiae Department of the Attorney General

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

Dissent: GORMAN, J., with whom JABAR, J., joins, and HJELM, J., joins in part.

Dissent: JABAR, J.

Dissent: HJELM, J.

SAUFLEY, C.J.

[¶ 1] This appeal requires us to determine whether evidence obtained from a warrantless blood-alcohol test, taken upon probable cause to believe that a driver's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by intoxicants, falls within the consent exception to the warrant requirement if the suspect agrees to the blood draw following the standard explanation of the implied consent warnings. In this evolving area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, we conclude that the operator consented to the blood test, and we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress.¹

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] Lyanne LeMeunier–Fitzgerald appeals from a judgment of conviction entered by the trial court (Kennebec County, Mullen, J. ) upon her conditional guilty plea to charges of operating under the influence (Class C), 29–A M.R.S. § 2411(1–A)(B)(2), (5)(C) (2017), and operating beyond a license condition or restriction (Class E), 29–A M.R.S. § 1251(1)(B) (2017), entered after the court (Marden, J. ) denied her motion to suppress the results of a blood test for alcohol. She challenges the court's determination that she voluntarily consented to the blood test after she was warned by the arresting officer that there were potential consequences if she refused to consent.

[¶ 3] The operative facts, most of which were found upon the parties' stipulation and none of which are disputed on appeal, are as follows. On December 21, 2015, an Augusta police officer suspected that LeMeunier–Fitzgerald was operating under the influence of an intoxicant after observing her in a supermarket parking lot. Her vehicle was partially pulled out of a parking space, her eyes were glassy, and she smelled of alcohol. When the officer approached and questioned her, she grabbed a bottle of pills and poured them into her mouth. The officer placed her in handcuffs and called for a rescue team. When the rescue team arrived, the handcuffs were removed and LeMeunier–Fitzgerald was taken to the hospital.

[¶ 4] After hospital personnel had attended to LeMeunier–Fitzgerald and had placed her in a room, the officer met with her. The officer informed her that he suspected that she had been attempting to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants, and he read Maine's "implied consent" warnings to her verbatim from a form provided by the Secretary of State's Bureau of Motor Vehicles. See 29–A M.R.S. § 2521 (2017). Included was the warning, "If you are convicted of operating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, your failure to submit to a chemical test will be considered an aggravating factor at sentencing which in addition to other penalties, will subject you to a mandatory minimum period of incarceration." LeMeunier–Fitzgerald agreed to submit to the blood test, and a blood sample was taken from her without a warrant.

[¶ 5] LeMeunier–Fitzgerald was charged by complaint, and she was later indicted, for operating under the influence (Class C), 29–A M.R.S. § 2411(1–A)(B)(2), and operating beyond a license condition or restriction (Class E), 29–A M.R.S. § 1251(1)(B). She moved to suppress the blood test results as having been procured without a warrant and without voluntary consent, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court held a hearing on the motion to suppress on July 26, 2016. The parties stipulated that (1) the officer had probable cause to believe that LeMeunier–Fitzgerald was operating while under the influence of an intoxicant, (2) her blood was drawn without a search warrant, and (3) there were no exigent circumstances. The court then heard brief testimony from the officer who had taken LeMeunier–Fitzgerald into custody. For purposes of the motion, that testimony was not disputed by LeMeunier–Fitzgerald.

[¶ 6] The court denied the motion to suppress, reasoning that, unlike the situation that the United States Supreme Court recently addressed in Birchfield v. North Dakota , LeMeunier–Fitzgerald did not submit to the blood testing "on pain of committing a criminal offense." 579 U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 2186, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016). The court concluded that the heightened minimum penalties, including a mandatory minimum period of incarceration, that may be imposed on a person who refuses to submit to testing if convicted of OUI were not equivalent to an independent criminal offense for refusal as described in Birchfield. 579 U.S. at ––––, 136 S.Ct. at 2169–70, 2186.

[¶ 7] LeMeunier–Fitzgerald entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving her right to appeal from the ruling on the motion to suppress, and the court (Mullen, J. ) sentenced her to three years in prison, with all but forty-five days suspended,² and two years of probation for the OUI conviction and forty-five days in prison, to run concurrently, for the conviction of operating beyond a license condition or restriction. The court also imposed fines and surcharges amounting to $1,405.

[¶ 8] LeMeunier–Fitzgerald timely appealed. See 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2017) ; M.R. App. P. 2(b)(2)(A) (Tower 2016).³ She argues that the blood test violated the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures because it was taken without a warrant and her consent to the test was rendered involuntary by the warning of an increased minimum sentence if she refused to consent and was then convicted.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 9] We anchor our analysis in the language of the United States Constitution. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. There is no question that strictures of the Fourth Amendment apply to searches in the form of blood tests. See Schmerber v. California , 384 U.S. 757, 767–72, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). The question is how those strictures apply here.

[¶ 10] In recent years, courts across the country have been challenged to find an appropriate balance between a defendant's right to be free from "unreasonable" searches of their blood for its alcohol content and the State's interest in addressing the public safety crisis resulting from impaired drivers causing death and destruction on America's roads.⁴ U.S. Const. amend. IV. We endeavor here to assure that the constitution's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is given full force, with the required determination of reasonableness informed by a full consideration of urgent public safety considerations.⁵ In this opinion, we (A) summarize the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding searches undertaken for purposes of blood-alcohol testing; (B) review the statutory basis for providing warnings about the legal consequences of a refusal to submit to testing; and (C) consider the legal question of whether a driver who consents to a blood draw after receiving such warnings has voluntarily consented, recognizing, as the First Circuit has eloquently explained, that a defendant's consent that has been "pried loose by ... a claim of authority is merely acquiescence."

United States v. Vazquez , 724 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2013).

A. Alcohol Testing and the Fourth Amendment

[¶ 11] We begin with the bedrock understanding that the withdrawal of a blood sample from the veins or arteries of a human being for blood-alcohol testing is a "search" falling within the protection of the Fourth Amendment. See Birchfield , 579 U.S. at ––––, 136 S.Ct. at 2173 ; Schmerber , 384 U.S. at 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826 ; State v. Boyd , 2017 ME 36, ¶ 8, 156 A.3d 748 ; State v. Arndt , 2016 ME 31, ¶ 8, 133 A.3d 587. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches, and the procurement of a legitimate search warrant, with all that it entails, is designed to ensure the reasonableness of a search. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n , 489 U.S. 602, 619, 622, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989).

[¶ 12] As is also clear, however, there are "a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions" to the warrant requirement. Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ; see also Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141, 148–49, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) ; Georgia v. Randolph , 547 U.S. 103, 109, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006). "When faced with special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the [Supreme] Court has found that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure reasonable." Illinois v. McArthur , 531 U.S. 326, 330, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) ; see, e.g. , Pennsylvania v. Labron , 518 U.S. 938, 940, ...