189 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 1999), 96-16528, Bogovich v. Sandoval
| Citation | 189 F.3d 999 |
| Party Name | STEPHEN BOGOVICH; CHARLES W. THOMPSON, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JOSEPH SANDOVAL, Secretary of Youth and Corrections Agency; JAMES H. GOMEZ, Director of the Department of Corrections; JOHN W. GILLIS, Commissioner of the Board of Prison Terms, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Case Date | August 30, 1999 |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals, U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Page 999
Argued and Submitted June 15, 1999--San Francisco, California
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Thomas P. Brown, Heller Ehrman White & McAuliffe, San Francisco, California, for the plaintiffs-appellants.
Joan W. Cavanagh, Deputy Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for the defendants-appellees.
Caroline N. Mitchell, Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, San Francisco, California, and Prison Law Office, San Quentin, California, for the amicus curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California; Garland E. Burrell, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-96-00297-GEB.
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Before: Thomas G. Nelson, Michael Daly Hawkins, and Susan P. Graber, Circuit Judges.
T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judge:
This court must determine whether the claim asserted in this case--that the Board of Prison Terms' ("Board") consideration of prisoners' past substance abuse history as a part of its parole decisions violates the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")--must be brought as a habeas corpus petition. We conclude that the claim does not necessarily challenge the fact or duration of appellants' confinement and that, as a result, they are not required to bring a habeas petition to assert their claims. We therefore reverse the district court's stay order, which required appellants to exhaust state habeas remedies.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Stephen Bogovich and Charles Thompson are state prisoners who are serving terms of fifteen years to life for second-degree murder. Both received treatment for substance abuse while in prison and have been drug-free since 1984 and 1990, respectively. Both became statutorily eligible for parole in 1993 and both assert that they have been denied a parole release date primarily due to their history of substance abuse. Appellants filed this action in federal court against the Board, asserting that their policy of considering a prisoner's substance abuse history when making parole decisions violates Title II of the ADA. Appellants' complaint sought prospective injunctive relief only. Specifically, the remedy sought was a prohibition against the Board "[c]ontinuing to deny plaintiffs a parole release date primarily because of their substance abuse disabilities."
A magistrate judge determined that the complaint alleged that appellants were "improperly denied parole, " that their claims "may affect their release from prison, " and that their "sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. " Characterizing their claim as an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.S 1983, the magistrate judge then ordered appellants' claim to be stayed pending the exhaustion of state habeas remedies. The district court, stating that the prisoners had filed a civil rights action seeking relief under S 1983, affirmed the magistrate judge's order. Appellants timely appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court's decision to stay civil proceedings to allow for exhaustion of state habeas remedies is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Marchetti v. Bitterolf, 968 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1992). "A district court may abuse its discretion if it does not apply the correct law or if it rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of material fact." United States v. Plainbull, 957 F.2d 724, 725 (9th Cir. 1992). Whether a petitioner's sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus is a question of law, which we review de novo. See General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 139 F.3d 1280, 1282 (9th Cir. 1998).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Appellants' Claim
As an initial matter, it appears that the magistrate judge and the district court misconstrued appellants' complaint as a S 1983 claim. It is clear that the complaint is challenging the Board's action only as a statutory violation of the ADA. The well-drafted complaint asserts only, and details facts related to, potential ADA violations, and it appears to have done so as an attempt to create a novel challenge to the Board's procedures. Although courts must construe pro se complaints liberally, see Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992), courts should not undertake to infer in one cause of action when a complaint clearly states a claim under a different cause of action. " `[T]he party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon.' " Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 n.7 (1987) (quoting The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty
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Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913)).It seems only appropriate to review appellants' complaint as they plead it--a complaint seeking relief for alleged violations of the ADA.
B. Relationship between Habeas Corpus and ADA Claims
"[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). When a prisoner chal lenges "the fact or duration of his confinement[ ] based . . . upon the alleged unconstitutionality of state administrative action[,] [s]uch a challenge is just as close to the core of habeas corpus as an attack on the prisoner's conviction." Id. at 489.
Prisoners may not attempt to evade habeas procedural requirements, such as exhaustion of state remedies, by characterizing their claims as seeking some other type of relief. See id. at 489-90. Thus, in Preiser, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner could not bring a S 1983 civil rights claim in federal court when the prisoner was seeking injunctive relief to compel the restoration of...
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