Robinson v. State

• Citation: 229 Ga. 14,189 S.E.2d 53
• Decision Date: 07 April 1972
• Docket Number: No. 27083,27083
• Parties: Carlos ROBINSON, Jr. v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 53

189 S.E.2d 53

229 Ga. 14

Carlos ROBINSON, Jr. v. The STATE.

No. 27083.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

April 7, 1972.

Frank G. Wilson, Carl Wilson, Macon, for appellant.

George A. Horkan, Jr., Dist. Atty., Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Harold N. Hill, Jr., Executive Asst. Atty. Gen., Courtney Wilder Stanton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Roger W. Moister, Jr., Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

NICHOLS, Justice.

Carlos Robinson, Jr., was indicted for the offense of armed robbery. He was jointly tried with Jerry Timms, who was also indicted for such offense and both were convicted. Robinson's motion for new trial was overruled and the present appeal filed. There was evidence adduced that five persons were involved in the armed robbery, three who actually entered the place of business and took cash from the cash register and from the person of the operator of the business at gun point. The other two, the two tried here, remained in Robinson's automobile which was parked approximately 300 yards away. After the robbery, the five proceeded in the automobile to a place known as 'Gikes' Place' on the Pavo Road, where they divided the proceeds of the robbery. Timms, who had made a written confession after being arrested, denied the facts stated in the confession and contended he had been drinking and knew nothing of the robbery. Held:

1. The written confession of the codefendant Timms was admitted in evidence. A separate hearing as to its admissibility was first had outside the presence of the jury, and while Timms testified that he did not understand his rights, yet on cross examination his testimony was such that the judge first and then the jury was authorized to find that he did understand such rights as were read to him and by him.

After testifying that the statement was made voluntarily, the police officer testified, on cross examination, that Timms 'asked me if it would help if he told the truth. I said it has always been true that everybody asks how cooperative has a suspect been with you, was this voluntary or did you have to get out and prove it . . . I told him that I felt it would be better for him to go ahead and tell the truth.'

The reply that it is always better to tell the truth was not such an inducement as is demanded to invalidate the confession. Compare Hicks v. State, 178 Ga. 561, 173 S.E. 395; McLemore v. State, 181 Ga. 462, 471, 182 S.E. 618. However, the remaining language 'everybody asks how cooperative has a suspect been, was this voluntary or did you have to get out and prove it' cannot be said not to hold out a hope of reward by special consideration if the suspect cooperates, and it was not necessary that the officer get out and prove the suspect's involvement in the crime, or fear, if convicted without the confession, and the officer did have to get out and prove the suspect's involvement in the crime. Accordingly, the admission of the confession was error, if such question was properly presented in the trial court.

Both defendants on the joint trial were represented by the same counsel, and an objection by such counsel raising the issue as to the voluntariness of the confession was sufficient as to both defendants. See Strickland v. State, 226 Ga. 750, 751, 177 S.E.2d 238. Accordingly, the admission of such confession was error.

The next question to be decided is whether it was harmful error. 'Harm as well as error must be shown to authorize a reversal by this court. As was held in Brown v. City of Atlanta, 66 Ga. 71, 76: 'When a plaintiff in error brings a case here, he must show error which has hurt him. This court is not an expounder of theoretical law, but it administers practical law, and corrects only such errors as have practically wronged the complaining party.' See also Dill v. State, 222 Ga. 793, 152 S.E.2d 741, and citations.' Batemen v. Bateman, 224 Ga. 20, 21, 159 S.E.2d 387, 389.

Two of the other participants in the armed robbery testified on the trial. Each of these two participants testified to the basic facts included in the confession, and they were thoroughly cross examined by the defendant's counsel. Under such circumstances, the admission of the confession was not harmful error since legally admissible evidence of the same facts was introduced. Such situation is not the same as that referred to in the Act of 1971 (Ga.L. 1971, p. 460) enacting Code § 38-1713, which deals with the waiver of an objection to evidence, and not to harmless error which results from legally admissible evidence rendering harmless the admission...