Munday v. Bank Of Franklin
| Decision Date | 24 February 1937 |
| Docket Number | No. 24.,24. |
| Citation | 211 N.C. 278,189 S.E. 779 |
| Parties | MUNDAY. v. BANK OF FRANKLIN. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Macon County; W. F. Harding, Judge.
Civil action on contract by T. S. Munday against the Bank of Franklin. From the judgment, the plaintiff appeals.
No error.
Civil action to recover on contract.
The facts are these: Prior to December 15, 1930, the defendant became indebted to the plaintiff in the principal sum of $1,452.38, represented by time certificate of $1,256.67 (reissued October 30, 1931) and checking account of $195.71. On said date, the defendant, being financially embarrassed, was allowed to operate only under restrictions, and continued under such restrictions until February 14, 1934, when it again resumed its full status as a solvent banking institution. On February 12, 1934, having in its possession a past-due note of $1,000, executed by C. L. Ingram and indorsed and "payment guaranteed at any time after maturity" by plaintiff, the same was set off and charged against plaintiff's account. Defendant admits its liability to plaintiff for the balance of said account.
The court, being of opinion that the defendant had the right to charge plaintiff's account with said note, upon which he was indorser and guarantor, before it was barred by the statute of limitations, so in structed the jury and gave judgment accordingly, from which the plaintiff appeals, assigning errors.
J. N. Moody, of Murphy, and George B. Patton, of Franklin, for appellant.
Jones & Jones and G. L. Houk, all of Franklin, for appellee.
It will be observed that the plaintiff was not only an indorser of the Ingram note, but also a guarantor. As such, the relation of debtor and creditor existed between him and the defendant, and under the decision in Page Trust Co, v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co, 188 N.C. 766, 125 S.E. 536, 37 A.L.R. 1368, the charge or credit was properly entered in respect of the checking account, if not the certificate of deposit, which would repel the bar of the statute of limitations, the only point in dispute, and ultimately end in the same result as the judgment entered below. Hence the trial will not be disturbed. It is not after the manner of appellate courts to upset judgments when the action of the trial court, even if partly erroneous, could by no possibility injure the appellant. Bechtel v. Weaver, 202 N.C. 856, 164 S.E. 338; Farmers' Bank v. McCullers, 201 N.C. 440, 160 S.E. 494; Daniel v. Power Co, 201 N.C. 680, 161 S. E. 210; Rankin v. Oates, 183 N.C. 517, 112 S.E. 32; Butts v. Screws, 95 N.C. 215. Litigants are interested in practical errors which result in harm, not in theoretical ones which produce no injury. White v. McCabe, 208 N.C. 301, 180 S.E. 704; State v. Beal, 199 N.C. 278, 154 S.E. 604; Brewer v. Ring and Valk, 177 N.C. 476, 99 S.E. 358.
The pertinent decisions are to the effect that "a bank has the right to apply the debt due by it for deposits to any indebtedness by the depositor, in...
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