U.S. v. Marquez, 93-50160
| Decision Date | 17 March 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-50160,93-50160 |
| Citation | 19 F.3d 1442 |
| Parties | NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel Joseph MARQUEZ, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Before: TANG, PREGERSON, and NOONAN, Circuit Judges.
In March and April of 1992, Appellant Daniel Marquez robbed three banks in Southern California of a total of roughly $8,500. Marquez admitted to robbing the banks, but contended that he did so due to duress. According to his statements and to a diary presented to the judge, Marquez had been forced to rob the banks by members of the Mexican Mafia. Marquez stated that Sana, a member of the Mexican Mafia, had threatened him and his family with injury if he did not commit the crimes. Sana or another member of the Mexican Mafia would accompany Marquez to the bank but not follow him in during the robbery. Marquez was free to approach the authorities at any time during the robberies, yet he did not do so due to his fear of the Mafia.
The Government filed a motion in limine to prevent Marquez from presenting any evidence concerning his claims of duress. Because the district judge granted the motion in limine, Marquez entered a conditional guilty plea which would allow him to appeal the judge's decision on the motion. Marquez also currently appeals his sentence, arguing that his previous commitment in the California Rehabilitation Center should not qualify as a predicate for career offender enhancement and that the judge erred by not departing downward based on an imperfect duress defense.
Although trial courts rarely rule on a defense as a matter of law, "[i]f the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support a duress defense, however, the trial court should exclude that evidence." United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir.1984). In reviewing whether there is sufficient evidence for a duress defense, this Court does not evaluate the credibility of the proffered evidence. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 414-415 (1980). Even if the statements and diary of Marquez are taken as perfectly true, Marquez failed to present sufficient evidence to support presenting a duress defense to the jury.
In order to get a duress defense to the jury, a defendant must make a proffer of proof that there exists (1) an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury, (2) a well-grounded fear that the threat will be carried out, and (3) no reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm. Marquez fails on prong 3 of this test.
Marquez baldly states that he feared that the authorities would not protect him and his family if he were to turn himself in to the authorities. He presents no evidence at all to support his belief. Marquez had ample opportunity over the six weeks he robbed the banks to escape from the Mafia or report to the authorities. This Court has held that "a defendant who has acted under a well-grounded fear of immediate harm with no opportunity to escape may assert the duress defense, if there is a triable issue of fact whether he took the opportunity to escape the threatened harm by submitting to authorities at the first reasonable opportunity." Contento-Pachon at 695. Marquez had both an opportunity to escape and an opportunity to submit to the authorities. He took neither opportunity and cannot now assert a duress defense.
Marquez argues that...
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