Carney v. Resolution Trust Corp.

Decision Date14 April 1994
Docket NumberNo. 93-1329,93-1329
PartiesJohn H. CARNEY and James R. Fisher, a/k/a Bill Fisher, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION, as receiver for MeraBank Savings, in its corporate capacity and as conservator of New MeraBank Texas, FSB El Paso, Texas, as receiver for MeraBank Savings, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

(Opinion January 11, 1994, 5th Cir.1994, 10 F.3d 1164)

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The opinion in this case filed on January 11, 1994, and reprinted at 10 F.3d 1164 (5th Cir.1994), is withdrawn and the following opinion is substituted therefor.

John H. Carney and James R. Fisher brought a declaratory judgment action against the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) in its corporate capacity and its capacities as receiver for MeraBank Texas, FSB El Paso, Texas (MeraBank), and as conservator of New MeraBank Texas, FSB El Paso, Texas (New MeraBank). Carney and Fisher also asserted pendent state law claims. The district court granted the RTC's motion to dismiss. Carney and Fisher appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case to district court.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Monzer Attar brought an action in the 364th District Court of Lubbock County (the state court action) seeking damages from MeraBank and EquiSource Realty Corporation (EquiSource). On May 30, 1991, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) appointed the RTC as receiver for MeraBank and as conservator of New MeraBank. The RTC as receiver for MeraBank was substituted for MeraBank in the state court action as the party defendant.

On September 23, 1991, the RTC as receiver for MeraBank filed a motion requesting permission from the state court to file a third party action against Carney and Fisher, former officers of EquiSource. Carney and Fisher then filed their original complaint in federal district court on December 18, 1991, against the RTC as receiver for MeraBank seeking a resolution of the matters in controversy in the state court action. Carney and Fisher asserted that the district court had jurisdiction to decide the declaratory judgment action under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346.

On December 26, 1991, the RTC as conservator of New MeraBank filed a third party petition against Carney and Fisher in the state court action alleging that the damages that Monzer Attar sought were caused by EquiSource and by Carney and Fisher, individually. The RTC as conservator of New MeraBank had previously intervened in the state court action because it owned the claims asserted against Carney and Fisher. The RTC then filed its answer and a motion to dismiss Carney and Fisher's complaint. The RTC argued that Carney and Fisher's complaint should be dismissed because 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346 does not authorize the award of declaratory relief against the United States.

Carney and Fisher then moved for leave of the court to file an amended complaint, which the district court granted. On March 12, 1992, Carney and Fisher filed their first amended complaint. In their first amended complaint, Carney and Fisher asserted, in addition to their claim for declaratory relief, injunctive relief for denial of due process, monetary damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and injunctive relief and monetary damages for tortious interference with prospective contractual relations. Additionally, they asserted that the district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1346, 1338.

On March 23, 1992, the RTC as receiver for MeraBank filed a motion to dismiss Carney and Fisher's first amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or, alternatively, for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The district court granted the RTC's motion. The district court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1346, 1338. Carney and Fisher then filed a motion for reconsideration. In their motion for reconsideration, Carney and Fisher argued that the district court did have jurisdiction in this case pursuant to 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1441a(l )(1), the Federal Home Loan Bank Act. Carney and Fisher further argued that the reference in their complaint to Sec. 1338 was a typographical error and that the complaint should have stated Sec. 1331. The district court reinstated the case and vacated its prior order. On April 3, 1992, the OTS replaced the RTC as conservator of New MeraBank with the RTC as receiver for New MeraBank.

On September 4, 1992, Carney and Fisher filed their second amended complaint. In their second amended complaint, Carney and Fisher asserted that their claims were against the RTC in its corporate capacity and in its capacities as receiver for MeraBank and as conservator of New MeraBank. Carney and Fisher also stated that the district court had jurisdiction to hear the case under the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1441a(l )(1).

The RTC then filed a motion to dismiss Carney and Fisher's second amended complaint. The RTC alleged three grounds for dismissal: (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction, (2) failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted, and (3) pendency of a state court action which will serve to resolve all issues between the parties. The district court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Carney and Fisher's claims for monetary damages because Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) precluded Carney and Fisher from asserting those claims against the RTC before exhausting their administrative remedies. Therefore, the district court dismissed Carney and Fisher's claims for monetary damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and tortious interference with prospective contractual relations because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over those claims.

The district court went on to determine that FIRREA's jurisdictional bar in Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) did not preclude the plaintiffs from pursuing injunctive and declaratory relief against the RTC. However, the district court determined that Carney and Fisher's claims for injunctive relief for denial of due process and tortious interference with prospective contractual relations should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Finally, the district court also dismissed Carney and Fisher's request for a declaratory judgment.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court's dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1) de novo. Benton v. United States, 960 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir.1992). We take the allegations of the complaint to be true, and we will not affirm the district court's dismissal unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Id.

III. DISCUSSION
A. CLAIMS FOR MONETARY DAMAGES

Initially, Carney and Fisher allege that the district court erred in determining that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over their claims for monetary damages. Subject matter jurisdiction is determined at the time that the complaint is filed. Rosa v. Resolution Trust Co., 938 F.2d 383, 392 n. 12 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 582, 116 L.Ed.2d 608 (1991); F. Alderete Gen. Contractors v. United States, 715 F.2d 1476, 1480 (Fed.Cir.1983). The district court determined that at the time Carney and Fisher filed their second amended complaint the RTC had been named as receiver for New MeraBank and that, therefore, the jurisdictional bar of FIRREA required Carney and Fisher to exhaust their administrative remedies before it could obtain jurisdiction over their claims for monetary damages against the RTC. Carney and Fisher argue, however, that their second amended complaint relates back to the time that they filed their first amended complaint and that FIRREA's jurisdictional bar would not therefore apply to their claims for monetary damages because they filed their first amended complaint before the RTC was named as receiver.

In Sessions v. Rusk State Hosp., we stated that

[a] complaint that is defective because it does not allege a claim within the subject matter jurisdiction of a federal court may be amended to state a different claim over which the federal court has jurisdiction. If the claim asserted in the amendment arises out of the conduct or occurrence set forth in the original complaint, the amendment is given retroactive effect to the date the original complaint was filed.

648 F.2d 1066, 1070 (5th Cir.1981) (citations omitted). Relation back to the date of the original filing applies even when the amendment states a new basis for subject matter jurisdiction. Berkshire Fashions, Inc. v. M.V. Hakusan II, 954 F.2d 874, 887 (3d Cir.1992) (determining that when the plaintiffs amended their complaint to establish diversity jurisdiction the amendment related back to the date of the filing of the original complaint so that the statutory requirement of $10,000 to establish diversity jurisdiction applied instead of the new $50,000 requirement); 3 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE p 15.15[3.-2], at 15-154 (2d ed. 1993) (noting that an amendment which changes the jurisdictional basis of an action will relate back to the date of the filing of the original complaint, if the factual situation alleged otherwise remains unaltered); 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE Sec. 1497, at 80 (2d ed. 1990) ("Amendments curing a defective statement of subject matter jurisdiction ... will relate back."). In this case, the...

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