Hoyt v. City of East Saginaw

• Decision Date: 12 July 1869
• Citation: 19 Mich. 39
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Jesse Hoyt v. The City of East Saginaw et al

19 Mich. 39

Jesse Hoyt v. The City of East Saginaw et al

Supreme Court of Michigan

July 12, 1869

Heard May 7, 1869 [Syllabus Material]

Appeal in Chancery from Saginaw Circuit.

The bill in this cause was filed to enjoin the collection of an assessment for an improvement on Genesee street in East Saginaw. The greater part of the cost of which was assessed upon the property in the vicinity benefited, in proportion to the benefit. A perpetual injunction was granted in the Court below.

Decree affirmed with costs.

John J Wheeler, for complainant.

1. The provisions of the Charter regulating proceedings for making improvements and assessing taxes therefor, are unconstitutional.

The expense of the improvement is ascertained by the Council, the amount to be specially assessed and property deemed to be benefited, determined by the Council, and their commissioners are appointed to assess that amount on the property designated in proportion to the benefit each piece shall be deemed to have acquired by the making of the improvements:--Laws of 1858, pp. 1,010, 1,011, 1,012; Laws of 1861, p. 50.

There is not and cannot be any rule of apportionment in this case:--Williams v. Detroit, 2. Mich. 560; Woodbridge v Detroit, 8 Id. 274.

In the case cited in 2 Mich. great stress is put on the fact that there was a uniform rule of apportionment. See pp. 570 and 571.

In the East Saginaw Charter there is and can be no rule. Each case stands by itself, and is left to the whim, prejudice, or judgment of the Council in being, both as to amount to be assessed and property on which to be assessed, and then each piece of property is left to the opinion of an irresponsible tribunal appointed for the particular case, and no other. This is directly condemned in 2 Mich. p. 572, and 8 Mich. 292 and 293.

2. The law provides (L. 1859, p. 997, §§ 1 and 2) that the necessity for making the improvement shall be determined by a resolution of the Council, and we submit that a resolution ordering the improvement does not comply with the law.

3. The resolution of the Common Council is not such a resolution as the charter prescribes.--L. 1859, p. 977, § 2.

B. J. Brown, for defendant.

1. The provisions of the charter of the city of East Saginaw, authorizing special assessments for public improvements, are not unconstitutional, inasmuch as such assessments are required to be made upon the owners and occupants of lands benefited, in proportion to the advantage which each shall be deemed to acquire by making such improvements. Vide Title 6 of charter, §§ 37, 38, 39; 1 Kent's Com. 448; People v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419; Woodbridge v. Detroit, 8 Mich. 274; Cooley on Const. Lim. 498, et seq.; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 256.

2. If the object of the charter in declaring that the tax shall be and remain a lien from the confirmation of the assessment roll, is other than that of regulating the relation of vendor and vendee, it is not clearly apparent. At all events the complainant can found no claim upon it to the equitable interference of the court, as the bill does not aver that there were not goods and chattels out of which the tax could have been satisfied. The tax remained a personal charge against the complainant, and it was the duty of the Marshal to enforce collection by distress and sale of personal property.--Sec. 44, Title 6, of Charter. In general, a distress and sale of personal property to satisfy an illegal tax, will not be restrained by injunction.--Blackwell on Tax Titles, 566; Williams v. Mayor, 2 Mich. 562; Green v. Mumford, 5 Rhode Island, 472; Wilson v. Mayor, 4 E. D. Smith, 675; McCoy v. Chillicothe, 3 Ohio 370; Van Doren v. Mayor, 9 Paige 388; Mooers v. Smedley, 6 Johns. Ch. 29; Dodd v. Hartford, 25 Conn. 232; Betts v. Williamsburgh, 15 Barb. 255.

3. A court of equity will not restrain the collection of a tax merely because the proceedings on which it is founded are irregular or even void. It must also appear that the proceedings are inequitable, that it will be against conscience to allow them to go on, and that the party applying for relief is in no fault.--Jackson v. Detroit, 10 Mich. 248; Betts v. Williamsburgh, 15 Barb. 255; Hovey v. Smith, 1 Id. 372; Warden v. Board of Supervisors, 14 Wis. 618; Whitney v. Brunette, 3 Id. 621; Miltimore v. Supervisors, 15 Id. 9; Bond v. Kenosha, 17 Id. 284; Dodd v. Hartford, 25 Conn. 232; Susquehanna Bank v. Board of Supervisors, 25 N.Y. 312; Albany Northern R. R. Co. v. Brownell, 24 Id. 345.

The resolution of the Common Council of June 18th, 1867, affirms and ratifies all the proceedings of that body, the contract for the work inclusive--which it does not in terms rescind. This is the necessary effect of all subsequent proceedings which are based upon such ratification and especially of the confirmation of the roll.--Cushing's Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, § 2,104; Peterson v. Mayor, 17 N.Y. 449; People ex rel. Smith v. Flagg, Id. 584; Str. 1,066; 4 Term Rep. 109; Commonwealth v. Herrick, 6 Cush. 465; People v. Mayor, 32 Barb. 35.

Cooley, Ch. J. Christiancy and Graves, JJ., Campbell, J. concurred.

OPINION

Cooley, Ch. J.

The bill in this case was filed to enjoin the collection of an assessment which had been made for the grading, ditching and planking of Genesee street, in the city of East Saginaw. It appears that the Common Council, by resolution, determined that the cost and expense of the improvement would be the sum of $ 15,612, and that the property in the vicinity of the improvement would be benefited by it to the amount of $ 11,700; and that they consequently assumed on behalf of the city the payment of $ 3,912, and directed the sum of $ 11,700 to be assessed upon the property in the vicinity which was particularly described in their resolution. The assessment was made accordingly, and the complainant, who was owner of a portion of the property described and assessed, seeks to enjoin the assessment on various grounds, which are particularly set out in his bill.

It is not disputed that the provisions of the charter are such as, if valid, will warrant this mode of apportioning and assessing the expense of such improvements; and on reference thereto it appears that they establish a basis for the assessment, and require it to be made by commissioners appointed for the purpose upon the several parcels of land in proportion to the benefit each shall be deemed to have acquired by the making of the improvement. It is claimed, however, that those provisions are in conflict with the constitution and void, because, as it is alleged, there is and can be under them no rule for the apportionment of the expense, inasmuch as the Council, according to their own "whim, prejudice or judgment" determine upon what property the expense shall be levied, and "an irresponsible tribunal appointed for the particular case and no other," makes the assessment. To this position the cases of Williams v. The Mayor, &c., 2 Mich. 560, and Woodbridge v. Detroit, 8 Mich. 274, are cited, neither of which I think will give it any countenance.

I have no doubt it is entirely competent for the Legislature to authorize municipal incorporations to assess the whole or any portion of the expense of these local improvements upon the property deemed to be particularly and specially benefited thereby, in proportion to the benefit received, if in the judgment of the Legislature that rule of apportionment is most just and equitable. There is nothing in the constitution which expressly prohibits it, and nothing in the nature of the power of taxation which is inconsistent with it. This mode of assessing such burdens has been repeatedly sustained by the Courts of other States, and is supported by the reasoning of the Court in the case of Williams v. The Mayor, &c., and by that of the majority of the court in Woodbridge v. Detroit. I shall content myself, therefore, in this case with a reference to those cases and to that of Motz v. Detroit, just decided.

Whatever may be the basis of apportionment for such a tax, a taxing district must necessarily be established; and the Legislature in the charter before us have deemed it proper to empower the Common Council to judge what property is specially benefited by the improvement and define the taxing district accordingly. As the question in such case is one which can only properly and intelligently be decided upon personal inspection of the improvement and the manner in which it will affect the neighboring property, it is obvious that the Legislature is not the proper authority to pass upon it, and the natural and proper course would seem to be to refer it to some local tribunal. If the Legislature consider the Common Council the proper tribunal for this purpose, there is not only no constitutional principle which precludes the question being referred to their judgment, but there is a manifest propriety in the reference. And the mode prescribed by the charter of apportioning the tax throughout the district which the Common Council have defined in proportion to the benefit which the several parcels of land receive, as determined by impartial commissioners, is equally free from valid objection.

The charter not being found defective, it remains to be seen whether the city authorities have complied with its provisions in the various steps taken by them and which are contested in this suit. Nearly every proceeding of the Common Council is attacked as irregular, illegal and void; but as we find ourselves compelled to hold that the first step in the proceedings which must be the foundation of all the others and without which the Council would have no jurisdiction to proceed at all, was not taken in compliance with the charter; it does not seem to be important,...