Hoverson v. Noker

• Decision Date: 15 May 1884
• Citation: 60 Wis. 511,19 N.W. 382
• Parties: HOVERSON, IMPLEADED, ETC. v. NOKER AND OTHERS.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

60 Wis. 511

19 N.W. 382

HOVERSON, IMPLEADED, ETC.

v.NOKER AND OTHERS.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Filed May 15, 1884.

Appeal from circuit court, Kewaunee county.R. L. Wing and W. H. Timlin, for appellant, Sarah Hoverson, impleaded, etc.

Nash & Nash, for respondents, Frank Noker and others.

TAYLOR, J.

The plaintiffs in this action are husband and wife, and the defendants are father and his two sons. The action was in the nature of an action on the case for an injury to the wife, caused, as alleged in the complaint, by the joint acts of the defendants. The evidence on the trial shows pretty clearly that, while the plaintiffs were passing along the highway with their team and wagon in front of the defendant's house on a Sunday, going to church, the two young sons of the defendant, Frank Noker, came out of their father's house and fired off a pistol and shouted, and so frightened the plaintiffs' horses that they jumped suddenly forward and threw Sarah Hoverson out of the seat and injured her; and in the afternoon, on their return from the church, the boys again fired the pistol and shouted and again frightened the plaintiffs' horses, but did not injure Mrs. Hoverson to as great an extent as in the morning. The jury, under the instructions of the court, found a special verdict, and assessed the plaintiff's damages at the sum of five dollars. From the judgment entered on such verdict Sarah Hoverson appeals to this court.

The case, though not involving any great amount of money, has been argued by counsel orally and in the submitted briefs with a degree of ability and care highly commendable. The learned counsel for the appellant presents several points upon the rulings of the court upon the trial rejecting evidence offered by him, for which he claims the judgment should be reversed. It will be seen by an examination of the record that it became important for the plaintiffs to connect the father with the acts of his young sons, which the plaintiffs allege caused the injury complained of, and for this purpose the plaintiffs offered evidence tending to prove that the sons had frequently, before the day upon which the accident happened, called abusive names, shouted, and frequently discharged fire-arms when persons were passing the house of the defendants, and that this was often done in the presence of their father. All evidence of this kind was excluded. This, we are inclined to hold, was error. If the father permitted his young sons to shout, use abusive language, and discharge fire-arms at persons who were passing along the highway in front of his house, he permitted that to be done upon his premises which, in its nature, was likely to result in damage to those passing, and when an injury did happen from that cause he was not only morally but legally responsible for the damage done. If a parent permits his very young children to become a source of damage to those who pass the highway in front of his house, he is as much liable for the injury as though he permitted them to erect some frightful or dangerous object near the highway which would frighten passing teams; and in such case he cannot screen himself by saying that he did not in words order the erection to be made. If he made it himself, with the intention to frighten passing teams, he would be responsible for the injury caused by it; and when he permits his irresponsible children to do it he is equally liable, because he has the control...