Jones v. Fuller
| Decision Date | 17 March 1883 |
| Citation | 19 S.C. 66 |
| Parties | JONES v. FULLER. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
1. The exception to the general rule, that the opinions of witnesses are not competent evidence, is not confined to the case of expert testimony.
2. While it is necessary that the witness should first state the facts upon which he bases his opinion, where the facts are such as are capable of being reproduced in language, it is not necessary to do so where the facts are not capable of reproduction in such a way as to bring before the minds of the jury the condition of things upon which the witness bases his opinion. Such evidence is competent from the necessity of the case.
3. In action for breach of promise of marriage, witnesses for the plaintiff, her neighbors and the intimate friends of her family, were permitted to testify as to what, in their opinion, was the amount of damage she had sustained by reason of the breach. Held , that such evidence was admissible.
Before WALLACE, J., Laurens, September, 1882.
Action by Mary Belle Jones against P. H. E. Fuller. The opinion states the case.
Mr. B D. Cuningham , for appellant, cited 10 Pick. 477; 21 Id. 142; 22 Id. 427; 27 Me. 35; 19 Wend. 232; 1 Hawks 6; 1 Greenl. Evid. , § 440; 13 N. J. 232; 1 McMull. 57; 1 Paige 171; 4 Den. (N Y. ) 311; 17 Wend. 136, 161; 4 Id. 320; 12 Me. 310; 3 N. H. 357; 20 Wis. 262; Sedgw. Dam. (5 th ed. ) 228, 421, 693.
Mr. R C. Watts , contra, cited Whart. Ev. , §§ 509, 512; 27 Conn. 192; 17 Id. 249; 117 Mass. 133; 14 N. Y. 562; 1 McMull. 56; 14 Serg. & R. 142; 13 Metc. 288; 49 N. H. 399; 56 Id. 227; 29 Mich. 173; 1 Greenl. Evid. , § 440; 2 Id. , § 171.
Mr. D R. Duncan , in reply.
This was an action to recover damages for a breach of promise of marriage. The contract and the breach thereof were fully established, not only by the admission in the pleadings, but also by testimony adduced at the trial, and the only question for the jury was as to the amount of the damages.
The plaintiff, after adducing testimony as to the contract and its breach, offered evidence tending to show the damages which she had sustained. Amongst other witnesses offered for this purpose, Dr. E. G. Simpson was examined, who testified " that he had known the plaintiff from her infancy, having been the family physician; that the social standing of the family was as good as any in the county; that the plaintiff was particularly bright and attractive, and that she was well educated; that her engagement to Fuller was well known in the community, and also the treatment which she had received from Fuller; that he thought she had been seriously damaged."
This witness was then asked the following question: " From what you know of all the facts and circumstances, how much was the plaintiff damaged?" To this question the defendant objected, and his objection being overruled, the witness answered as follows: " That he thought the plaintiff had been seriously- somewhere from $5,000 to $10,000." The next witness offered was Col. John G. Williams, who, after testifying substantially as Dr. Simpson had done, was asked the same question, as to what he thought was the amount of the damages sustained by plaintiff, to which, after objection, which was overruled, he replied: " Her damages are incalculable in dollars and cents-certainly not less than $10,000."
No testimony was offered on the part of the defense, and the Circuit judge, after instructing the jury that the only question for them to determine was the amount of the damages, the contract and its breach having been admitted by the pleadings, proceeded to charge the jury in these words: that being the amount demanded in the complaint.
The jury found a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $9,000; and a motion for a new trial, on the minutes, having been refused, the defendant appealed from the judgment entered on the verdict on the following ground: " Because his Honor erred in allowing the witnesses, Dr. E. G. Simpson and Col. John G. Williams, to state to the jury their opinions as to the damages inflicted upon plaintiff by breach of contract of marriage by the defendant."
While much has been written by elementary writers, and in the opinions of the courts, as to the admissibility of the opinions of witnesses as evidence, we are not aware of any case in which the precise question raised by this appeal, has been determined. We must, therefore, resort to the general principles of evidence, and from them deduce the rule applicable to this particular case.
There can be no doubt that, as a general rule, a witness is not at liberty to express an opinion, but must confine himself to the statement of facts; but there is as little doubt that this rule is subject to many exceptions. This will be seen by reference to the case of Commonwealth v. Sturtivant , 117 Mass. 122, and the note to that case as reported in 19 Am. Rep. 410, as well as to the case of State v. Pike , 49 N. H. 399, reported also in 6 Am. Rep. 533; especially the dissenting opinion of Doe, J., which afterwards received the sanction of the same court in Hardy v. Merrill , 56 N. H. 227(22 Am. Rep. 441), where the case of the State v. Pike was overruled. In these cases will be found elaborate discussion of the subject and very full collections of the authorities.
In 1 Whart. Ev. , § 511, the writer, in discussing this subject, after mentioning many instances in which exceptions to the general rule have been allowed, lays down the following principle: " Whenever a condition of things is such that it cannot be reproduced and made palpable in the concrete to the jury, or when language is not adequate to such realization, then a witness may describe it by its effect on his mind, even though such effect be opinion." Again, in section 450, the same author,...
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