State v. Ulrich
Decision Date | 31 May 1892 |
Parties | The State v. Ulrich, Appellant |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court. -- Hon. Henry P. White, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.
E. H Stiles and R. F. Gilkeson for appellant.
(1) The court erred in overruling defendant's plea in bar and motion for discharge on the ground that he had been once in jeopardy. See opinion of Judge Philips, 42 F. 587, granting writ of habeas corpus to defendant from the United States court at Kansas City, on the ground that his restraint was in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution, that no state shall deprive any person of life liberty or property without due process of law. (2) The alleged wife was incompetent as a witness against defendant. 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, secs. 339, 340, 342; Wharton's Criminal Evidence, sec. 394; State v. Berlin, 42 Mo 572; State v. Gardner, 1 Root (Conn.) 485. (3) The court erred in denying a new trial on the ground of the misconduct of the prosecuting attorney. (4) The court committed error in refusing and giving instructions.
John M. Wood, Attorney General, for the State.
(1) The defendant was not in jeopardy. The necessity which caused the discharge of the jury was something that could not be foreseen at the commencement of the trial, and the jeopardy which was supposed to have attached by impaneling of the jury and taking part of the testimony was by reason thereof shown to have never existed in fact or in contemplation of law. 1 Bishop on Criminal Law, sec. 1032; Hector v. State, 2 Mo. 167; State v. Huting, 21 Mo. 464; State v. Jeffors, 64 Mo. 376; State v. Tatman, 59 Iowa 471; Commonwealth v. McCormick, 130 Mass. 61; Dales v. State, 97 Ind. 555; Mixon v. State, 59 Ala. 129; State v. Emery, 59 Vt. 88; Windsor v. Queen, L. R. 1 Q. B. 289. (2) The authority to discharge a jury from giving a verdict under the circumstances above indicated, or under any other circumstances where "there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated," is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court. In the exercise of that discretion the trial court must determine the existence of the necessity for discharging a jury, and, if the act is done, it is to be presumed that the necessity existed, and no other court can revise its decision. United States v. Morris, 1 Curtis, 23; Moseley v. State, 33 Tex. 671; Commonwealth v. Purchase, 2 Pick. 521; State v. Tatman, 59 Iowa 475; State v. Copeland, 65 Mo. 597. (3) No evidence was offered in support of the plea in bar. The record of the proceedings in the cause should have been introduced to show whether in fact the defendant had been in jeopardy, and, if so, that it "was not discharged by operation of the law, or waived by some act of the defendant." The plea does not prove itself. In pleading jeopardy, the burden is upon the defendant to show all the facts which are necessary to entitle him to the benefit of such a plea. Hensley v. State, 107 Ind. 587; Commonwealth v. Daley, 4 Gray, 209; Cooper v. State, 47 Ind. 61; State v. Huting, 21 Mo. 471; State v. Daniel, 94 Mo. 301. (4) Frederica Ulrich, defendant's first and lawful wife, was a competent witness under the statute, if she desired to testify. R. S. 1889, sec. 4218; State v. Newberry, 43 Mo. 429; State v. Sloan, 55 Iowa 217. (5) Admissions of defendant are competent to show both the first and second marriages. The evidence of Frederica Ulrich, that she first discovered that defendant was married a second time from his admissions made before Judge Gibson in a divorce proceeding instituted by him against her, was competent. Tucker v. People, 122 Ill. 583; State v. Hughes, 35 Kan. 626. (6) The remarks of the prosecuting attorney did not constitute reversible error. State v. Stark, 72 Mo. 37; State v. Zumbunson, 86 Mo. 111; State v. Emery, 79 Mo. 461; State v. Walker, 98 Mo. 95; State v. Brooks, 92 Mo. 542; State v. Elvins, 101 Mo. 243; State v. McNamara, 100 Mo. 100; State v. Young, 105 Mo. 634.
The defendant was indicted in the criminal court of Jackson county, at the January term, 1890, for bigamy. He was brought to trial on April 21, 1890. After the jury was impaneled, the cause progressed until noon on the twenty-second day of April.
The record herein then recites the following proceedings:
On the morning of the said twenty-sixth day of May, 1890, to which defendant's case had been adjourned, and when his said case was called for trial, he then and there filed his motion for discharge and plea in abatement, on the ground that having once been placed in jeopardy by the former proceeding he could not then again lawfully be placed on trial, which said motion and plea set forth the foregoing facts, and was verified by defendant's affidavit and that of his counsel. No other evidence was offered by defendant.
This plea in abatement was overruled by the court, and this is assigned as error, both in the motion for new trial and in arrest of judgment.
The attorney general makes the preliminary objection, that the defendant offered no evidence of the facts alleged in his plea or motion for discharge. It was not necessary to do so in this case. Every fact alleged in the motion was entered of record or was within the knowledge of the judge of the court, and the motion was directed at his conduct. Courts take judicial cognizance of their own orders in the same cause. State v. Jackson, 106 Mo. 174, 17 S.W. 301, and cases cited.
II. Assuming, then, the truth of every fact stated in the plea in abatement, was the defendant entitled to his discharge by the constitution of this state? Section 23 of the bill of rights provides: "Nor shall any person, after being once acquitted by a jury, be again, for the same offense, put in jeopardy of life or liberty; but if the jury, to which the question of his guilt or innocence is submitted, fails to render a verdict the court before which the trial is had may, in its discretion, discharge the jury and commit or bail the prisoner for trial at the next term of court, or, if the state of business will permit, at the same term; and if judgment be arrested after a verdict of guilty on a defective indictment, or if judgment on a verdict of guilty be reversed for error in law, nothing herein contained shall prevent a new trial of the prisoner on a proper indictment, or according to correct principles of law."
It is deemed wholly unnecessary to inquire again into the history of this provision, or determine whether this guarantee against a second trial for the same offense has its origin in the constitution or in natural law, independent of the bill of rights. It is sufficient to say that it is not denied nor controverted by any intelligent person in this age of the world.
The fifth amendment to the constitution of the United States secured this right in a shorter statement of the principle: "Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
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