Hill v. State ex rel. Watson
| Citation | 155 Fla. 245,19 So.2d 857 |
| Parties | HILL et al. v. STATE ex rel. WATSON, Atty. Gen. |
| Decision Date | 28 November 1944 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Duval County; Miles W. Lewis judge.
Jennings & Coffee, of Jacksonville, and Joseph A. Padway and Herbert S. Thatcher, both of Washington, D. C., for appellants.
J. Tom Watson, Atty. Gen., and Howard S. Bailey and R. W. Ervin, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.
The Legislature of 1943 enacted Chapter 21968, F.S.A. § 481.01 et seq., Sections 4 and 6 of which are as follows:
'(1) The name of the labor organization;
'(2) The location of its office;
'(3) The name and address of the president, secretary, treasurer, and business agent.
'At the time of filing such report it shall be the duty of every such labor organization to pay the Secretary of State an annual fee therefor in the sum of One Dollar.'
Appellants declined to comply with the provisions of the act as thus quoted, contending that it was invalid. This suit was brought by the Attorney General to restrain Local 234 from functioning as a labor organization and Leo H. Hill from acting as its business agent pending compliance with the law. A motion to dismiss the bill was overruled. An answer interposed various defenses predicated on the State and Federal Constitutions. On final hearing, Section 6 was upheld as valid in toto. As to Section 4, the Court deleted the words 'and are of the opinion that the public interest requires that a license or permit should be issued to such applicant', and upheld it in all other respects. This appeal is from the decree so entered.
It appears that the trial court deleted the provision from Section 4 because it vested arbitrary power in the board and was in conflict with the standard of qualification prescribed for one applying for a license to be a business agent of a labor union rendering it unconstitutional. We approve this holding.
It is first contended that Sections 4 and 6 as quoted and deleted are void because they restrain the exercise of appellants' civil rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
In essence, Section 4 of Chapter 21968, hereafter referred to as House Bill 142, creates a State Licensing Board composed of the Governor, Secretary of State, and the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. All business agents for labor organizations must secure a permit from the State Licensing Board and as a prerequisite for securing such permit they must furnish proof that they have been (A) a citizen of the United States for more than ten years next preceding their application for the permit, (B) have not been convicted of a felony, (C) must be of good moral character and Section 6 requires them to accompany the application with a fee of $1.
Similar regulations are imposed on attorneys, physicians, barbers, insurance agents, real estate brokers, nurses, beauty parlor operators, civil engineers, architects, liquor dealers, and many others engaged in gainful occupations. All such requirements have been upheld in the interest of the public health, morals, safety, welfare, and prosperity of the people. They are imposed on the theory that the business engaged in by the applicant vitally affects the public welfare and that the public is entitled to the protection they afford.
Such regulations have been imposed under the police power of the State and have been generally upheld for reasons so academic that it would hardly seem necessary to cite authority to support them. Appellant's answer to this is that they are like religious associations, law and order leagues, citizens' committees, and chambers of commerce, and suould, like these, be exempt from such regulations. Our attention is directed to no similarity between labor unions and the last named institutions and, as we shall later show, there is no basis to grant them the same exemption.
Appellants contend that these regulations unduly restrict their freedom of speech, free press, and free assembly. This contention overlooks the fact that none of these guaranties are absolutes but are subject to reasonable police regulation in the interest of the public. It would be difficult to name an organization that more vitally affects the public or one in which the public is more vitally interested than the organizations of labor. Their activities and their public relations of late years have frequently pushed the war and every other human relation off the front page. To hold that their agents may not be regulated in the manner prescribed here would amount to a reversal of our holding with reference to every other kindred relation. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 30 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893, 108 A.L.R. 1352; Riley v. Sweat, 110 Fla. 362, 149 So. 48; Page v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 141 Fla. 294, 193 So. 82; State ex rel. Munch v. Davis, 143 Fla. 236, 196 So. 491; State Board of Funeral Directors v. Cooksey, 147 Fla. 337, 3 So.2d 502.
Appellants also contend that Sections 4 and 6 of House Bill 142 unduly restrict their right to assemble as working men, to solicit membership in labor organizations and that the fee charged is an undue restraint on these and other civil rights. They rely on Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. 1292, 146 A.L.R. 82, and that line of cases to uphold this contention.
The gist of this contention is that they are no different from religious, fraternal, and charitable organizations and should enjoy the same immunity from license or other restraints. The answer to this contention is that religious, fraternal, and charitable organizations are in terms immunized from license taxes and other regulations on the theory that they minister to the spiritual, moral, educational and other necessities of the community. They are very largely gratuitous, are not imbued with the profit aspect and there is every reason why they should be so immunized, while none of the reasons that immunize them have been shown to be attached to labor organizations.
The Federal Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld acts regulating different phases of employer and labor relations in the interest of the common good. National Labor Relations Board v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., 6 Cir., 120 F.2d 611, reversed on other grounds in 315 U.S. 685, 62 S.Ct. 846, 86 L.Ed. 1120; American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 42 S.Ct. 72, 66 L.Ed. 189, 27 A.L.R. 360. In the briefs of counsel for the State, our attention is directed to acts by at least eleven other states, Alabama, Kansas, Arkansas, Wisconsin, South Dakota, Idaho, Texas, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Minnesota regulating some phase of labor relations. Some of these acts are very similar to the one in question but others are different in some respects. The case of Ex parte Thomas, 141 Tex. 591, 174 S.W.2d 958, is illuminating on the point because in most features the Texas act is similar to ours and it upholds the power of the State to regulate labor unions under its police power.
Casual review of the cases cited would seem to settle the controversy beyond question.
The requirement of Section 6 to file annual reports giving (1) the name of the labor organization, (2) the location of its office, and (3) the name and address of its president, secretary, treasurer and business agent is supported by similar requirements in acts of Kansas, Texas, Wisconsin, Idaho, South Dakota, and Alabama. The Alabama Act was upheld by the Alabama Supreme Court in Alabama...
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