Noyes v. Commercial Travelers' Eastern Acc. Ass'n

Decision Date04 January 1906
Citation76 N.E. 665,190 Mass. 171
PartiesNOYES v. COMMERCIAL TRAVELERS' EASTERN ACC. ASS'N.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
COUNSEL

John J. & W. A. Hogan, for plaintiff.

Wm. F Merritt and N. Thos. Merritt, Jr., for defendant.

OPINION

KNOWLTON C.J.

This is an action of contract, brought by a member of the defendant fraternal benefit association, to recover $2,500 as an indemnity for the loss of a leg by a railroad accident. To maintain the action the plaintiff, at the trial, was bound to establish two propositions: First, that the accident was within the terms of the contract creating a liability; and secondly, that he furnished to the defendant, as required by the contract, satisfactory proof of the particular disability suffered by him.

The defendant objected to a part of the evidence offered to support the first proposition, on the ground that it was not included in the proof of disability furnished by the plaintiff as a preliminary to the bringing of the suit. This objection was founded on the decision in Campbell v. Charter Oak Insurance Company, 10 Allen, 213, in which it was said that corrections of mistakes in proofs of death 'are not for the first time to be made known to the insurers at the trial of the action to recover for the loss, by the introduction of evidence showing that the statements filed were not true in a material fact, which, if it existed as stated, was fatal to a right of the insured to recover.' In Hogan v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 164 Mass. 448, 41 N.E. 663, the court said, in referring to the decision, with a citation of authorities: 'This case has not been generally followed in other jurisdictions. * * * In this commonwealth it has never been treated as enunciating a doctrine of universal application, nor extended to facts differing from its own.' See, also, Abraham v. Mutual Reserve Fund Association, 183 Mass. 116, 66 N.E. 605. In Cluff v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company, 99 Mass. 317-324, Mr. Justice Wells, in giving the opinion, used these words: 'When an apparent ground of defense is disclosed by a separate and unnecessary narration of circumstances, and the proofs required by the policy are complete without that narration and disclosure, it cannot be said that the party has failed to comply with the condition imposed upon his right to litigate his claim; and the effect of such disclosure, to defeat the action, must depend upon the degree to which the plaintiff is bound by the statement.'

There is no reason why a plaintiff, in the proof of the first of these two propositions, should be limited to details of fact or evidence contained in the statement of his claim made to the company under the requirements of the contract. The real question between the parties arises more naturally in another way; that is, whether the plaintiff has furnished a sufficient statement or proof of his claim, in accordance with the contract, as a condition of his right to recover. If he has failed to do this, he cannot maintain his action. Proof furnished at the trial will not take the place of proof required to be furnished before bringing a suit. If, in the essentials to be furnished, the statement is fatally defective, it is useless to try to maintain one's case by evidence offered in court. Whether in the present state of the law the doctrine declared in Campbell v. Charter Oak Insurance Company, 10 Allen, 213, should be held applicable to a part of the statement or proof of loss not required to be made, which, if true, would establish a fact that might be relied on as a defense, it is unnecessary now to decide. The proofs filed with the board of directors by the plaintiff in this case show no bar to the maintenance of the action, and the evidence was rightly admitted.

The next question is whether the decision of the board of directors, that the proofs filed by the plaintiff were not satisfactory to them, leaves him without a right to recover. The defendant's contention is that the contract makes their decision conclusive. Under language like that used in this contract this is not the rule of law. An accident insurance policy provided 'that before payment of the sum insured by any policy proof satisfactory to the board of directors of the company should be furnished by the claimants of the death or accident,' etc.; and it was held in Braunstein v. Accidental Death Co., 1 Best & Smith, 782-789, that this meant proof reasonably satisfactory, and that the board could not deprive the plaintiff of his right by unreasonably refusing to be satisfied. Similar decisions have been made in many cases. Hawkins v. Graham, 149 Mass. 284-287, 21 N.E. 312, 14 Am. St. 422; Webber v Cambridgeport Savings Bank, 186 Mass. 315, 71 N.E. 567; Sloan v. Hayden, 110 Mass. 141; Lockwood Manufacturing Co. v. Mason Railway Co., 183 Mass. 25, 26, 66 N.E. 420; Charter Oak Life Insurance Co. v. Rodel, 95 U.S. 237, 24 L.Ed. 433; Accord Bowen v. National Life Association, 63 Conn. 460-473, 27 A. 1059. The language in this contract is different in meaning from that under which one undertakes to do or...

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